

THE
PUBLIC OF PLATO

TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH

BY
BENJAMIN JOWETT

(THIRD EDITION)

VOL I

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
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NOTE

In the present reprint the Introduction Analysis, and Translation are unchanged. A few headlines have been altered where the change of pagination made the old ones unsuitable and the Index has been simplified.

The marginal analyses have been sacrificed but reference to the Greek text has been facilitated by the insertion of the sections, as well as the pages, of Stephanus.

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INTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS

THE Republic of Plato is the longest of his works with the exception of the Laws and is certainly the greatest of them. There are nearer approaches to modern metaphysics in the Philebus and in the Sophist the Politicus or Statesman is more ideal the form and institutions of the State are more clearly drawn out in the Laws as works of art the Symposium and the Protagoras are of higher excellence. But no other Dialogue of Plato has the same largeness of view and the same perfection of style no other shows an equal knowledge of the world or contains more of those thoughts which are new as well as old, and not of one age only but of all. Nowhere in Plato is there a deeper irony or a greater wealth of humour or imagery or more dramatic power. Nor in any other of his writings is the attempt made to interweave life and speculation or to connect politics with philosophy. The Republic is the centre around which the other Dialogues may be grouped here philosophy reaches the highest point (cp. especially in Books V VI VII) to which ancient thinkers ever attained. Plato among the Greeks like Bacon among the moderns was the first who conceived a method of knowledge, although neither of them always distinguished the bare outline or form from the substance of truth and both of them had to be content with an abstraction of science which was not yet realized. He was the greatest metaphysical genius whom the world has seen and in him more than in any other ancient thinker the germs of future knowledge are contained. The sciences of logic and psychology which have supplied so many instruments of thought to after-ages are based upon the analyses of Socrates and Plato. The principles of definition the law of contradiction, the fallacy of arguing in a circle, the distinction between the

essence and accidents of a thing or notion between means and ends between causes and conditions also the division of the mind into the rational concupiscent, and irascible elements or of pleasures and desires into necessary and unnecessary—these and other great forms of thought are all of them to be found in the Republic and were probably first invented by Plato The greatest of all logical truths, and the one on which writers on philosophy are most apt to lose sight the difference between words and things has been most strenuously insisted on by him (cp Rep 454 A Polit 261 E Cratyl 435 436 ff) although he has not always avoided the confusion of them in his own writings (e.g. Rep 463 E) But he does not bind up truth in logical formulae—logic is still veiled in metaphysics and the science which he imagines to contemplate all truth and all existence is very unlike the doctrine of the syllogism which Aristotle claims to have discovered (Soph Elenchi 33 18)

Neither must we forget that the Republic is but the third part of a still larger design which was to have included an ideal history of Athens as well as a political and physical philosophy The fragment of the Critias has given birth to a world famous fiction second only in importance to the tale of Troy and the legend of Arthur and is said as a fact to have inspired some of the early navigators of the sixteenth century This mythical tale of which the subject was a history of the wars of the Athenians against the island of Atlantis is supposed to be founded upon an unfinished poem of Solon to which it would have stood in the same relation as the writings of the logographers to the poems of Homer It would have told of a struggle for Liberty (cp Tim 25 C), intended to represent the conflict of Persia and Hellas We may judge from the noble commencement of the Timaeus from the fragment of the Critias itself and from the third book of the Laws in what manner Plato would have treated his high argument We can only guess why the great design was abandoned perhaps because Plato became sensible of some incongruity in a fictitious history or he had

los his interest in it or because advancing years forbade the completion of it and we may please ourselves with the fancy that had this imaginary narrative ever been finished we should have found Plato himself sympathizing with the struggle for Hellenic independence (cp *Laws* iii 698 ff) singing a hymn of triumph over Marathon and Salamis perhaps making the reflection of Herodotus (v 78) where he contemplates the growth of the Athenian empire—How brave a thing is freedom of speech which has made the Athenians so far exceed every other state of Hellas in greatness¹ or more probably attributing the victory to the ancient good order of Athens and to the favour of Apollo and Athene (cp *Introd to Critias*)

Again Plato may be regarded as the captain (*αρχηγος*) or leader of a goodly band of followers for in the *Republic* is to be found the original of Cicero's *De Republica* of St Augustine's *City of God* of the *Utopia* of Sir Thomas More and of the numerous other imaginary States which are framed upon the same model The extent to which Aristotle or the Aristotelian school were indebted to him in the *Politics* has been little recognized, and the recognition is the more necessary because it is not made by Aristotle himself The two philosophers had more in common than they were conscious of and probably some elements of Plato remain still undetected in Aristotle In English philosophy too many affinities may be traced not only in the works of the Cambridge Platonists but in great original writers like Berkeley or Coleridge to Plato and his ideas That there is a truth higher than experience of which the mind bears witness to herself is a conviction which in our own generation has been enthusiastically asserted, and is perhaps gaining ground Of the Greek authors who at the Renaissance brought a new life into the world Plato has had the greatest influence The *Republic* of Plato is also the first treatise upon education of which the writings of Milton and Locke, Rousseau Jean Paul and Goethe are the legitimate descendants Like Dante or Bunyan, he has a revelation of another

life like Bacon he is profoundly impressed with the unity of knowledge in the early Church he exercised a real influence on theology and at the Revival of Literature on politics. Even the fragments of his words when repeated at second hand (Symp 215 D) have in all ages ravished the hearts of men who have seen reflected in them their own higher nature. He is the father of idealism in philosophy in politics in literature. And many of the latest conceptions of modern thinkers and statesmen such as the unity of knowledge the reign of law and the equality of the sexes have been anticipated in a dream by him.

The argument of the Republic is the search after Justice the nature of which is first hinted at by Cephalus the just and blameless old man—then discussed on the basis of proverbial morality by Socrates and Polemarchus—then caricatured by Thrasymachus and partially explained by Socrates—reduced to an abstraction by Glaucon and Adeimantus and having become invisible in the individual reappears at length in the ideal State which is constructed by Socrates. The first care of the rulers is to be education of which an outline is drawn after the old Hellenic model providing only for an improved religion and morality and more simplicity in music and gymnastic a manlier strain of poetry and greater harmony of the individual and the State. We are thus led on to the conception of a higher State, in which no man calls anything his own and in which there is neither marrying nor giving in marriage and kings are philosophers and philosophers are kings and there is another and higher education intellectual as well as moral and religious of science as well as of art and not of youth only but of the whole of life. Such a State is hardly to be realized in this world and quickly degenerates. To the perfect ideal succeeds the government of the soldier and the lover of honour this again declining into democracy, and democracy into tyranny in an imaginary but regular order having not much resemblance to the actual facts. When the wheel has come full circle we do not begin again with a new period of human

life but we have passed from the best to the worst, and there we end. The subject is then changed and the old quarrel of poetry and philosophy which had been more lightly treated in the earlier books of the Republic is now resumed and fought out to a conclusion. Poetry is discovered to be an imitation thrice removed from the truth, and Homer as well as the dramatic poets having been condemned as an imitator is sent into banishment along with them. And the idea of the State is supplemented by the revelation of a future life.

The division into books, like all similar divisions¹ is probably later than the age of Plato. The natural divisions are five in number —(1) Book I and the first half of Book II down to p. 368 which is introductory the first book containing a refutation of the popular and sophistical notions of justice and concluding like some of the earlier Dialogues without arriving at any definite result. To this is appended a restatement of the nature of justice according to common opinion, and an answer is demanded to the question—What is justice stripped of appearances? The second division (2) includes the remainder of the second and the whole of the third and fourth books which are mainly occupied with the construction of the first State and the first education. The third division (3) consists of the fifth, sixth, and seventh books in which philosophy rather than justice is the subject of inquiry and the second State is constructed on principles of communism and ruled by philosophers and the contemplation of the idea of good takes the place of the social and political virtues. In the eighth and ninth books (4) the perversions of States and of the individuals who correspond to them are reviewed in succession and the nature of pleasure and the principle of tyranny are further analysed in the individual man. The tenth book (5) is the conclusion of the whole, in which the relations of philosophy to poetry are finally determined, and the happiness of the citizens in this life, which has now been assured, is crowned by the vision of another

Or a more general division into two parts may be adopted the first (Books I-IV) containing the description of a State framed generally in accordance with Hellenic notions of religion and morality while in the second (Books V-X) the Hellenic State is transformed into an ideal kingdom of philosophy of which all other governments are the perversions. These two points of view are really opposed and the opposition is only veiled by the genius of Plato. The Republic like the *Phaedrus* (see *Introduction to Phaedrus*) is an imperfect whole. The higher light of philosophy breaks through the regularity of the Hellenic temple which at last fades away into the heavens (592 B). Whether this imperfection of structure rises from an enlargement of the plan or from the imperfect reconciliation in the writer's own mind of the struggling elements of thought which are now first brought together by him or perhaps from the composition of the work at different times—are questions, like the similar question about the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* which are worth asking but which cannot have a distinct answer. In the age of Plato there was no regular mode of publication and an author would have the less scruple in altering or adding to a work which was known only to a few of his friends. There is no absurdity in supposing that he may have laid his labours aside for a time or turned from one work to another and such interruptions would be more likely to occur in the case of a long than of a short writing. In all attempts to determine the chronological order of the Platonic writings on internal evidence this uncertainty about any single Dialogue being composed at one time is a disturbing element which must be admitted to affect longer works such as the *Republic* and the *Laws* more than shorter ones. But, on the other hand the seeming discrepancies of the *Republic* may only arise out of the discordant elements which the philosopher has attempted to unite in a single whole perhaps without being himself able to recognize the inconsistency which is obvious to us. For there is a judgement of after ages which few great writers have ever been able to anticipate for them-

selves They do not perceive the want of connexion in their own writings or the gaps in their systems which are visible enough to those who come after them In the beginnings of literature and philosophy amid the first efforts of thought and language more inconsistencies occur than now when the paths of speculation are well worn and the meaning of words precisely defined For consistency too is the growth of time and some of the greatest creations of the human mind have been wanting in unity Tried by this test several of the Platonic Dialogues according to our modern ideas appear to be defective but the deficiency is no proof that they were composed at different times or by different hands And the supposition that the Republic was written uninterruptedly and by a continuous effort is in some degree confirmed by the numerous references from one part of the work to another

The second title Concerning Justice is not the one by which the Republic is quoted either by Aristotle or generally in antiquity and, like the other second titles of the Platonic Dialogues may therefore be assumed to be of later date. Morgenstern and others have asked whether the definition of justice which is the professed aim or the construction of the State is the principal argument of the work The answer is that the two blend in one and are two faces of the same truth for justice is the order of the State and the State is the visible embodiment of justice under the conditions of human society The one is the soul and the other is the body and the Greek ideal of the State, as of the individual is a fair mind in a fair body In Hegelian phraseology the State is the reality of which justice is the idea Or described in Christian language the kingdom of God is within, and yet develops into a Church or external kingdom the house not made with hands eternal in the heavens is reduced to the proportions of an earthly building Or to use a Platonic image justice and the State are the warp and the woof which run through the whole texture And when the construction of the State is completed, the conception of justice

is not dismissed, but reappears under the same or different names throughout the work, both as the inner law of the individual soul and finally as the principle of rewards and punishments in another life. The virtues are based on justice of which common honesty in buying and selling is the shadow and justice is based on the idea of good which is the harmony of the world and is reflected both in the institutions of states and in motions of the heavenly bodies (cp Tim 47). The Timaeus which takes up the political rather than the ethical side of the Republic and is chiefly occupied with hypotheses concerning the outward world yet contains many indications that the same law is supposed to reign over the State, over nature and over man.

Too much however has been made of this question both in ancient and modern times. There is a stage of criticism in which all works whether of nature or of art are referred to design. Now in ancient writings and indeed in literature generally there remains often a large element which was not comprehended in the original design. For the plan grows under the author's hand new thoughts occur to him in the act of writing he has not worked out the argument to the end before he begins. The reader who seeks to find some one idea under which the whole may be conceived must necessarily seize on the vaguest and most general. Thus Stallbaum who is dissatisfied with the ordinary explanations of the argument of the Republic, imagines himself to have found the true argument 'in the representation of human life in a State perfected by justice and governed according to the idea of good'. There may be some use in such general descriptions but they can hardly be said to express the design of the writer. The truth is that we may as well speak of many designs as of one nor need anything be excluded from the plan of a great work of which the mind is naturally led by the association of ideas and which does no interfere with the general purpose. What kind or degree of unity is to be sought after in a building in the plastic arts, in poetry in prose is a problem which has to be determined.

relatively to the subject matter. To Plato himself the inquiry what was the intention or the write or what was the principal argument of the Republic would have been hardly intelligible and therefore had better be at once dismissed (cp. the Introduction to the Phaedrus vol. 1.)

Is not the Republic the vehicle of three or four great truths which o Plato's own mind are most naturally represented in the form of the State. Just as in the Jewish prophets the reign of Messiah or the day of the Lord or the suffering Servant or people of God or the Sun of righteousness with healing in his wings only convey to us at least, their great spiritual ideals so through the Greek State Plato reveals to us his own thoughts about divine perfection, which is the idea of good—like the sun in the visible world—about human perfection which is justice—about education beginning in youth and continuing in later years—about poets and sophists and tyrants who are the false teachers and evil rulers of mankind—about the world which is the embodiment of them—about a kingdom which exists nowhere upon earth but is laid up in heaven to be the pattern and rule of human life. No such inspired creation is at unity with itself any more than the clouds of heaven when the sun pierces through them. Every shade of light and dark, of truth and of fiction which is the veil of truth, is allowable in a work of philosophical imagination. It is not all on the same plane, it easily passes from ideas to myths and fancies from facts to figures of speech. It is not prose but poetry at least a great part of it and ought not to be judged by the rules of logic or the probabilities of history. The writer is not fashioning his ideas into an artistic whole they take possession of him and are too much for him. We have no need therefore to discuss whether a State such as Plato has conceived is practicable or not or whether the outward form or the inward life came first into the mind of the writer. For the practicability of his ideas has nothing to do with their truth (v. 472 D) and the highest thoughts to which he attains may be truly said to bear the greatest marks of design. Justice more

than the external framework of the State the idea of good more than justice. The great science of dialectic or the organization of ideas has no real content but is only a type of the method or spirit in which the higher knowledge is to be pursued by the spectator of all time and all existence. It is in the fifth, sixth and seventh books that Plato reaches the summit of speculation and these although they fail to satisfy the requirements of a modern thinker may therefore be regarded as the most important as they are also the most original portions of the work.

It is not necessary to discuss at length a minor question which has been raised by Boeckh, respecting the imaginary date at which the conversation was held (the year 411 B.C. which is proposed by him will do as well as any other) for a writer of fiction and especially a writer who like Plato is notoriously careless of chronology (cp. *Rep.* i. 356 *Symp.* 193 A, &c.) only aims at general probability. Whether all the persons mentioned in the *Republic* could ever have met at any one time is not a difficulty which would have occurred to an Athenian reading the work forty years later or to Plato himself at the time of writing (any more than to Shakespeare respecting one of his own dramas), and need not greatly trouble us now. Yet this may be a question having no answer which is still worth asking because the investigation shows that we cannot argue historically from the dates in Plato: it would be useless therefore to waste time in inventing far-fetched reconcilements of them in order to avoid chronological difficulties such for example as the conjecture of C. F. Hermann that Glaucon and Adeimantus are not the brothers but the uncles of Plato (cp. *Apol.* 34 A) or the fancy of Stallbaum that Plato intentionally left anachronisms indicating the dates at which some of his Dialogues were written.

The principal characters in the *Republic* are Cephalus, Polemarchus, Thrasymachus, Socrates, Glaucon and Adeimantus. Cephalus appears in the introduction only. Polemarchus drops at the end of the first argument and Thrasy

machus is reduced to silence at the close of the first book. The main discussion is carried on by Socrates, Glaucon and Adeimantus. Among the company are Lysias (the orator) and Euthydemus, the sons of Cephalus and brothers of Polemarchus, an unknown Charmantides—these are mute auditors; also there is Cleitophon, who once interrupts (340 A) where, as in the Dialogue which bears his name, he appears as the friend and ally of Thrasymachus.

Cephalus, the patriarch of the house, has been appropriately engaged in offering a sacrifice. He is the pattern of an old man who has almost done with life, and is at peace with himself and with all mankind. He feels that he is drawing nearer to the world below, and seems to linger around the memory of the past. He is eager that Socrates should come to visit him, fond of the poetry of the last generation, happy in the consciousness of a well spent life, glad at having escaped from the tyranny of youthful lusts. His love of conversation, his affection, his indifference to riches, even his garrulity, are interesting traits of character. He is not one of those who have nothing to say, because their whole mind has been absorbed in making money. Yet he acknowledges that riches have the advantage of placing men above the temptation to dishonesty or falsehood. The respectful attention shown to him by Socrates, whose love of conversation, no less than the mission imposed upon him by the Oracle, leads him to ask questions of all men, young and old alike (cp. 1328 A), should also be noted. Who better suited to raise the question of justice than Cephalus, whose life might seem to be the expression of it? The moderation with which old age is pictured by Cephalus as a very tolerable portion of existence is characteristic not only of him, but of Greek feeling generally, and contrasts with the exaggeration of Cicero in the *De Senectute*. The evening of life is described by Plato in the most expressive manner yet, with the fewest possible touches. As Cicero remarks (*Ep. ad Attic.* iv. 16), the aged Cephalus would have been out of place in the discussion which follows, and which he could neither have understood

nor taken part in without a violation of dramatic propriety (cp Lysimachus in the *Laches* 89)

His son and heir Polemarchus has the frankness and impetuosity of youth. He is for detaining Socrates by force in the opening scene and will not let him off' (v 449 B) on the subject of women and children. Like Cephalus he is limited in his point of view and represents the proverbial age of morality which has rules of life rather than principles and he quotes Simonides (cp *Aristoph.* *Clouds* 1355 ff) as his father had quoted Pindar. But after this he has no more to say. The answers which he makes are only elicited from him by the dialectic of Socrates. He has not yet experienced the influence of the Sophists like Glaucon and Adeimantus nor is he sensible of the necessity of refuting them. He belongs to the pre-Socratic or pre-dialectical age. He is incapable of arguing and is bewildered by Socrates to such a degree that he does not know what he is saying. He is made to admit that justice is a thief and that the virtues follow the analogy of the arts (i 333 E). From his brother Lysias (contra *Eratosth.* p 121) we learn that he fell a victim to the Thirty Tyrants but no allusion is here made to his fate nor to the circumstance that Cephalus and his family were of Syracusan origin, and had migrated from Thurii to Athens.

The Chalcedonian giant, Thrasymachus of whom we have already heard in the *Phaedrus* (267 D) is the personification of the Sophists according to Plato's conception of them in some of their worst characteristics. He is vain and blustering, refusing to discourse unless he is paid, fond of making an oration and hoping thereby to escape the inevitable Socrates but a mere child in argument and unable to foresee that the next move (to use a Platonic expression) will shut him up (vi 487 B). He has reached the stage of framing general notions and in this respect is in advance of Cephalus and Polemarchus. But he is incapable of defending them in a discussion and vainly tries to cover his confusion with banter and insolence. Whether such doctrines as are attributed to him by Plato were really held either by

him or by any other Sophist is uncertain in the infancy of philosophy serious errors about morality might easily grow up—they are certainly put into the mouths of speakers in Thucydides but we are concerned at present with Plato's description of him and not with the historical reality. The inequality of the contest adds greatly to the humour of the scene. The pompous and empty Sophist is utterly helpless in the hands of the great master of dialectic who knows how to touch all the springs of vanity and weakness in him. He is greatly irritated by the irony of Socrates but his noisy and imbecile rage only lays him more and more open to the thrusts of his assailant. His determination to cram down their throats or put bodily into their souls his own words elicits a cry of horror from Socrates. The state of his temper is quite as worthy of remark as the process of the argument. Nothing is more amusing than his complete submission when he has been once thoroughly beaten. At first he seems to continue the discussion with reluctance but soon with apparent good will and he even testifies his interest at a later stage by one or two occasional remarks (v 450 A, B). When attacked by Glaucon (vi 498 C-D) he is humorously protected by Socrates as one who has never been his enemy and is now his friend. From Cicero and Quintilian and from Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (ii 1 7 ii 3 29) we learn that the Sophist whom Plato has made so ridiculous was a man of note whose writings were preserved in later ages. The play on his name which was made by his contemporary Herodotus (*Ans Rhet* ii 23 29), thou wast ever bold in battle seems to show that the description of him is not devoid of verisimilitude.

When Thrasymachus has been silenced, the two principal respondents Glaucon and Adeimantus appear on the scene. He is as in Greek tragedy (cp *Intro* to *Phaedo*) three actors are introduced. At first sight the two sons of Ariston may seem to wear a family likeness like the two friends Simmias and Cebes in the *Phaedo*. But on a nearer examination of them the similarity vanishes and they are seen to be distinct characters. Glaucon is the impetuous youth who can just

never have enough of fechtung' (cp the character of him in Xen Mem iii 6) the man of pleasure who is acquainted with the mysteries of love (v 474 D) the juvenis qui gaudet canibus' and who improves the breed of animals (v 459 A) the lover of art and music (iii 398 D, E) who has all the experiences of youthful life. He is full of quickness and penetration piercing easily below the clumsy platitudes of Thrasymachus to the real difficulty. He turns out to the light the seamy side of human life and yet does not lose faith in the just and true. It is Glaucon who seizes what may be termed the ludicrous relation of the philosopher to the world to whom a state of simplicity is a city of pigs who is always prepared with a jest (iii 398 C 407 A v 450 451 468 C vi 509 C ix 586) when the argument offers him an opportunity and who is ever ready to second the humour of Socrates and to appreciate the ridiculous whether in the connoisseurs of music (vii 531 A) or in the lovers of theatricals (v 475 D), or in the fantastic behaviour of the citizens of democracy (viii 557 foll). His weaknesses are several times alluded to by Socrates (iii 40 E v 474 D 475 E) who, however will not allow him to be attacked by his brother Adeimantus (viii 548 D E). He is a soldier and like Adeimantus has been distinguished at the battle of Megara (368 A anno 456). The character of Adeimantus is deeper and graver and the profounder objections are commonly put into his mouth. Glaucon is more demonstrative, and generally opens the game. Adeimantus pursues the argument further. Glaucon has more of the liveliness and quick sympathy of youth. Adeimantus has the maturer judgement of a grown up man of the world. In the second book when Glaucon insists that justice and injustice shall be considered without regard to their consequences Adeimantus remarks that they are regarded by mankind in general only for the sake of their consequences and in a similar vein of reflection he urges at the beginning of the fourth book that Socrates fails in making his ——— happy and is ed that happiness is not the first but the second thing.

not the direct aim but the indirect consequence of the good government of a State. In the discussion about religion and mythology Adeimantus is the respondent (iii 376-398), but at p 398 C Glaucon breaks in with a slight jest, and carries on the conversation in a lighter tone about music and gymnastic to the end of the book. It is Adeimantus again who volunteers the criticism of common sense on the Socratic method of argument (vi 487 B) and who refuses to let Socrates pass lightly over the question of women and children (v 449). It is Adeimantus who is the respondent in the more argumentative as Glaucon in the lighter and more imaginative portions of the Dialogue. For example throughout the greater part of the sixth book the causes of the corruption of philosophy and the conception of the idea of good are discussed with Adeimantus. At p 506 C Glaucon resumes his place of principal respondent but he has a difficulty in apprehending the higher education of Socrates and makes some false hits in the course of the discussion (526 D 527 D). Once more Adeimantus returns (viii 548) with the allusion to his brother Glaucon whom he compares to the contentious State in the next book (ix 576) he is again superseded, and Glaucon continues to the end (x 621 B).

Thus in a succession of characters Plato represents the successive stages of morality beginning with the Athenian gentleman of the olden time who is followed by the practical man of that day regulating his life by proverbs and saws to him succeeds the wild generalization of the Sophists, and lastly come the young disciples of the great teacher who know the sophistical arguments but will not be convinced by them and desire to go deeper into the nature of things. These too like Cephalus Polemarchus, Thrasymachus, are clearly distinguished from one another. Neither in the Republic nor in any other Dialogue of Plato is a single character repeated.

The delineation of Socrates in the Republic is not wholly consistent. In the first book we have more of the real Socrates, such as he is depicted in the Memorabilia of Xeno-

phon, in the earliest Dialogues of Plato and in the *Apology*. He is ironical, provoking, questioning the old enemy of the Sophists, ready to put on the mask of Silenus as well as to argue seriously. But in the sixth book his enmity towards the Sophists abates: he acknowledges that they are the representatives rather than the corrupters of the world (vi 492 A). He also becomes more dogmatic and constructive, passing beyond the range either of the political or the speculative ideas of the real Socrates. In one passage (vi 506 C) Plato himself seems to intimate that the time had now come for Socrates, who had passed his whole life in philosophy, to give his own opinion and not to be always repeating the notions of other men. There is no evidence that either the idea of good or the conception of a perfect state were comprehended in the Socratic teaching, though he certainly dwelt on the nature of the universal and of final causes (cp *Xen. Mem.* 1.4, *Phaedo* 97) and a deep thinker like him, in his thirty or forty years of public teaching, could hardly have failed to touch on the nature of family relations, for which there is also some positive evidence in the *Memorabilia* (*Mem.* 1.2, 51 foll.). The Socratic method is nominally retained, and every inference is either put into the mouth of the respondent or represented as the common discovery of him and Socrates. But any one can see that this is a mere form, of which the affectation grows wearisome as the work advances. The method of inquiry has passed into a method of teaching in which by the help of interlocutors the same thesis is looked at from various points of view. The nature of the process is truly characterized by Glaucon when he describes himself as a companion who is not good for much in an investigation but can see what he is shown (iv 432 C) and may perhaps give the answer to a question more fluently than another (v 474 A cp 589 A).

Neither can we be absolutely certain that Socrates himself taught the immortality of the soul, which is unknown to his disciple Glaucon in the *Republic* (x. 608 D cp vi 498 D E, *Apol.* 40-41); nor is there any reason to suppose that he used

myths or revelations of another world as a vehicle of instruction or that he would have banished poetry or have denounced the Greek mythology. His favourite oath is retained and a slight mention is made of the *daemonium* or internal sign which is alluded to by Socrates as a phenomenon peculiar to himself (vi 496 C). A real element of Socratic teaching which is more prominent in the Republic than in any of the other Dialogues of Plato is the use of example and illustration (*τὰ φορτικά αὐτῷ προσφέροντες* iv 442 E). Let us apply the test of common instances. You says Adeimantus ironically in the sixth book are so unaccustomed to speak in images. And this use of examples or images though truly Socratic in origin is enlarged by the genius of Plato into the form of an allegory or parable which embodies in the concrete what has been already described, or is about to be described in the abstract. Thus the figure of the cave in Book VII is a recapitulation of the divisions of knowledge in Book VI. The composite animal in Book IX is an allegory of the parts of the soul. The noble captain and the ship and the true pilot in Book VI are a figure of the relation of the people to the philosophers in the State which has been described. Other figures such as the dog (ii 375 A D iii 404 A 416 A v 451 D) or the marriage of the portionless maiden (v 495 496) or the drones and wasps in the eighth and ninth books also form links of connexion in long passages or are used to recall previous discussions.

Plato is most true to the character of his master when he describes him as not of this world. And with this representation of him the ideal state and the other paradoxes of the Republic are quite in accordance though they cannot be shown to have been speculations of Socrates. To him, as to other great teachers both philosophical and religious when they looked upward the world seemed to be the embodiment of error and evil. The common sense of mankind has revolted against this view or has only partially admitted it. And even in Socrates himself the sternest judgement of the multitude at times passes into a sort of ironical pity or love. Men

in general are incapable of philosophy and are therefor at enmity with the philosopher but their misunderstanding of him is unavoidable (vi 494 foll ix. 589 D) for they have never seen him as he truly is in his own image, they are only acquainted with artificial systems possessing no native force of truth—words which admit of many applications Their leaders have nothing to measure with and are therefore ignorant of their own stature But they are to be pitied or laughed at not to be quarrelled with they mean well with their nostrums if they could only learn that they are cutting off a Hydra's head (iv 426 D E) This moderation towards those who are in error is one of the most characteristic features of Socrates in the Republic (vi 499-502) In all the different representations of Socrates whether of Xenophon or Plato and amid the differences of the earlier or later Dialogues he always retains the character of the unwearied and disinterested seeker after truth without which he would have ceased to be Socrates

Leaving the characters we may now analyse the contents of the Republic, and then proceed to consider (1) The general aspects of this Hellenic ideal of the State (2) The modern lights in which the thoughts of Plato may be read.

Book I The Republic opens with a truly Greek scene—a festival in honour of the goddess Bendis which is held in the Piræus to this is added the promise of an equestrian torch race in the evening The whole work is supposed to be recited by Socrates on the day after the festival to a small party consisting of Critias Timæus Hermocrates and another this we learn from the first words of the Timæus

When the rhetorical advantage of reciting the Dialogue has been gained, the attention is not distracted by any reference to the audience nor is the reader further reminded of the extraordinary length of the narrative Of the numerous company three only take any serious part in the discussion nor are we informed whether in the evening they went to the torch race, or talked, as in the Symposium, through the night

The manner in which the conversation has arisen is described as follows — Socrates and his companion Claucon are about to leave the festival when they are detained by a message from Polemarchus who speedily appears accompanied by Adeimantus the brother of Glaucon and with playful violence compels them to remain promising them not only the torch race but the pleasure of conversation with the young which to Socrates is a far greater attraction They return to the house of Cephalus Polemarchus father now in extreme old age who is found sitting upon a cushioned seat crowned for a sacrifice You should come to me oftener Socrates for I am too old to go to you and at my time of life having lost other pleasures I care the more for conversation Socrates asks him what he thinks of age to which the old man replies that the sorrows and discontents of age are to be attributed to the tempers of men, and that age is a time of peace in which the tyranny of the passions is no longer felt Yes replies Socrates but the world will say Cephalus that you are happy in old age because you are rich And there is something in what they say Socrates but not so much as they imagine—as Themistocles replied to the Seriphian Neither you if you had been an Athenian nor I if I had been a Seriphian would ever have been famous I might in like manner reply to you Neither a good poor man can be happy in age nor yet a bad rich man Socrates remarks that Cephalus appears not to care about riches a quality which he ascribes to his having inherited not acquired them and would like to know what he considers to be the chief advantage of them Cephalus answers that when you are old the belief in the world below grows upon you and then to have done justice and never to have been compelled to do injustice through poverty and never to have deceived any one are felt to be unspeakable blessings Socrates who is evidently preparing for an argument next asks What is the meaning of the word justice? To tell the truth and pay your debts? No more than this? Or must we admit exceptions? Ought I, for example, to put back into

the hands of my friend who has gone mad the sword which I borrowed of him when he was in his right mind? There must be exceptions. And yet says Polemarchus the definition which has been given has the authority of Simonides. Here Cephalus retires to look after the sacrifices and bequeaths as Socrates facetiously remarks the possession of the argument to his heir Polemarchus.

The description of old age is finished and Plato as his manner is has touched the keynote of the whole work in asking for the definition of justice, first suggesting the question which Glaucon afterwards pursues respecting external goods, and preparing for the concluding mythos of the world below in the slight allusion of Cephalus. The portrait of the just man is a natural frontispiece or introduction to the long discourse which follows and may perhaps imply that in all our perplexity about the nature of justice there is no difficulty in discerning who is a just man. The first explanation has been supported by a saying of Simonides and now Socrates has a mind to show that the resolution of justice into two unconnected precepts which have no common principle fails to satisfy the demands of dialectic.

He proceeds. What did Simonides mean by this saying of his? Did he mean that I was to give back arms to a madman? No not in that case not if the parties are friends and evil would result. He meant that you were to do what was proper good to friends and harm to enemies. Every act does something to somebody and following this analogy, Socrates asks What is this due and proper thing which justice does and to whom? He is answered that justice does good to friends and harm to enemies. But in what way good or harm? In making alliances with the one and going to war with the other. Then in time of peace what is the good of justice? The answer is that justice is of use in contracts and contracts are money partnerships. Yes but how in such partnerships is the just man of more use than any other? When you want to have money safely kept and not used. Then justice will be useful when

money is useless. And there is another difficulty: justice like the art of war or any other art must be or opposites good at attack as well as at defence, at stealing as well as at guarding. But then justice is a thief though a hero notwithstanding like Autolycus the Homeric hero who was excellent above all men in theft and perjury—to such a pass have you and Homer and Simonides brought us though I do not forget that the thieving must be for the good of friends and the harm of enemies. And still there arises another question: Are friends to be interpreted as real or seeming enemies as real or seeming? And are our friends to be only the good, and our enemies to be the evil? The answer is, that we must do good to our seeming and real good friends and evil to our seeming and real evil enemies—good to the good, evil to the evil. But ought we to render evil for evil at all when to do so will only make men more evil? Can justice produce injustice any more than the art of horsemanship can make bad horsemen or heat produce cold? The final conclusion is that no sage or poet ever said that the just return evil for evil: this was a maxim of some rich and mighty man, Periander, Perdiccas or Ismenias the Theban (about B.C. 398–381).

Thus the first stage of aphoristic or unconscious morality is shown to be inadequate to the wants of the age: the authority of the poets is set aside and through the winding mazes of dialectic we make an approach to the Christian precept of forgiveness of injuries. Similar words are applied by the Persian mystic poet to the Divine Being when the questioning spirit is stirred within him—If because I do evil Thou punishest me by evil, what is the difference between Thee and me? In this both Plato and Kheyam rise above the level of many Christian (?) theologians. The first definition of justice easily passes into the second, for the simple words to speak the truth and pay your debts is substituted the more abstract to do good to your friends and harm to your enemies. Either of these explanations gives a sufficient rule of life for plain men, but they both fall

short of the precision of philosophy. We may note in passing the antiquity of casuistry which not only arises out of the conflict of established principles in particular cases but also out of the effort to attain them, and is prior as well as posterior to our fundamental notions of morality. The interrogation of moral ideas—the appeal to the authority of Homer—the conclusion that the maxim, 'Do good to your friends and harm to your enemies' being erroneous, could not have been the word of any great man (cp. ii. 380 A, B) are all of them very characteristic of the Platonic Socrates.

Here Thrasymachus, who has made several attempts to interrupt but has hitherto been kept in order by the company, takes advantage of a pause and rushes into the arena, beginning like a savage animal with a roar. Socrates, he says, 'what folly is this—Why do you agree to be vanquished by one another in a pretended argument?' He then prohibits all the ordinary definitions of justice, to which Socrates replies that he cannot tell how many twelve is, if he is forbidden to say 2×6 or 3×4 or 6×2 or 4×3 . At first Thrasymachus is reluctant to argue, but at length with a promise of payment on the part of the company and of praise from Socrates, he is induced to open the game.

Listen, he says, my answer is that might is right, justice the interest of the stronger; now praise me. Let me understand you first. Do you mean that because Polydamas the wrestler, who is stronger than we are, finds the eating of beef for his interest, the eating of beef is also for our interest, who are not so strong? Thrasymachus is indignant at the illustration and in pompous words, apparently intended to restore dignity to the argument, he explains his meaning to be that the rulers make laws for their own interests. But suppose, says Socrates, that the ruler or stronger makes a mistake—then the interest of the stronger is not his interest. Thrasymachus is saved from this speedy downfall by his disciple Cleitophon, who introduces the word, 'thinks'—not the actual interest of the ruler but what he thinks or what seems to be his interest, is justice.

The contradiction is escaped by the unmeaning evasion for though his real and apparent interests may differ what the ruler thinks to be his interest will always remain what he thinks to be his interest

Of course this was not the original assertion nor is the new interpretation accepted by Thrasymachus himself. But Socrates is not disposed to quarrel about words if as he significantly insinuates his adversary has changed his mind. In what follows Thrasymachus does in fact withdraw his admission that the ruler may make a mistake for he affirms that the ruler as a ruler is infallible. Socrates is quite ready to accept the new position which he equally turns against Thrasymachus by the help of the analogy of the arts. Every art or science has an interest but this interest is to be distinguished from the accidental interest of the artist and is only concerned with the good of the things or persons which come under the art. And justice has an interest which is the interest not of the ruler or judge but of those who come under his sway.

Thrasymachus is on the brink of the inevitable conclusion when he makes a bold diversion. Tell me Socrates he says have you a nurse? What a question! Why do you ask? Because if you have she neglects you and lets you go about drivelling and has not even taught you to know the shepherd from the sheep. For you fancy that shepherds and rulers never think of their own interest but only of their sheep or subjects whereas the truth is that they fatten them for their use sheep and subjects alike. And experience proves that in every relation of life the just man is the loser and the unjust the gainer especially where injustice is on the grand scale which is quite another thing from the petty rogueries of swindlers and burglars and robbers of temples. The language of men proves this—our gracious and blessed tyrant and the like—all which tends to show (1) that justice is the interest of the stronger and (2) that injustice is more profitable and also stronger than justice.

Thrasymachus who is better at a speech than at a close

argument, having deluged the company with words has a mind to escape. But the others will not let him go and Socrates adds a humble but earnest request that he will not desert them at such a crisis of their fate. And what can I do more for you? he says would you have me put the words bodily into your souls? God forbid! replies Socrates but we want you to be consistent in the use of terms and not to employ 'physician' in an exact sense, and then again shepherd or ruler in an inexact—if the words are strictly taken the ruler and the shepherd look only to the good of their people or flocks and not to their own whereas you insist that rulers are solely actuated by love of office.

No doubt about it replies Thrasymachus. Then why are they paid? Is not the reason that their interest is not comprehended in their art and is therefore the concern of another and the art of pay which is common to the arts in general and therefore not identical with any one of them? Nor would any man be a ruler unless he were induced by the hope of reward or the fear of punishment—the reward is money or honour the punishment is the necessity of being ruled by a man worse than himself. And if a State [or Church] were composed entirely of good men, they would be affected by the last motive only and there would be as much *nolo episcopari* as there is at present of the opposite.

The satire on existing governments is heightened by the simple and apparently incidental manner in which the last remark is introduced. There is a similar irony in the argument that the governors of mankind do not like being in office and that therefore they demand pay.

Enough of this the other assertion of Thrasymachus is far more important—that the unjust life is more gainful than the just. Now, as you and I Glaucon, are not convinced by him we must reply to him but if we try to compare their respective gains we shall want a judge to decide for us we had better therefore proceed by making mutual admissions of the truth to one another.

Thrasymachus had said that perfect injustice was more

gainful than perfect justice and after a little hesitation he is induced by Socrates to admit the still greater paradox that injustice is virtue and justice vice. Socrates praises his frankness and assumes the attitude of one whose only wish is to understand the meaning of his opponents. At the same time he is weaving a net in which Thrasymachus is finally enclosed. The admission is elicited from him that the just man seeks to gain an advantage over the unjust only but not over the just, while the unjust would gain an advantage over either. Socrates in order to test this statement employs once more the favourite analogy of the arts. The musician doctor skilled a tist of any sort does not seek to gain more than the skilled, but only more than the unskilled (that is to say he works up to a rule standard, law and does not exceed it) whereas the unskilled makes random efforts at excess. Thus the skilled falls on the side of the good and the unskilled on the side of the evil and the just is the skilled, and the unjust is the unskilled.

There was great difficulty in bringing Thrasymachus to the point the day was hot and he was streaming with perspiration and for the first time in his life he was seen to blush. But his other thesis that injustice was stronger than justice has not yet been refuted, and Socrates now proceeds to the consideration of this which, with the assistance of Thrasymachus he hopes to clear up the latter is a first churlish, but in the judicious hands of Socrates is soon restored to good humour. Is there not honour among thieves? Is not the strength of injustice only a remnant of justice? Is not absolute injustice absolute weakness also? A house that is divided against itself cannot stand two men who quarrel detract from one another's strength and he who is at war with himself is the enemy of himself and the gods. Not wickedness therefore but semi wickedness flourishes in states—a remnant of good is needed in order to make union in action possible—there is no kingdom of evil in this world.

Another question has not been answered. Is the just or the unjust the happier? To this we reply that every art

has an end and an excellence or virtue by which the end is accomplished. And is not the end of the soul happiness and justice the excellence of the soul by which happiness is attained. Justice and happiness being thus shown to be inseparable the question whether the just or the unjust is the happier has disappeared.

Thrasymachus replies. Let this be your entertainment, Socrates at the festival of Bendis. Yes and a very good entertainment with which your kindness has supplied me now that you have left off scolding. And yet not a good entertainment—but that was my own fault for I tasted of too many things. First of all the nature of justice was the subject of our inquiry and then whether justice is virtue and wisdom or evil and folly and then the comparative advantages of just and unjust and the sum of all is that I know no what justice is how then shall I know whether the just is happy or not?

Thus the sophistical fabric has been demolished chiefly by appealing to the analogy of the arts. Justice is like the arts (1) in having no external interest, and (2) in not aiming at excess and (3) justice is to happiness what the implement of the workman is to his work. At this the modern reader is apt to stumble because he forgets that Plato is writing in an age when the arts and the virtues like the moral and intellectual faculties were still undistinguished. Among early inquirers into the nature of human action the arts helped to fill up the void of speculation and at first the comparison of the arts and the virtues was not perceived by them to be fallacious. They only saw the points of agreement in them and not the points of difference. Virtue like art must take means to an end good manners are both an art and a virtue character is naturally described under the image of a statue (ii 361 D vii 540 C) and there are many other figures of speech which are readily transferred from art to morals. The next generation cleared up these perplexities or at least supplied after ages with a further analysis of them. The contemporaries of Plato were in

The three arguments respecting justice 27

a state of transition and had not yet fully realized the common sense distinction of Aristotle, that 'virtue is concerned with action art with production' (Nic. Eth. vi 4) or that 'virtue implies intention and constancy of purpose whereas art requires knowledge only' (Nic. Eth. ii 3). And yet in the absurdities which follow from some uses of the analogy (cp. 1 333 E 334 B) there seems to be an intimation conveyed that virtue is more than art. This is implied in the *reductio ad absurdum* that justice is a thief and in the dissatisfaction which Socrates expresses at the final result.

The expression 'an art of pay' (1 346 B) which is described as common to all the arts is not in accordance with the ordinary use of language. Nor is it employed elsewhere either by Plato or by any other Greek writer. It is suggested by the argument and seems to extend the conception of art to doing as well as making. Another flaw or inaccuracy of language may be noted in the words (1 355 C) 'men who are injured are made more unjust'. For those who are injured are not necessarily made worse but only harmed or ill-treated.

The second of the three arguments—that the just does not aim at excess—has a real meaning though wrapped up in an enigmatical form. That the good is of the nature of the finite is a peculiarly Hellenic sentiment which may be compared with the language of those modern writers who speak of virtue as fitness and of freedom as obedience to law. The mathematical or logical notion of limit easily passes into an ethical one and even finds a mythological expression in the conception of envy (*φθονος*). Ideas of measure, equality, order, unity, proportion still linger in the writings of moralists and the true spirit of the fine arts is better conveyed by such terms than by superlatives.

When workmen strive to do better than well,
They do confound their skill in covetousness

(*King John* Act iv Sc. 2)

The harmony of the soul and body (ii. 402 D) and of the

parts of the soul with one another (iv 442 C) a harmony far far er than that of musical notes is the true Hellenic mode of conceiving the perfection of human nature

In what may be called the epilogue of the discussion with Thrasymachus Plato argues that evil is not a principle of strength but of discord and dissolution just touching the question which has been often treated in modern times by theologians and philosophers of the negative nature of evil (cp on the other hand x 610) In the last argument we trace the germ of the Aristotelian doctrine of an end and a virtue directed towards the end, which again is suggested by the arts The final reconciliation of justice and happiness and the identity of the individual and the State are also intimated Socrates reassumes the character of a know nothing at the same time he appears to be not wholly satisfied with the manner in which the argument has been conducted Nothing is concluded but the tendency of the dialectical process, here as always is to enlarge our conception of ideas and to widen their application to human life

Book II Thrasymachus is pacified, but the intrepid Glaucon insists on continuing the argument He is not satisfied with the indirect manner in which at the end of the last book, Socrates had disposed of the question Whether the just or the unjust is the happier He begins by dividing goods into three classes,—first goods desirable in themselves secondly, goods desirable in themselves and for their results thirdly goods desirable for their results only He then asks Socrates in which of the three classes he would place justice In the second class replies Socrates, among goods desirable for themselves and also for their results

Then the world in general are of another mind for they say that justice belongs to the troublesome class of goods which are desirable for their results only Socrates answers that this is the doctrine of Thrasymachus which he rejects Glaucon thinks that Thrasymachus was too ready to listen to the voice of the charmer and proposes to the

nature of justice and injustice in themselves and apart from the results and rewards of them which the world is always dinn ng in his ears. He will first of all speak of the nature and origin of justice secondly, of the manner in which men view justice as a necessity, and not a good and thirdly, he will prove the reasonableness of this view.

To do injustice is said to be a good to suffer injustice an evil. As the evil is discovered by experience to be greater than the good the sufferers who cannot also be doers make a compact that they will have neither and thus compact or mean is called justice but is really the impossibility of doing injustice. No one would observe such a compact if he were not obliged. Let us suppose that he just and unjust have two rings, like that of Gyges in the well known story which make them invisible and then no difference will appear in them for every one will do evil if he can. And he who abstains will be regarded by the world as a fool for his pains. Men may praise him in public out of fear for themselves but they will laugh at him in their hearts. (Cp Gorgias 483 B)

And now let us frame an ideal of the just and unjust. Imagine the unjust man to be master of his craft seldom making mistakes and easily correcting them, having gifts of money speech, strength—the greatest villain bearing the highest character and at his side let us place the just in his nobleness and simplicity—being not seeming—without name or reward—clothed in his justice only—the best of men who is thought to be the worst, and let him die as he has lived. I might add (but I would rather put the rest into the mouth of the panegyrists of injustice—they will tell you) that the just man will be scourged racked bound will have his eyes put out and will at last be crucified [literally impaled]—and all this because he ought to have preferred seeming to being. How different is the case of the unjust who clings to appearance as the true reality! His high character makes him a ruler he can marry where he likes trade where he likes, help his friends and hurt his enemies having got rich

by dishonesty he can worship the gods better and will therefore be more loved by them than the just

I was thinking what to answer when Ademantus joined in the already unequal fray. He considered that the most important point of all had been omitted — (Men are taught to be just for the sake of rewards — parents and guardians make reputation the incentive to virtue. And other advantages are promised by them of a more solid kind such as wealthy marriages and high offices.) There are the pictures in Homer and Hesiod of fat sheep and heavy fleeces rich cornfields and trees topping with fruit, which the gods provide in this life for the just. And the Orphic poets add a similar picture of another. The heroes of Musaeus and Eumolpus lie on couches at a festival with garlands on their heads enjoying as the meed of virtue a paradise of immortal drunkenness. Some go further and speak of a fair posterity in the third and fourth generation. But the wicked they bury in a slough and make them carry water in a sieve and in this life they attribute to them the infamy which Glaucon was assuming to be the lot of the just who are supposed to be unjust.

Take another kind of argument which is found both in poetry and prose — Virtue as Hesiod says is honourable but difficult, vice is easy and profitable. You may often see the wicked in great prosperity and the righteous afflicted by the will of heaven. And mendicant prophets knock at rich men's doors promising to atone for the sins of themselves or their fathers in an easy fashion with sacrifices and festive games or with charms and invocations to get rid of an enemy good or bad by divine help and at a small charge — they appeal to books professing to be written by Musaeus and Orpheus and carry away the minds of whole cities and promise to get souls out of purgatory and if we refuse to listen to them no one knows what will happen to us.

When a lively minded ingenuous youth hears all this what will be his conclusion? Will he in the language of Pindar make justice his high tower or fortify himself with

crooked deceit? Justice, he reflects without the appearance of justice is misery and ruin, injustice has the promise of a glorious life. Appearance is master of truth and lord of happiness. To appearance then I will turn—I will put on the show of virtue and trail behind me the fox of Archilochus. I hear some one saying that wickedness is not easily concealed to which I reply that nothing great is easy. Union and force and rhetoric will do much and if men say that they cannot prevail over the gods still how do we know that there are gods? Only from the poets who acknowledge that they may be appeased by sacrifices. Then why not sin and pay for indulgences out of your sin? For if the righteous are only unpunished still they have no further reward, while the wicked may be unpunished and have the pleasure of sinning too. But what of the world below? Nay says the argument there are atoning powers who will set that matter right as the poets who are the sons of the gods tell us and this is confirmed by the authority of the State.

How can we resist such arguments in favour of injustice? Add good manners and, as the wise tell us we shall make the best of both worlds. Who that is not a miserable castiff will refrain from smiling at the praises of justice? Even if a man knows the better part he will not be angry with others for he knows also that more than human virtue is needed to save a man and that he only praises justice who is incapable of injustice.

The origin of the evil is that all men from the beginning heroes poets instructors of youth, have always asserted the temporal dispensation the honours and profits of justice. Had we been taught in early youth the power of justice and injustice inherent in the soul, and unseen by any human or divine eye, we should not have needed others to be our guardians but every one would have been the guardian of himself. This is what I want you to show Socrates—other men use arguments which rather tend to strengthen the position of Thrasymachus that might is right but from you I expect better things. And p aucon said, to

exclude reputation let the just be thought unjust and the unjust just, and do you still prove to us the superiority of justice

The thesis which for the sake of argument has been maintained by Glaucon is the converse of that of Thrasymachus—not right is the interest or the stronger but right is the necessity of the weaker. Starting from the same premises he carries the analysis of society a step further back—might is still right but the might is the weakness of the many combined against the strength of the few

There have been theories in modern as well as in ancient times which have a family likeness to the speculations of Glaucon e.g. that power is the foundation of right or that a monarch has a divine right to govern well or ill or that virtue is self love or the love of power or that war is the natural state of man or that private vices are public benefits. All such theories have a kind of plausibility from their partial agreement with experience. For human nature oscillates between good and evil and the motives of actions and the origin of institutions may be explained to a certain extent on either hypothesis according to the character or point of view of a particular thinker. The obligation of maintaining authority under all circumstances and sometimes by rather questionable means is felt strongly and has become a sort of instinct among civilized men. The divine right of kings, or more generally of governments is one of the forms under which this natural feeling is expressed. Nor again is there any evil which has not some accompaniment of good or pleasure nor any good which is free from some alloy of evil nor any noble or generous thought which may not be attended by a shadow or the ghost of a shadow of self interest or of self love. We know that all human actions are imperfect but we do not therefore attribute them to the worse rather than to the better motive or principle. Such a philosophy is both foolish and false, like that opinion of the clever rogue who assumes all other men to be like himself (in 409 C). And theories of this sort do not rep

the real nature of the State which is based on a vague sense of right gradually corrected and enlarged by custom and law (although capable also of perversion) any more than they describe the origin of society which is to be sought in the family and in the social and religious feelings of man. Nor do they represent the average character of individuals which cannot be explained simply on a theory of evil, but has always a counteracting element of good. And as men become better such theories appear more and more untruthful to them because they are more conscious of their own disinterestedness. A little experience may make a man a cynic; a great deal will bring him back to a truer and kinder view of the mixed nature of himself and his fellow men.

The two brothers ask Socrates to prove to them that the just is happy when they have taken from him all that in which happiness is ordinarily supposed to consist. Not that there is (1) any absurdity in the attempt to frame a notion of justice apart from circumstances. For the ideal must always be a paradox when compared with the ordinary conditions of human life. Neither the Stoical ideal nor the Christian ideal is true as a fact but they may serve as a basis of education and may exercise an ennobling influence. An ideal is none the worse because some one has made the discovery that no such ideal was ever realized. (Cp v 472 D.) And in a few exceptional individuals who are raised above the ordinary level of humanity the ideal of happiness may be realized in death and misery. This may be the state which the reason deliberately approves and which the utilitarian as well as every other moralist may be bound in certain cases to prefer.

Nor again, (2) must we forget that Plato though he agrees generally with the view implied in the argument of the two brothers is not expressing his own final conclusion but rather seeking to dramatize one of the aspects of ethical truth. He is developing his idea gradually in a series of positions or situations. He is exhibiting Socrates for the first time undergoing the Socratic interrogation. Lastly (3) the word *happiness* involves some degree of confusion because

associated in the language of modern philosophy with conscious pleasure or satisfaction, which was not equally present to his mind

Glaucon has been drawing a picture of the misery of the just and the happiness of the unjust to which the misery of the tyrant in Book IX is the answer and parallel. And still the unjust must appear just that is the homage which vice pays to virtue. But now Adeimantus taking up the hint which had been already given by Glaucon (ii 358 C) proceeds to show that in the opinion of mankind justice is regarded only for the sake of rewards and reputation and points out the advantage which is given to such arguments as those of Thrasymachus and Glaucon by the conventional morality of mankind. He seems to feel the difficulty of justifying the ways of God to man. Both the brothers touch upon the question whether the morality of actions is determined by their consequences (cp iv 420 foll.) and both of them go beyond the position of Socrates that justice belongs to the class of goods not desirable for themselves only but desirable for themselves and for their results, to which he recalls them. In their attempt to view justice as an internal principle and in their condemnation of the poets they anticipate him. The common life of Greece is not enough for them they must penetrate deeper into the nature of things.

It has been objected that justice is honesty in the sense of Glaucon and Adeimantus but is taken by Socrates to mean all virtue. May we not more truly say that the old-fashioned notion of justice is enlarged by Socrates and becomes equivalent to universal order or well being first in the State and secondly in the individual? He has found a new answer to his old question (Protag 329) whether the virtues are one or many viz that one is the ordering principle of the three others. In seeking to establish the purely internal nature of justice he is met by the fact that man is a social being and he tries to harmonize the two opposite theses as well as he can. There is no more inconsistency in this than

was inevitable in his age and country there is no use in turning upon him the cross lights of modern philosophy, which, from some other point of view would appear equally inconsistent. Plato does not give the final solution of philosophical questions for us nor can he be judged of by our standard.

The remainder of the Republic is developed out of the question of the sons of Ariston. Three points are deserving of remark in what immediately follows—First that the answer of Socrates is altogether indirect. He does not say that happiness consists in the contemplation of the idea of justice and still less will he be tempted to affirm the Stoical paradox that the just man can be happy on the rack. But first he dwells on the difficulty of the problem and insists on restoring man to his natural condition before he will answer the question at all. He too will frame an ideal, but his ideal comprehends not only abstract justice, but the whole relations of man. Under the fanciful illustration of the large letters he implies that he will only look for justice in society and that from the State he will proceed to the individual. His answer in substance amounts to this—that under favourable conditions i.e. in the perfect State justice and happiness will coincide and that when justice has been once found, happiness may be left to take care of itself. That he falls into some degree of inconsistency when in the tenth book (612 A) he claims to have got rid of the rewards and honours of justice may be admitted for he has left those which exist in the perfect State. And the philosopher who retires under the shelter of a wall (vi. 496) can hardly have been esteemed happy by him, at least not in this world. Still he maintains the true attitude of moral action. Let a man do his duty first without asking whether he will be happy or not and happiness will be the inseparable accident which attends him. Seek ye first the kingdom of God and his righteousness and all these things shall be added unto you.

Secondly it may be remarked that Plato preserves the genuine character of Greek thought in beginning with the

State and in going on to the individual First ethics then politics—this is the order of ideas to us the reverse is the order of history Only after many struggles of thought does the individual assert his right as a moral being In early ages he is not one but one of many the citizen of a State which is prior to him and he has no notion of good or evil apart from the law of his country or the creed of his church And to this type he is constantly tending to revert whenever the influence of custom or of party spirit or the recollection of the past becomes too strong for him

Thirdly we may observe the confusion or identification of the individual and the State of ethics and politics which pervades early Greek speculation and even in modern times retains a certain degree of influence The subtle difference between the collective and individual action of mankind seems to have escaped early thinkers and we too are sometimes in danger of forgetting the conditions of united human action whenever we either elevate politics into ethics or lower ethics to the standard of politics The good man and the good citizen only coincide in the perfect State and this perfection cannot be attained by legislation acting upon them from without, but, if at all by education fashioning them from within

Socrates praises the sons of Aris on inspired offspring of the renowned hero as the elegiac poet terms them but he does not understand how they can argue so eloquently on behalf of injustice while their character shows that they are uninfluenced by their own arguments He knows not how to answer them, although he is afraid of deserting justice in the hour of need He therefore makes a condition that having weak eyes he shall be allowed to read the large letters first and then go on to the smaller that is he must look for justice in the State first and will then proceed to the individual Accordingly he begins to construct the State

Society arises out of the wants of man His first want is food his second a house his third a coat The of these needs and the possibility of satisfying them by exchange

draw individuals together on the same spot and thus is the beginning of a State which we take the liberty to invent, though necessity is the real inventor. There must be first a husbandman secondly a builder thirdly a weaver to which may be added a cobbler. Four or five citizens at least are required to make a city. Now men have different natures and one man will do one thing better than many and business waits for no man. Hence there must be a division of labour into different employments into wholesale and retail trade into workers and makers of workmen's tools into shepherds and husbandmen. A city which includes all this will have far exceeded the limit of four or five, and yet not be very large. But then again imports will be required, and imports necessitate exports and this implies variety of produce in order to attract the taste of purchasers also merchants and ships. In the city too we must have a market and money and retail trades otherwise buyers and sellers will never meet and the valuable time of the producers will be wasted in vain efforts at exchange. If we add hired servants the State will be complete. And we may guess that somewhere in the intercourse of the citizens with one another, justice and injustice will appear.

Here follows a rustic picture of their way of life. They spend their days in houses which they have built for themselves they make their own clothes and produce their own corn and wine. Their principal food is meal and flour and they drink in moderation. They live on the best of terms with each other and take care not to have too many children.

But' said Glaucon interposing are they not to have a relish? Certainly they will have salt and olives and cheese vegetables and fruits and chestnuts to roast at the fire. 'Tis a city of pigs Socrates' Why I replied what do you want more? Only the comforts of life,—sofas and tables also sauces and sweets. I see you want not only a State but a luxurious State and possibly in the more complex frame we may sooner find justice and injustice. Then the first step must go to work—every con. v. bl.

instrument and ornament of luxury will be wanted. There will be dancers painters sculptors musicians cooks barbers tire women nurses artists swineherds and neatherds too for the animals and physicians to cure the disorders of which luxury is the source. To feed all these superfluous mouths we shall need a part of our neighbours land, and they will want a part of ours. And this is the origin of war which may be traced to the same causes as other political evils. Our city will now require the slight addition of a camp and the citizen will be converted into a soldier. But then again our old doctrine of the division of labour must not be forgotten. The art of war cannot be learned in a day and there must be a natural aptitude for military duties. There will be some warlike natures who have this aptitude—dogs keen of scent swift of foot to pursue and strong of limb to fight. And as spirit is the foundation of courage such natures whether of men or animals will be full of spirit. But these spirited natures are apt to bite and devour one another the union of gentleness to friends and fierceness against enemies appears to be an impossibility, and the guardian of a State requires both qualities. Who then can be a guardian? The image of the dog suggests an answer. For dogs are gentle to friends and fierce to strangers. Your dog is a philosopher who judges by the rule of knowing or not knowing and philosophy whether in man or beast is the parent of gentleness. The human watchdogs must be philosophers or lovers of learning which will make them gentle. And how are they to be learned without education.

But what shall their education be? Is any better than the old fashioned sort which is comprehended under the name of music and gymnastic? Music includes literature and literature is of two kinds true and false. What do you mean? he said. I mean that children hear stories before they learn gymnastics, and that the stories are either untrue or have at most one or two grains of truth in a bushel of falsehood. Now early life is very impressible and children ought not to learn what they will have to unlearn when they

grow up we must therefore have a censorship of nursery-tales banishing some and keeping others. Some of them are very improper as we may see in the great instances of Homer and Hesiod, who not only tell lies but bad lies—stories about Uranus and Saturn which are immoral as well as false, and which should never be spoken of to young persons or indeed at all or if at all, then in a mystery after the sacrifice, not of an Eleusinian pig but of some unprocurable animal. Shall our youth be encouraged to beat their fathers by the example of Zeus or our citizens be incited to quarrel by hearing or seeing representations of strife among the gods? Shall they listen to the narrative of Hephaestus binding his mother and of Zeus sending him flying for helping her when she was beaten? Such tales may possibly have a mystical interpretation, but the young are incapable of understanding allegory. If any one asks what tales are to be allowed, we will answer that we are legislators and not book makers—we only lay down the principles according to which books are to be written—to write them is the duty of others.

And our first principle is, that God must be represented as he is, not as the author of all things but of good only. We will not suffer the poets to say that he is the steward of good and evil or that he has two casks full of destinies—or that Athene and Zeus incited Pandarus to break the treaty or that God caused the sufferings of Niobe or of Pelops or the Trojan war, or that he makes men sin when he wishes to destroy them. Either these were not the actions of the gods or God was just and men were the better for being punished. But that the deed was evil and God the author, is a wicked suicidal fiction which we will allow no one old or young to utter. This is our first and great principle—God is the author of good only.

And the second principle is like unto it—With God is no variableness or change of form. Reason teaches us this—for 1st we suppose a change in God, he must be changed either by another or by himself. By another?—but the best works of nature and art and the noblest qualities of mind are least

liable to be changed by any external force By himself — but he cannot change for the better he will hardly change for the worse He remains for ever fairest and best in his own image Therefore we refuse to listen to the poets who tell us of Here begging in the likeness of a priestess or of other deities who prowl about at night in strange disguises all that blasphemous nonsense with which mothers fool the manhood out of their children must be suppressed But some one will say that God who is himself unchangeable may take a form in relation to us Why should he? For gods as well as men hate the lie in the soul or principle of falsehood and as for any other form of lying which is used for a purpose and is regarded as innocent in certain exceptional cases—what need have the gods of this? For they are not ignorant of antiquity like the poets nor are they afraid of their enemies nor is any madman a friend of theirs God then is true he is absolutely true he changes not he deceives not by day or night by word or sign This is our second great principle—God is true Away with the lying dream of Agamemnon in Homer and the accusation of Thetis against Apollo in Aeschylus

In order to give clearness to his conception of the State Plato proceeds to trace the first principles of mutual need and of division of labour in an imaginary community of four or five citizens Gradually this community increases the division of labour extends to countries imports necessitate exports a medium of exchange is required and retailers t in the market place to save the time of the producers These are the steps by which Plato constructs the first or primitive State, introducing the elements of political economy by the way As he is going to frame a second or civilized State the simple naturally comes before the complex He indulges like Rousseau in a picture of primitive life—an idea which has indeed often had a powerful influence on the imagination of mankind but he does not seriously mean to say that one is better than the other (cp Politicus p 272) nor can any inference be drawn from the description of the

first state taken apart from the second such as Aristotle appears to draw in the *Politics* iv 4 12 (cp again *Politicus* 272) We should not interpret a Platonic dialogue any more than a poem or a parable in too literal or matter-of-fact a style On the other hand when we compare the lively fancy of Plato with the dried up abstractions of modern treatises on philosophy we are compelled to say with Protagoras, that the mythus is more interesting (*Protag* 320 D)

Several interesting remarks which in modern times would have a place in a treatise on Political Economy are scattered up and down the writings of Plato cp especially *Law* i 740 *Population* viii 847 *Free Trade* xi 916-7 *Adulteration* 923-4 *Wills and Bequests* 930 *Begging* *Eryxias* (though not Plato's) *Value and Demand* *Republic*, ii 369 ff *Division of Labour* The last subject and also the origin of Retail Trade is treated with admirable lucidity in the second book of the *Republic*. But Plato never combined his economic ideas into a system and never seems to have recognized that Trade is one of the great motive powers of the State and of the world He would make retail traders only of the inferior sort of citizens (*Rep* ii 371 cp *Laws* viii 847), though he remarks, quaintly enough (*Laws* ix 918 D) that if only the best men and the best women everywhere were compelled to keep taverns for a time or to carry on retail trade &c then we should know how pleasant and agreeable all these things are

The disappointment of Glaucon at the 'city of pigs' the ludicrous description of the ministers of luxury in the more refined State, and the afterthought of the necessity of doctors the illustration of the nature of the guardian taken from the dog the desirableness of offering some almost unprocurable victim when impure mysteries are to be celebrated, the behaviour of Zeus to his father and of Hephaestus to his mother are touches of humour which have also a serious meaning In speaking of education Plato rather startles us by affirming that a child must be trained in falsehood first and in truth afterwards Yet this is not very different from

saying that children must be taught through the medium of imagination as well as reason that the minds can only develop gradually and that there is much which they must learn without understanding (cp 11 402 A) This is also the substance of Plato's view though he must be acknowledged to have drawn the line somewhat differently from modern ethical writers respecting truth and falsehood To us economies or accommodations would not be allowable unless they were required by the human faculties or necessary for the communication of knowledge to the simple and ignorant We should insist that the word was inseparable from the intention, and that we must not be falsely true i.e. speak or act falsely in support of what was right or true But Plato would limit the use of fictions only by requiring that they should have a good moral effect and that such a dangerous weapon as falsehood should be employed by the rulers alone and for great objects

A Greek in the age of Plato attached no importance to the question whether his religion was an historical fact. He was just beginning to be conscious that the past had a history but he could see nothing beyond Homer and Hesiod Whether their narratives were true or false did not seriously affect the political or social life of Hellas Men only began to suspect that they were fictions when they recognized them to be immoral And so in all religions the consideration of their morality comes first afterwards the truth of the documents in which they are recorded, or of the events natural or supernatural which are told of them But in modern times and in Protestant countries perhaps more than in Catholic we have been too much inclined to identify the historical with the moral and some have refused to believe in religion at all unless a superhuman accuracy was discernible in every part of the record The facts of an ancient or religious history are amongst the most important of all facts but they are frequently uncertain, and we only learn the true lesson which is to be gathered from them when we place ourselves above them These reflections tend to show that the

difference between Plato and ourselves though not unimportant is not so great as might at first sight appear. For we should agree with him in placing the moral before the historical truth of religion and generally in disregarding those errors or misstatements of fact which necessarily occur in the early stages of all religions. We know also that changes in the traditions of a country cannot be made in a day and are therefore tolerant of many things which science and criticism would condemn.

We note in passing that the allegorical interpretation of mythology said to have been first introduced as early as the sixth century before Christ by Theagenes of Rhegium was well established in the age of Plato and here as in the *Phaedrus* (229-30) though for a different reason was rejected by him. That anachronisms whether of religion or law when men have reached another stage of civilization should be got rid of by fictions is in accordance with universal experience. Great is the art of interpretation and by a natural process, which when once discovered was always going on what could not be altered was explained away. And so without any palpable inconsistency there existed side by side two forms of religion, the tradition inherited or invented by the poets and the customary worship of the temple on the other hand there was the religion of the philosopher who was dwelling in the heaven of ideas but did not therefore refuse to offer a cock to Aesculapius, or to be seen saying his prayers at the rising of the sun. At length the antagonism between the popular and philosophical religion never so great among the Greeks as in our own age, disappeared, and was only felt like the difference between the religion of the educated and uneducated among ourselves. The Zeus of Homer and Hesiod easily passed into the 'royal mind' of Plato (*Philebus* 28) the giant Heracles became the knight errant and benefactor of mankind. These and still more wonderful transformations were readily effected by the ingenuity of Stoics and neo Platonists in the two or three centuries before and after Christ. The Greek and

Roman religions were gradually permeated by the spirit of philosophy having lost their ancient meaning they were resolved into poetry and morality and probably were never purer than at the time of their decay when their influence over the world was waning

A singular conception which occurs towards the end of the book is the lie in the soul this is connected with the Platonic and Socratic doctrine that involuntary ignorance is worse than voluntary The lie in the soul is a true lie the corruption of the highest truth the deception of the highest part of the soul from which he who is deceived has no power of delivering himself For example to represent God as false or immoral, or according to Plato as deluding men with appearances or as the author of evil or again to affirm with Protagoras that knowledge is sensation or that being is becoming or with Thrasymachus that might is right would have been regarded by Plato as a lie of this hateful sort The greatest unconsciousness of the greatest untruth e.g. if in the language of the Gospels (John iv 41) he who was blind were to say I see is another aspect of the state of mind which Plato is describing The lie in the soul may be further compared with the sin against the Holy Ghost (Luke xii 10) allowing for the difference between Greek and Christian modes of speaking To this is opposed the lie in words which is only such a deception as may occur in a play or poem, or allegory or figure of speech, or in any sort of accommodation—which though useless to the gods may be useful to men in certain cases Socrates is here answering the question which he had himself raised (i 3,1 C) about the propriety of deceiving a madman and he is also contrasting the nature of God and man For God is Truth but mankind can only be true by appearing sometimes to be partial or false Reserving for another place the greater questions of religion or education we may note further (1) the approval of the old traditional education of Greece (2) the preparation which Plato is making for the attack on Homer and the poets (3) the preparation which he is also making

for the use of economists in the State (4) the contemptuous and at the same time euphemistic manner in which here as below (iii 390) he alludes to the *Chronique Scandaleuse* of the gods

Book III There is another motive in purifying religion, which is to banish fear for no man can be courageous who is afraid of death, or who believes the tales which are repeated by the poets concerning the world below. They must be gently requested not to abuse hell they may be reminded that their stories are both untrue and discouraging. Nor must they be angry if we expunge obnoxious passages such as the depressing words of Achilles—I would rather be a serving man than rule over all the dead and the verses which tell of the squalid mansions the senseless shadows the flitting soul mourning over lost strength and youth the soul with a gibber going beneath the earth like smoke or the souls of the suitors which flutter about like bats. The terrors and horrors of Cocytus and Styx, ghosts and shapeless shades and the rest of their Tartarean nomenclature must vanish. Such tales may have their use but they are not the proper food for soldiers. As little can we admit the sorrows and sympathies of the Homeric heroes—Achilles the son of Thetis in tears throwing ashes on his head, or pacing up and down the sea-shore in distraction or Priam the cousin of the gods, crying aloud, rolling in the mire. A good man is not prostrated at the loss of children or fortune. Neither is death terrible to him and therefore lamentations over the dead should not be practised by men of note they should be the concern of inferior persons only whether women or men. Still worse is the attribution of such weakness to the gods as when the goddesses say *Alas! my travail!* and worst of all when the king of heaven himself laments his inability to save Hector or sorrows over the impending doom of his dear Sarpedon. Such a character of God if not ridiculed by our young men is likely to be imitated by them. Nor should our citizens be

given to excess of laughter Such violent delights are followed by a violent reaction. The description in the *Iliad* of the gods shaking their sides at the clumsiness of Hephaestus will not be admitted by us Certainly not

Truth should have a high place among the virtues for falsehood, as we were saying is useless to the gods and only useful to men as a medicine But this employment of falsehood must remain a privilege of state the common man must not in return tell a lie to the ruler any more than the patient would tell a lie to his physician, or the sailor to his captain

In the next place our youth must be temperate and temperance consists in self control and obedience to authority That is a lesson which Homer teaches in some places The Achaeans marched on breathing prowess in silent awe of their leaders —but a very different one in other places

O heavy with wine, who hast the eyes of a dog but the heart of a stag Language of the latter kind will not impress self control on the minds of youth The same may be said about his praises of eating and drinking and his dream of starvation also about the verses in which he tells of the rapturous loves of Zeus and Here or of how Hephaestus once detained Ares and Aphrodite in a net on a similar occasion There is a nobler strain heard in the words —

Endure my soul thou hast endured worse Nor must we allow our citizens to receive bribes or to say Gifts persuade the gods gifts reverend kings or to applaud the ignoble advice of Phoenix to Achilles that he should get money out of the Greeks before he assisted them or the meanness of Achilles himself in taking gifts from Agamemnon or his requiring a ransom for the body of Hector or his cursing of Apollo or his insolence to the river god Scamander or his dedication to the dead Patroclus of his own hair which had been already dedicated to the other river-god Spercheus or his cruelty in dragging the body of Hector round the walls and slaying the captives at the pyre such a combination of —ness and cruelty in Cheiron's pupil is unconceivable

The amatory exploits of Peanthon and Theseus are equally unworthy. Either these so called sons of gods were not the sons of gods or they were not such as the poets imagine them, any more than the gods themselves are the authors of evil. The youth who believes that such things are done by those who have the blood of heaven flowing in their veins will be too ready to imitate their example.

Enough of gods and heroes —what shall we say about men? What the poets and story tellers say—that the wicked prosper and the righteous are afflicted, or that justice is another's gain. Such misrepresentations cannot be allowed by us. But in this we are anticipating the definition of justice and had therefore better defer the inquiry.

The subjects of poetry have been sufficiently treated next follows style. Now all poetry is a narrative of events past present, or to come and narrative is of three kinds the simple the imitative, and a composition of the two. An instance will make my meaning clear. The first scene in Homer is of the last or mixed kind being partly description and partly dialogue. But if you throw the dialogue into the *oratio obliqua* the passage will run thus. The priest came and prayed Apollo that the Achaeans might take Troy and have a safe return if Agamemnon would only give him back his daughter and the other Greeks assented but Agamemnon was wroth, and so on.—The whole then becomes descriptive and the poet is the only speaker left or if you omit the narrative the whole becomes dialogue. These are the three styles—which of them is to be admitted into our State? Do you ask whether tragedy and comedy are to be admitted? Yes but also something more—Is it not doubtful whether our guardians are to be imitators at all? Or rather has not the question been already answered, for we have decided that one man cannot in his life play many parts any more than he can act both tragedy and comedy or be rhapsodist and actor at once? Human nature is coined into very small pieces and as our guardians have their own business already which is the care of freedom, they will have enough to do without

imitating. If they imitate they should imitate not any mean-
ness or baseness but the good only for the mask which the
actor wears is not to become his face. We cannot allow men
to play the parts of women quarrelling weeping scolding
or boasting against the gods—least of all when making love
or in labour. They must not represent slaves or bullies or
cowards or drunkards or madmen or blacksmiths or neigh-
ing horses or bellowing bulls or sounding rivers or a raging
sea. A good or wise man will be willing to perform good and
wise actions but he will be ashamed to play an inferior part
which he has never practised and he will prefer to employ
the descriptive style with as little imitation as possible.
The man who has no self respect, on the contrary will
imitate anybody and anything sounds of nature and cries
of animals alike his whole performance will be imitation
of gesture and voice. Now in the descriptive style there are
few changes but in the dramatic there are a great many.
Poets and musicians use either or a compound of both and
this compound is very attractive to youth and their teachers
as well as to the vulgar. But our State in which one man
plays one part only is not adapted for complexity. And
when one of these polyphonous pantomimic gentlemen offers
to exhibit himself and his poetry we will show him every
observance or respect but at the same time tell him that
there is no room for his kind in our State we prefer the rough,
honest poet and will not depart from our original models
(ii 379 foll cp *Laws* vii 817)

Next as to the music. A song or ode has three parts—the
subject, the harmony and the rhythm of which the two
last are dependent upon the first. As we banished strains of
lamentation so we may now banish the mixed Lydian
harmonies which are the harmonies of lamentation and as
our citizens are to be temperate we may also banish convivial
harmonies such as the Ionian and pure Lydian. Two remain
—the Dorian and Phrygian the first for war the second for
peace the one expressive of courage the other of obedience
or instruction or religious feeling. And as we reject varieties

of harmony we shall also reject the many-stringed variously shaped instruments which give utterance to them, and in particular the flute which is more complex than any of them. The lyre and the harp may be permitted in the town and the Pan's-pipe in the fields. Thus we have made a purgation of music and will now make a purgation of metres. These should be like the harmonies simple and suitable to the occasion. There are four notes of the tetrachord, and there are three ratios of metre $\frac{3}{2}$ $\frac{2}{3}$ $\frac{4}{3}$ which have all their characteristics and the feet have different characteristics as well as the rhythms. But about this you and I must ask Damon, the great musician, who speaks if I remember rightly of a martial measure as well as of dactylic trochaic, and iambic rhythms which he arranges so as to equalize the syllables with one another assigning to each the proper quantity. We only venture to affirm the general principle that the style is to conform to the subject and the metre to the style and that the simplicity and harmony of the soul should be reflected in them all. This principle of simplicity has to be learnt by every one in the days of his youth, and may be gathered anywhere, from the creative and constructive arts as well as from the forms of plants and animals.

Other artists as well as poets should be warned against meanness or unbecomeliness. Sculpture and painting equally with music must conform to the law of simplicity. He who violates it cannot be allowed to work in our city, and to corrupt the taste of our citizens. For our guardians must grow up not amid images of deformity which will gradually poison and corrupt their souls but in a land of health and beauty where they will drink in from every object sweet and harmonious influences. And of all these influences the greatest is the education given by music, which finds a way into the innermost soul and imparts to it the sense of beauty and of deformity. At first the effect is unconscious but when reason arrives then he who has been thus trained welcomes her as the friend whom he always knew. As in learning to read first we acquire the elements or letters separately and

afterwards their combinations and cannot recognize reflections of them until we know the letters themselves—in like manner we must first attain the elements or essential forms of the virtues and then trace their combinations in life and experience. There is a music of the soul which answers to the harmony of the world and the fairest object of a musical soul is the fair mind in the fair body. Some defect in the latter may be excused, but not in the former. True love is the daughter of temperance and temperance is utterly opposed to the madness of bodily pleasure. Enough has been said of music which makes a fair ending with love.

Next we pass on to gymnastics about which I would remark that the soul is related to the body as a cause to an effect, and therefore if we educate the mind we may leave the education of the body in her charge and need only give a general outline of the course to be pursued. In the first place the guardians must abstain from strong drink for they should be the last persons to lose their wits. Whether the habits of the palaestra are suitable to them is more doubtful for the ordinary gymnastic is a sleepy sort of thing and if left off suddenly is apt to endanger health. But our warrior athletes must be wide-awake dogs and must also be inured to all changes of food and climate. Hence they will require a simpler kind of gymnastic akin to their simple music and for their diet a rule may be found in Homer who feeds his heroes on roast meat only and gives them no fish although they are living at the seaside nor boiled meats which involve an apparatus of pots and pans and if I am not mistaken he nowhere mentions sweet sauces. Sicilian cookery and Attic confections and Corinthian courtesans which are to gymnastic what Lydian and Ionian melodies are to music, must be forbidden. Where gluttony and intemperance prevail the town quickly fills with doctors and pleaders and law and medicine give themselves airs as soon as the freemen of a State take an interest in them. But what can show a more disgraceful state of education than to have to go abroad for justice because you have none of your own at home? And

yet there is a worse stage of the same disease—when men have learned to take a pleasure and pride in the twists and turns of the law, not considering how much better it would be for them so to order their lives as to have no need of a nodding justice. And there is a like disgrace in employing a physician not for the cure of wounds or epidemic disorder but because a man has by laziness and luxury contracted diseases which were unknown in the days of Asclepius. How simple is the Homeric practice of medicine. Eurypylus after he has been wounded drinks a posset of Pramnian wine which is of a heating nature and yet the sons of Asclepius blame neither the damsel who gives him the drink nor Patroclus who is attending on him. The truth is that this modern system of nursing diseases was introduced by Herodicus the trainer who being of a sickly constitution by a compound of training and medicine tortured first himself and then a good many other people and lived a great deal longer than he had any right. But Asclepius would not practise this art because he knew that the citizens of a well-ordered State have no leisure to be ill, and therefore he adopted the kill or cure method, which artisans and labourers employ.

They must be at their business they say, and have no time for coddling if they recover well if they don't, there is an end of them. Whereas the rich man is supposed to be a gentleman who can afford to be ill. Do you know a maxim of Phocylides—that when a man begins to be rich (or perhaps a little sooner) he should practise virtue? But how can excessive care of health be inconsistent with an ordinary occupation and yet consistent with that practice of virtue which Phocylides inculcates? When a student imagines that philosophy gives him a headache he never does anything he is always unwell. This was the reason why Asclepius and his sons practised no such art. They were acting in the interest of the public, and did not wish to preserve useless lives or raise up a puny offspring to wretched sires. Honest diseases they honestly cured and if a man was wounded, they applied the proper remedies, and then

let him eat and drink what he liked. But they declined to treat intemperate and worthless subjects even though they might have made large fortunes out of them. As to the story of Pinda that Asclepius was slain by a thunderbolt in restoring a rich man to life that is a lie—following our old rule we must say either that he did not take bribes or that he was not the son of a god.

Glaucon then asks Socrates whether the best physicians and the best judges will not be those who have had severally the greatest experience of diseases and of crimes. Socrates draws a distinction between the two professions. The physician should have had experience of disease in his own body for he cures with his mind and not with his body. But the judge controls mind by mind and therefore his mind should not be corrupted by crime. Where then is he to gain experience? How is he to be wise and also innocent? When young a good man is apt to be deceived by evil doers because he has no pattern of evil in himself and therefore the judge should be of a certain age his youth should have been innocent and he should have acquired insight into evil not by the practice of it, but by the observation of it in others. This is the ideal of a judge the criminal turned detective is wonderfully suspicious but when in company with good men who have experience he is at fault for he foolishly imagines that every one is as bad as himself. Vice may be known of virtue but cannot know virtue. This is the sort of medicine and thus the sort of law which will prevail in our State they will be healing arts to better natures but the evil body will be left to die by the one and the evil soul will be put to death by the other. And the need of either will be greatly diminished by good music which will give harmony to the soul and good gymnastic which will give health to the body. Not that this division of music and gymnastic really corresponds to soul and body for they are both equally concerned with the soul, which is tamed by the one and aroused and sustained by the other. The two together supply our guardians with their twofold nature. The

pa onate disposition when it has too much gymnastic is
 hardened and brutalized the gentle or philo ophic temper
 which has too much music becomes exervated While a man
 is allowing music to pour like water through the funnel of his
 ears the edge of his soul gradually wears away and the
 passionate or spirited element is melted out of him Too little
 spirit is easily exhausted too much quickly passes into
 nervous ir itability So again the athlete by feeding and
 tr ning has his courage doubled but he soon grows stupid
 he is like a wild beast, ready to do eve ything by blows and
 nothing by counsel or policy There are two principles in
 man reason and passion and to these, not to the soul and
 body the two arts of music and gymnastic correspond
 He who mingles them in harrmonious concord is the true
 musician—he shall be the presiding genius o our State

The next question is Who are to be our rulers? First the
 elder must rule the younger and the best of the elders will
 be the best guardians Now they will be the best who love
 their subjects most, and think that they have a common
 interest with them in the welfare of the state. These we
 must select but they must be watched at every epoch of life
 to see whether they have retained the same opimons and held
 out against force and enchantment For time and persuasion
 ard the love of pleasure may enchant a man into a change of
 purpose and the force of grief and pain may compel him
 And therefore our guardians must be men who have been
 tried by many tests like gold in the refiner's fire and have
 been passed first through danger then through pleasure and
 at every age have come out of such trials victorious and with
 out stain in full command of themselves and their principles
 having all their faculties in harmonious exercise for their
 country's good These shall receive the highest honours
 both in life and death. (It would perhaps be better to confine
 the term guardians to this select class the younger men
 may be called auxiliaries)

And now for one magnificent lie, in the belief of which
 Oh that we could train our rulers!—at any rate let us make

the attempt with the rest of the world. What I am going to tell is only another version of the legend of Cadmus but our unbelieving generation will be slow to accept such a story. The tale must be imparted first to the rulers then to the soldiers lastly to the people. We will inform them that their youth was a dream and that during the time when they seemed to be undergoing their education they were really being fashioned in the earth, who sent them up when they were ready and that they must protect and cherish her whose children they are and regard each other as brothers and sisters. I do not wonder at your being ashamed to propound such a fiction. There is more behind. These brothers and sisters have different natures and some of them God framed to rule whom he fashioned of gold others he made of silver to be auxiliaries others again to be husband men and craftsmen, and these were formed by him of brass and iron. But as they are all sprung from a common stock, a golden parent may have a silver son or a silver parent a golden son, and then there must be a change of rank the son of the rich must descend and the child of the artisan rise in the social scale for an oracle says that the State will come to an end if governed by a man of brass or iron. Will our citizens ever believe all this? Not in the present generation but in the next, perhaps. Yes.

Now let the earthborn men go forth under the command of their rulers and look about and pitch their camp in a high place which will be safe against enemies from without and likewise against insurrections from within. There let them sacrifice and set up their tents for soldiers they are to be and not shopkeepers the watchdogs and guardians of the sheep and luxury and avarice will turn them into wolves and tyrants. Their habits and their dwellings should correspond to their education. They should have no property their pay should only meet their expenses and they should have common meals. Gold and silver we will tell them that they have from God and this divine gift in their souls they must not alloy with that earthly dross which p under

the name of gold. They only of the citizens may not touch it, or be under the same roof with it or drink from it. It is the accursed thing. Should they ever acquire houses or lands or money of their own, they will become householders and tradesmen instead of guardians, enemies and tyrants instead of helpers, and the hour of ruin both to themselves and the rest of the State will be at hand.

The religious and ethical aspect of Plato's education will hereafter be considered under a separate head. Some lesser points may be more conveniently noticed in this place.

I. The constant appeal to the authority of Homer, whom, with grave irony Plato after the manner of his age summons as a witness about ethics and psychology as well as about diet and medicine, attempting to distinguish the better lesson from the worse (390), sometimes altering the text from design (388, and perhaps 389) more than once quoting or alluding to Homer inaccurately (391-406) after the manner of the early logographers turning the *Iliad* into prose (393) and delighting to draw far fetched inferences from his words or to make ludicrous applications of them. He does not like Heracleitus, get into a rage with Homer and Archilochus (Heracl. Frag. 119, ed. Bywater) but uses their words and expressions as vehicles of a higher truth, not on a system like Theagenes of Rhegium or Metrodorus or in later times the Stoics but as fancy may dictate. And the conclusions drawn from them are sound although the premises are fictitious. These fanciful appeals to Homer add a charm to Plato's style and at the same time they have the effect of a satire on the follies of Homeric interpretation. To us (and probably to himself) although they take the form of arguments they are really figures of speech. They may be compared with modern citations from Scripture, which have often a great rhetorical power even when the original meaning of the words is entirely lost sight of. The real, like the Platonist Socrates as we gather from the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon, was fond of making similar adaptations (1.2.58 n. 6. 11). Great in all ages and times, in religion as

well as in law and literature has been the art of interpretation

2 The style is to conform to the subject and the metre to the style. Notwithstanding the fascination which the word classical exercises over us we can hardly maintain that this rule is observed in all the Greek poetry which has come down to us. We cannot deny that the thought of *en* exceeds the power of lucid expression in Aeschylus and Pindar or that rhetoric gets the better of the thought in the Sophist poet Euripides. Only perhaps in Sophocles is there a perfect harmony of the two. In him alone do we find a grace of language like the beauty of a Greek statue in which there is nothing to add or to take away. At least this is true of single plays or of large portions of them. The connexion in the Tragic Choruses and in the Greek lyric poets is not unfrequently a tangled thread which in an age before logic the poet was unable to draw out. Many thoughts and feelings mingled in his mind, and he had no power of disengaging or arranging them. For there is a subtle influence of logic which requires to be transferred from prose to poetry just as the music and perfection of language are infused by poetry into prose. In all ages the poet has been a bad judge of his own meaning (Apol. 22 B) for he does not see that the word which is full of associations to his own mind is difficult and unmeaning to that of another, or that the sequence which is clear to himself is puzzling to others. There are many passages in some of our greatest modern poets which are far too obscure in which there is no proportion between style and subject in which any half expressed figure any harsh construction, any distorted collocation of words any remote sequence of ideas is admitted and there is no voice coming sweetly from nature or music adding the expression of feeling to thought. As if there could be poetry without beauty or beauty without ease and clearness. The obscurities of early Greek poets arose necessarily out of the state of language and logic which existed in their age. They are not examples to be followed by us for the use of language ought

in every generation to become clearer and clearer. Like Shakespeare they were great in spite not in consequence of their imperfections of expression. But there is no reason for returning to the necessary obscurity which prevailed in the infancy of literature. The English poets of the last century were certainly not obscure and we have no excuse for losing what they had gained or for going back to the earlier or transitional age which preceded them. The thought of our own times has not outstripped language—a want of Plato's art of measuring is the real cause of the disproportion between them.

3 In the third book of the *Republic* a nearer approach is made to a theory of art than anywhere else in Plato. His views may be summed up as follows.—True art is not fanciful and imitative but simple and ideal,—the expression of the highest moral energy whether in action or repose. To live among works of plastic art which are of this noble and simple character or to listen to such strains is the best of influences—the true Greek atmosphere in which youth should be brought up. That is the way to create in them a natural good taste which will have a feeling of truth and beauty in all things. For though the poets are to be expelled, still art is recognized as another aspect of reason—like love in the *Symposium* extending over the same sphere but confined to the preliminary education, and acting through the power of habit (vii 522 A) and this conception of art is not limited to strains of music or the forms of plastic art, but pervades all nature and has a wide kindred in the world. The *Republic* of Plato like the Athens of Pericles has an artistic as well as a political side.

There is hardly any mention in Plato of the creative arts only in two or three passages does he even allude to them (cp *Rep* iv 420 *Soph* 236 A). He is not lost in rapture at the great works of Phidias the Parthenon the Propylea, the statues of Zeus or Athene. He would probably have regarded any abstract truth of number or figure (529 E) as higher than the greatest of them. Yet it is hard to see that some

influence such as he hopes to inspire in youth did not pass into his own mind from the works of art which he saw around him. We are living upon the fragments of them and find in a few broken stones the standard of truth and beauty. But in Plato this feeling has no expression. He nowhere says that beauty is the object of art. He seems to deny that wisdom can take an external form (*Phaedrus* 250 E). He does not distinguish the fine from the mechanical arts. Whether or no like some writers he felt more than he expressed it is at any rate remarkable that the greatest perfection of the fine arts should coincide with an almost entire silence about them. In one very striking passage (*iv* 420) he tells us that a work of art like the State is a whole and this conception of a whole and the love of the newly born mathematical sciences may be regarded, if not as the inspiring at any rate as the regulating principles of Greek art (cp *Xen. Mem.* iii 10 6 and *Sophist* 235 2, 36).

4. Plato makes the true and subtle remark that the physician had better not be in robust health and should have known what illness is in his own person. But the judge ought to have had no similar experience of evil. He is to be a good man who having passed his youth in innocence became acquainted late in life with the vices of others. And therefore according to Plato a judge should not be young just as a young man according to Aristotle is not fit to be a hearer of moral philosophy. The bad on the other hand, have a knowledge of vice but no knowledge of virtue. It may be doubted, however whether this train of reflection is well founded. In a remarkable passage of the *Laws* (*xii* 950 B) it is acknowledged that the evil may form a correct estimate of the good. The union of gentleness and courage in Book II at first seemed to be a paradox yet was afterwards ascertained to be a truth. And Plato might also have found that the intuition of evil may be consistent with the abhorrence of it (cp *infra*, ix 582). There is a directness of aim in virtue which gives an insight into vice. And the knowledge of character is in some degree a

natural sense independent of any special experience of good or evil

5 One of the most remarkable conceptions of Plato because un Greek and also very different from anything which existed at all in his age of the world, is the transposition of ranks. In the Spartan state there had been enfranchisement of Helots and degradation of citizens under special circumstances. And in the ancient Greek aristocracies merit was certainly recognized as one of the elements on which government was based. The founders of states were supposed to be their benefactors who were raised by their great actions above the ordinary level of humanity. at a later period the services of warriors and legislators were held to entitle them and their descendants to the privileges of citizenship and to the first rank in the state. And although the existence of an ideal aristocracy is slenderly proven from the remains of early Greek history and we have a difficulty in ascribing such a character however the idea may be defined to any actual Hellenic state—or indeed to any state which has ever existed in the world—still the rule of the best was certainly the aspiration of philosophers who probably accommodated a good deal their views of primitive history to their own notions of good government. Plato further insists on applying to the guardians of his state a series of tests by which all those who fell short of a fixed standard were either removed from the governing body or not admitted to it and this academic discipline did to a certain extent prevail in Greek states especially in Sparta. He also indicates that the system of caste which existed in a great part of the ancient and is by no means extinct in the modern European world should be set aside from time to time in favour of merit. He is aware how deeply the greater part of mankind resent any interference with the order of society and therefore he proposes his novel idea in the form of what he himself calls a monstrous fiction. (Compare the ceremony of preparation for the two great waves in Book V) Two principles are indicated by him first, that there is a distinction of

ranks dependent on circumstances proper to the individual second that this distinction is and ought to be broken through by personal qualities. He adapts mythology like the Homeric poems to the wants of the state making the Phoenician tale the vehicle of his ideas. Every Greek state had a myth respecting its own origin. the Platonic republic may also have a tale of earthborn men. The gravity and verisimilitude with which the tale is told and the analogy of Greek tradition are a sufficient verification of the monstrous falsehood. Ancient poetry had spoken of a gold and silver and brass and iron age succeeding one another but Plato supposes these differences in the natures of men to exist together in a single state. Mythology supplies a figure under which the lesson may be taught (as Protagoras says the myth is more interesting) and also enables Plato to touch lightly on new principles without going into details. In this passage he shadows forth a general truth but he does not tell us by what steps the transposition of ranks is to be effected. Indeed throughout the Republic he allows the lower ranks to fade into the distance. We do not know whether they are to carry arms and whether in the fifth book they are or are not included in the communistic regulations respecting property and marriage. Nor is there any use in arguing strictly either from a few chance words or from the silence of Plato or in drawing inferences which were beyond his vision. Aristotle in his criticism on the position of the lower classes does not perceive that the poetical creation is like the air invulnerable and cannot be penetrated by the shafts of his logic (Pol. 2. 5. 18 foll.)

6 Two paradoxes which strike the modern reader as in the highest degree fanciful and ideal and which suggest to him many reflections, are to be found in the third book of the Republic. first the great power of music so much beyond any influence which is experienced by us in modern times when the art or science has been far more developed, and has found the secret of harmony as well as of melody

secondly the ind finite and almost absolute control which the soul is supposed to exercise over the body

In the first we suspect some degree of exaggeration such as we may also observe among certain masters of the art not unknown to us at the present day With this natural enthusiasm which is felt by a few only there seems to mingle in Plato a sort of Pythagorean reverence for numbers and numerical proportion to which Aristotle is a stranger Intervals of sound and number are to him sacred things which have a law of their own not dependent on the variations of sense They rise above sense and become a connecting link with the world of ideas But it is evident that Plato is describing what to him appears to be also a fact The power of a simple and characteristic melody on the impressible mind of the Greek is more than we can easily appreciate The effect of national airs may bear some comparison with it And besides all this there is a confusion between the harmony of musical notes and the harmony of soul and body which is so potently inspired by them

The second paradox leads up to some curious and interesting questions—How far can the mind control the body? Is the relation between them one of mutual antagonism or of mutual harmony? Are they two or one and is either of them the cause of the other? May we not at times drop the opposition between them, and the mode of describing them which is so familiar to us and yet hardly conveys any precise meaning and try to view this composite creature man, in a more simple manner Must we not at any rate admit that there is in human nature a higher and a lower principle, divided by no distinct line which at times break asunder and take up arms against one another? Or again they are reconciled and move together either unconsciously in the ordinary work of life or consciously in the pursuit of some noble aim, to be attained not without an effort and for which every thought and nerve are strained And then the body becomes the good friend or ally or servant or instrument of the mind And the mind has often a wonderful and almost superhuman

power of banishing disease and weakness and calling out a hidden strength. Reason and the desires, the intellect and the senses are brought into harmony and obedience so as to form a single human being. They are ever parting, ever meeting, and the identity or diversity of their tendencies or operations is for the most part unnoticed by us. When the mind touches the body through the appetites, we acknowledge the responsibility of the one to the other. There is a tendency in us which says, Drink. There is another which says, Do not drink, it is not good for you. And we all of us know which is the rightful superior. We are also responsible for our health, although into this sphere there enter some elements of necessity which may be beyond our control. Still even in the management of health, care and thought, continued over many years, may make us almost free agents, if we do not exact too much of ourselves, and if we acknowledge that all human freedom is limited by the laws of nature and of mind.

We are disappointed to find that Plato, in the general condemnation which he passes on the practice of medicine prevailing in his own day, depreciates the effects of diet. He would like to have diseases of a definite character and capable of receiving a definite treatment. He is afraid of invalidism interfering with the business of life. He does not recognize that time is the great healer both of mental and bodily disorders, and that remedies which are gradual and proceed little by little are safer than those which produce a sudden catastrophe. Neither does he see that there is no way in which the mind can more surely influence the body than by the control of eating and drinking, or any other action or occasion of human life on which the higher freedom of the will can be more simply or truly asserted.

7 Lesser matters of style may be remarked. (1) The affected ignorance of music, which is Plato's way of expressing that he is passing lightly over the subject. (2) The tentative manner in which here, as in the second book, he proceeds with the construction of the State. (3) The description of the

State sometimes as a reality (389 D 416 B) and then again as a work of imagination only (cp 534 C 592 B), these are the arts by which he sustains the reader's interest (4) Connecting links (e.g. 408 C with 379) or the preparation (394 D) for the entire expulsion of the poets in Book X (5) The companion pictures of the lover of litigation and the valetudinarian (405) the satirical jest about the maxim of Phocylides (407) the manner in which the image of the gold and silver citizens is taken up into the subject (416 E) and the argument from the practice of Asclepius (407) should not escape notice

Book IV Adeimantus said Suppose a person to argue Socrates that you make your citizens miserable and this by their own free-will, they are the lords of the city and yet instead of having like other men, lands and houses and money of their own they live as mercenaries and are always mounting guard.' You may add, I replied, that they receive no pay but only their food, and have no money to spend on a journey or a mistress Well and what answer do you give? My answer is that our guardians may or may not be the happiest of men—I should not be surprised to find in the long-run that they were,—but this is not the aim of our constitution which was designed for the good of the whole and not of any one part If I went to a sculptor and blamed him for having painted the eye which is the noblest feature of the face, not purple but black he would reply The eye must be an eye and you should look at the statue as a whole. Now I can well imagine a fool's paradise in which everybody is eating and drinking clothed in purple and fine linen, and potters lie on sofas and have their wheel at hand, that they may work a little when they please and cobblers and all the other classes of a State lose their distinctive character And a State may get on without cobblers but when the guardians degenerate into boon companions, then the ruin is complete Remember that we are not talking of peasants keeping holiday but of a State in which every man is expected to do his own

work. The happiness resides not in this or that class but in the State as a whole. I have another remark to make — A middle condition is best for artists — they should have money enough to buy tools and not enough to be independent of business. And will not the same condition be best for our citizens? If they are poor they will be mean, if rich, luxurious and lazy and in neither case contented. But then how will our poor city be able to go to war against an enemy who has money? There may be a difficulty in fighting against one enemy — against two there will be none. In the first place the contest will be carried on by trained warriors against well-to-do citizens and is not a regular athlete an easy match for two stout opponents at least? Suppose also that before engaging we send ambassadors to one of the two cities saying 'Silver and gold we have not do you help us and take our share of the spoil' — who would fight against the lean, wiry dogs when they might join with them in preying upon the fatted sheep? But if many states join their resources shall we not be in danger? I am amused to hear you use the word state of any but our own State. They are states but not a state — many in one. For in every state there are two hostile nations rich and poor which you may set one against the other. But our State while she remains true to her principles will be in very deed the mightiest of Hellenic states.

To the size of the state there is no limit but the necessity of unity — it must be neither too large nor too small to be one. This is a matter of secondary importance like the principle of transposition which was intimated in the parable of the earthborn men. The meaning there implied was that every man should do that for which he was fitted and be at one with himself and then the whole city would be united. But all these things are secondary if education which is the great matter be duly regarded. When the wheel has once been set in motion the speed is always increasing and each generation improves upon the preceding both in physical and moral qualities. The care of the governors should be

directed to preserve music and gymnastic from innovation alter the songs of a country Damon says and you will soon end by altering its laws The change appears innocent at first, and begins in play but the evil soon becomes serious working secretly upon the characters of individuals then upon social and commercial relations and lastly upon the institutions of a state and there is ruin and confusion everywhere But if education remains in the established form there will be no danger A restorative process will be always going on the spirit of law and order will raise up what has fallen down No will any regulations be needed for the lesser matters of life—rules of deportment or fashions of dress Like invites like for good or for evil Education will correct deficiencies and supply the power of self government Far be it from us to enter into the particulars of legislation let the guardians take care of education and education will take care of all other things

But without education they may patch and mend as they please they will make no progress any more than a patient who thinks to cure himself by some favourite remedy and will not give up his luxurious mode of living If you tell such persons that they must first alter their habits then they grow angry they are charming people. Charming—nay the very reverse Evidently these gentlemen are not in your good graces nor the state which is like them And such states there are which first ordain under penalty of death that no one shall alter the constitution, and then suffer themselves to be flattered into and out of anything and he who indulges them and fawns upon them is their leader and saviour Yes the men are as bad as the states But do you not admire their cleverness? Nay some of them are stupid enough to believe what the people tell them And when all the world is telling a man that he is six feet high and he has no measure, how can he believe anything else? But don't get into a passion to see our statesmen trying their nostrums, and fancying that they can cut off at a blow the Hydra like rogueries of mankind, is as good as a play Minute

ments are superfluous in good states and are useless in bad ones

And now what remains of the work of legislation? Nothing for us but to Apollo the god of Delphi we leave the ordering of the greatest of all things—this is to say religion. Only our ancestral deity sitting upon the centre and navel of the earth will be trusted by us if we have any sense, in an affair of such magnitude. No foreign god shall be supreme in our realms

Here as Socrates would say let us reflect on (*σκοπωμεν*) what has preceded thus far we have spoken not of the happiness of the citizens but only of the well being of the State. They may be the happiest of men but our principal aim in founding the State was not to make them happy. They were to be guardians not holiday makers. In this pleasant manner is presented to us the famous question both of ancient and modern philosophy touching the relation of duty to happiness of right to utility

First duty then happiness is the natural order of our moral ideas. The utilitarian principle is valuable as a corrective of error and shows to us a side of ethics which is apt to be neglected. It may be admitted further that right and utility are co extensive and that he who makes the happiness of mankind his object has one of the highest and noblest motives of human action. But utility is not the historical basis of morality nor the aspect in which moral and religious ideas commonly occur to the mind. The greatest happiness of all is as we believe the far off result of the divine government of the universe. The greatest happiness of the individual is certainly to be found in a life of virtue and goodness. But we seem to be more assured of a law of right than we can be of a divine purpose, that all mankind should be saved and we infer the one from the other. And the greatest happiness of the individual may be the reverse of the greatest happiness in the ordinary sense of the term and may be realized in a life of pain or in a voluntary death. Further the word 'happiness' has several ambiguities it may mean

either pleasure or an ideal life happiness subjective or objective in this world or in another of ourselves only or of our neighbours and of all men everywhere. By the modern founder of Utilitarianism the self regarding and disinterested motives of action are included under the same term, although they are commonly opposed by us as benevolence and self love. The word happiness has not the definiteness or the sacredness of 'truth and right' it does not equally appeal to our higher nature and has not sunk into the conscience of mankind. It is associated too much with the comforts and conveniences of life too little with the goods of the soul which we desire for their own sake'. In a great trial or danger or temptation or in any great and heroic action it is scarcely thought of. For these reasons the greatest happiness principle is not the true foundation of ethics. But though not the first principle it is the second, which is like unto it and is often of easier application. For the larger part of human actions are neither right nor wrong except in so far as they tend to the happiness of mankind (cp. *Introd. to Gorgias and Philebus*).

The same question reappears in politics where the useful or expedient seems to claim a larger sphere and to have a greater authority. For concerning political measures we chiefly ask: How will they affect the happiness of mankind? Yet here too we may observe that what we term expediency is merely the law of right limited by the conditions of human society. Right and truth are the highest aims of government as well as of individuals and we ought not to lose sight of them because we cannot directly enforce them. They appeal to the better mind of nations and sometimes they are too much for merely temporal interests to resist. They are the watchwords which all men use in matters of public policy as well as in their private dealings, the peace of Europe may be said to depend upon them. In the most commercial and utilitarian states of society the power of ideas remains. And all the higher class of statesmen have in them something of that idealism which Pericles is said to have gathered from

the teaching of Anaxagoras. They recognize that the true leader of men must be above the motives of ambition, and that national character is of greater value than material comfort and prosperity. And this is the order of thought in Plato: first he expects his citizens to do their duty and then under favourable circumstances that is to say in a well ordered State their happiness is assured. That he was far from excluding the modern principle of utility in politics is sufficiently evident from other passages in which the most beneficial is affirmed to be the most honourable (v 457 B), and also the most sacred (v 458 E).

We may note (1) The manner in which the objection of Adeimantus here as in 357 foll 363 vi admit &c is designed to draw out and deepen the argument of Socrates. (2) The conception of a whole as lying at the foundation both of politics and of art in the latter supplying the only principle of criticism which under the various names of harmony symmetry measure proportion unity the Greek seems to have applied to works of art. (3) The requirement that the State should be limited in size after the traditional model of a Greek state as in the Politics of Aristotle (vii 4, &c) the fact that the cities of Hellas were small is converted into a principle. (4) The humorous pictures of the lean dogs and the fatted sheep of the light active boxer upsetting two stout gentlemen at least of the charming patients who are always making themselves worse or again, the playful assumption that there is no State but our own or the grave irony with which the statesman is excused who believes that he is six feet high because he is told so and having nothing to measure with is to be pardoned for his ignorance—he is too amusing for us to be seriously angry with him. (5) The light and superficial manner in which religion is passed over when provision has been made for two great principles—first, that religion shall be based on the highest conception of the gods (ii 377 foll), secondly that the true national or Hellenic type shall be maintained.

Socrates proceeds. But where amid all this is justice?

Son of Ariston tell me where I light a candle and search the city and get your brother and the rest of our friends to help in seeking for her That won't do replied Glaucon, you yourself promised to make the search and talked about the impiety of deserting justice Well, I said, I will lead the way but do you follow My notion is that our State being perfect will contain all the four virtues—wisdom, courage, temperance, justice If we eliminate the three first, the unknown remainder will be justice

First then of wisdom the State which we have called into being will be wise because politic And policy is one among many kinds of skill—not the skill of the carpenter or of the worker in metal or of the husbandman but the skill of him who advises about the interests of the whole State Of such a kind is the skill of the guardians who are a small class in number far smaller than the blacksmiths but in them is concentrated the wisdom of the State And if this small ruling class have wisdom then the whole State will be wise

Our second virtue is courage which we have no difficulty in finding in another class—that of soldiers Courage may be defined as a sort of salvation—the never failing salvation of the opinions which law and education have prescribed concerning dangers You know the way in which dyers first prepare the white ground and then lay on the dye of purple or of any other colour Colours dyed in this way become fixed and no soap or lye will ever wash them out Now the ground is education and the laws are the colours and if the ground is properly laid, neither the soap of pleasure nor the lye of pain or fear will ever wash them out This power which preserves right opinion about danger I would ask you to call 'courage' adding the epithet 'political' or 'civilized' in order to distinguish it from mere animal courage and from a higher courage which may hereafter be discussed

Two virtues remain temperance and justice More than the preceding virtues temperance suggests the idea of
Some light is thrown upon the nature of

virtue by the popular description of a man as master of himself—which has an absurd sound because the master is also the servant. The expression really means that the better principle in a man masters the worse. There are in cities whole classes—women, slaves and the like—who correspond to the worse and a few only to the better and in our State the former class are held under control by the latter. Now to which of these classes does temperance belong? To both of them. And our State if any will be the abode of temperance and we were right in describing this virtue as a harmony which is diffused through the whole making the dwellers in the city to be of one mind and attuning the upper and middle and lower classes like the strings of an instrument whether you suppose them to differ in wisdom strength or wealth.

And now we are near the spot let us draw in and surround the cover and watch with all our eyes lest justice should slip away and escape. Tell me if you see the thicket move first.

Nay I would have you lead. Well then offer up a prayer and follow. The way is dark and difficult but we must push on. I begin to see a track. Good news! Why Glaucon our dullness of scent is quite ludicrous! While we are straining our eyes into the distance justice is tumbling out at our feet. We are as bad as people looking for a thing which they have in their hands. Have you forgotten our old principle of the division of labour or of every man doing his own business concerning which we spoke at the foundation of the State—what but this was justice? Is there any other virtue remaining which can compete with wisdom and temperance and courage in the scale of political virtue? For every one having his own is the great object of government and the great object of trade is that every man should do his own business. Not that there is much harm in a carpenter trying to be a cobbler or a cobbler transforming himself into a carpenter but great evil may arise from the cobbler leaving his last and turning into a guardian or legislator or when a single individual is trainer warrior legislator all in one. And this evil is in use, or every man

doing another's business. I do not say that as yet we are in a condition to arrive at a final conclusion. For the definition which we believe to hold good in states has still to be tested by the individual. Having read the large letters we will now come back to the small. From the two together a brilliant light may be struck out.

Socrates proceeds to discover the nature of justice by a method of residues. Each of the first three virtues corresponds to one of the three parts of the soul and one of the three classes in the State, although the third temperance has more of the nature of a harmony than the first two. If there be a fourth virtue that can only be sought for in the relation of the three parts in the soul or classes in the State to one another. It is obvious and simple and for that very reason has not been found out. The modern logician will be inclined to object that ideas cannot be separated like chemical substances but that they run into one another and may be only different aspects or names of the same thing and such in this instance appears to be the case. For the definition here given of justice is verbally the same as one of the definitions of temperance given by Socrates in the *Charmides* (162 A) which however is only provisional, and is afterwards rejected. And so far from justice remaining over when the other virtues are eliminated the justice and temperance of the Republic can with difficulty be distinguished. Temperance appears to be the virtue of a part only and one of three whereas justice is a universal virtue of the whole soul. Yet on the other hand temperance is also described as a sort of harmony and in this respect is akin to justice. Justice seems to differ from temperance in degree rather than in kind whereas temperance is the harmony of discordant elements justice is the perfect order by which all natures and classes do their own business the right man in the right place the division and co operation of all the citizens. Justice, again is a more abstract notion than the other virtues and therefore from Plato's point of view the foundation of them, to which they are referred and which in dea

precedes them. The proposal to omit temperance is a mere trick of style intended to avoid monotony (cp vii 528)

There is a famous question discussed in one of the earlier Dialogues of Plato (*Protagoras* 329-330 cp *Arist. Nic. Ethics* vi 13-6). Whether the virtues are one or many? This receives an answer which is to the effect that there are four cardinal virtues (now for the first time brought together in ethical philosophy) and one supreme over the rest, which is not like Aristotle's conception of universal justice, virtue relative to others but the whole of virtue relative to the parts. To this universal conception of justice or order in the first education and in the moral nature of man the still more universal conception of the good in the second education and in the sphere of speculative knowledge seems to succeed. Both might be equally described by the terms law order harmony but while the idea of good embraces all time and all existence the conception of justice is not extended beyond man.

Socrates is now going to identify the individual and the State. But first he must prove that there are three parts of the individual soul. His argument is as follows — Quantity makes no difference in quality. The word just whether applied to the individual or to the State, has the same meaning. And the term justice implied that the same three principles in the State and in the individual were doing their own business. But are they really three or one? The question is difficult and one which can hardly be solved by the methods which we are now using but the truer and longer way would take up too much of our time. The shorter will satisfy me. Well then you would admit that the qualities of states mean the qualities of the individuals who compose them? The Scythians and Thracians are passionate our own race intellectual and the Egyptians and Phoenicians covetous because the individual members of each have such and such a character, the difficulty is to determine whether the several principles are one or three whether that is to say we reason with one part of our nature

desire with another are angry with another or whether the whole soul comes into play in each sort of action. This inquiry however requires a very exact definition of terms. The same thing in the same relation cannot be affected in two opposite ways. But there is no impossibility in a man standing still yet moving his arms or in a top which is fixed on one spot going round upon its axis. There is no necessity to mention all the possible exceptions. Let us provisionally assume that opposites cannot do or be or suffer opposites in the same relation. And to the class of opposites belong assent and dissent desire and avoidance. And one form of desire is thirst and hunger and here arises a new point—thirst is thirst of drink hunger is hunger of food not of warm drink or of a particular kind of food with the single exception of course that the very fact of our desiring any thing implies that it is good. When relative terms have no attributes their correlatives have no attributes when they have attributes their correlatives also have them. For example the term greater is simply relative to less and knowledge refers to a subject of knowledge. But on the other hand a particular knowledge is of a particular subject. Again every science has a distinct character which is defined by an object medicine, for example is the science of health, although not to be confounded with health. Having cleared our ideas thus far let us return to the original instance of thirst which has a definite object—drink. Now the thirsty soul may feel two distinct impulses the animal one saying Drink the rational one, which says Do not drink. The two impulses are contradictory and therefore we may assume that they spring from distinct principles in the soul. But is passion a third principle or akin to desire? There is a story of a certain Leontius which throws some light on this question. He was coming up from the Piræus outside the north wall and he passed a spot where there were dead bodies lying by the executioner. He felt a longing desire to see them and also an abhorrence of them at first he turned away and shut his eyes then, y tearing them open,

he said — 'Take your fill ye wretches of the far sight Now is there not here a third principle which is often found to come to the assistance of reason against desire but never of desire against reason? This is passion or spirit, of the separate existence of which we may further convince ourselves by putting the following case — When a man suffers justly if he be of a generous nature he is not indignant at the hardships which he undergoes but when he suffers unjustly his indignation is his great support hunger and thirst cannot tame him the spirit within him must do or die, until the voice of the shepherd that is of reason bidding his dog bark no more is heard within This shows that passion is the ally of reason Is passion then the same with reason? No for the former exists in children and brutes and Homer affords a proof of the distinction between them when he says He smote his breast and thus rebuked his soul'

And now at last, we have reached firm ground and are able to infer that the virtues of the State and of the individual are the same For wisdom and courage and justice in the State are severally the wisdom and courage and justice in the individuals who form the State Each of the three classes will do the work of its own class in the State, and each part in the individual soul reason the superior and passion, the inferior will be harmonized by the influence of music and gymnastic The counsellor and the warrior the head and the arm will act together in the town of Mansoul and keep the desires in proper subjection. The courage of the warrior is that quality which preserves a right opinion about dangers in spite of pleasures and pains The wisdom of the counsellor is that small part of the soul which has authority and reason The virtue of temperance is the friendship of the ruling and the subject principles both in the State and in the individual Of justice we have already spoken and the notion already given of it may be confirmed by common instances Will the just state or the just individual steal lie, commit adultery or be guilty or impious to gods and men? No And is not the reason of this that the several principles, whether in the

state or in the individual, do their own business? And justice is the quality which makes just men and just states. Moreover our old division of labour which required that there should be one man for one use was a dream or anticipation of what was to follow and that dream has now been realized in justice which begins by binding together the three chords of the soul, and then acts harmoniously in every relation of life. And injustice, which is the insubordination and disobedience of the inferior elements in the soul, is the opposite of justice and is inharmonious and unnatural, being to the soul what disease is to the body for in the soul as well as in the body good or bad actions produce good or bad habits. And virtue is the health and beauty and well being of the soul and vice is the disease and weakness and deformity of the soul.

Again the old question returns upon us. Is justice or injustice the more profitable? The question has become ridiculous. For injustice like mortal disease, makes life not worth having. Come up with me to the hill which overhangs the city and look down upon the single form of virtue and the infinite forms of vice among which are four special ones, characteristic both of states and of individuals. And the state which corresponds to the single form of virtue is that which we have been describing wherein reason rules under one of two names—monarchy and aristocracy. Thus there are five forms in all both of states and of souls.

In attempting to prove that the soul has three separate faculties Plato takes occasion to discuss what makes difference of faculties. And the criterion which he proposes is difference in the working of the faculties. The same faculty cannot produce contradictory effects. But the path of early reasoners is beset by thorny entanglements, and he will not proceed a step without first clearing the ground. This leads him into a tiresome digression which is intended to explain the nature of contradiction. First the contradiction must be at the same time and in the same relation. Secondly no extraneous word must be introduced into either of the in which

the contradictory proposition is expressed for example thirst is of drink not of warm drink. He implies what he does not say that if by the advice of reason or by the impulse of anger a man is restrained from drinking this proves that thirst or desire under which thirst is included is distinct from anger and reason. But suppose that we allow the term thirst or desire to be modified, and say an angry thirst or a revengeful desire then the two spheres of desire and anger overlap and become confused. This case therefore has to be excluded. And still there remains an exception to the rule in the use of the term good which is always implied in the object of desire. These are the discussions of an age before logic and any one who is wearied by them should remember that they are necessary to the clearing up of ideas in the first development of the human faculties.

The psychology of Plato extends no further than the division of the soul into the rational irascible, and concupiscent elements which, as far as we know was first made by him, and has been retained by Aristotle and succeeding ethical writers. The chief difficulty in this early analysis of the mind is to define exactly the place of the irascible faculty (*θυμός*) which may be variously described under the terms righteous indignation spirit, passion. It is the foundation of courage which includes in Plato moral courage the courage of enduring pain and of surmounting intellectual difficulties as well as of meeting dangers in war. Though irrational it inclines to side with the rational it cannot be aroused by punishment when justly inflicted it sometimes takes the form of an enthusiasm which sustains a man in the performance of great actions. It is the lion heart with which the reason makes a treaty (x 589 B). On the other hand it is negative rather than positive it is indignant at wrong or falsehood but does not like Love in the Symposium and Phaedrus aspire to the vision of Truth or Good. It is the peremptory military spirit which prevails in the government of honour. It differs from anger (*δράγη*) this latter term

having no accessory notion of righteous indignation. Although Aristotle has retained the word yet we may observe that passion (*θυμος*) has with him lost its affinity to the rational and has become indistinguishable from anger' (*οργη*). And to this vernacular use Plato himself in the *Laws* seems to revert (ix 836 B) though not always (v 731 A). By modern philosophy too as well as in our ordinary conversation, the words anger or passion are employed almost exclusively in a bad sense there is no connotation of a just or reasonable cause by which they are aroused. The feeling of righteous indignation' is too partial and accidental to admit of our regarding it as a separate virtue or habit. We are tempted also to doubt whether Plato is right in supposing that an offender however justly condemned could be expected to acknowledge the justice of his sentence this is the spirit of a philosopher or martyr rather than of a criminal.

We may observe (p 444 D E) how nearly Plato approaches Aristotle's famous thesis that good actions produce good habits. The words as healthy practices (*επιτηδεύματα*) produce health so do just practices produce justice have a sound very like the *Nicomachean Ethics*. But we note also that an incidental remark in Plato has become a far reaching principle in Aristotle, and an inseparable part of a great Ethical system.

There is a difficulty in understanding what Plato meant by the longer way (435 D *cp infra vi 504*) he seems to intimate some metaphysic of the future which will not be satisfied with arguing from the principle of contradiction. In the sixth and seventh books (compare *Sophist* and *Parmenides*) he has given us a sketch of such a metaphysic but when Glaucon asks for the final revelation of the idea of good he is put off with the declaration that he has not yet studied the preliminary sciences. How he would have filled up the sketch, or argued about such questions from a higher point of view we can only conjecture. Perhaps he hoped to find some *a priori* method of developing the parts out of the whole or he might have asked which of the ideas con-

tains the other ideas and possibly have stumbled on the Hegelian identity of the ego and the universal. Or he may have imagined that ideas might be constructed in some manner analogous to the construction of figures and numbers in the mathematical sciences. The most certain and necessary truth was to Plato the universal and to this he was always seeking to refer all knowledge or opinion just as in modern times we seek to rest them on the opposite pole of induction and experience. The aspirations of metaphysicians have always tended to pass beyond the limits of human thought and language—they seem to have reached a height at which they are moving about in worlds unrealized and their conceptions although profoundly affecting their own minds become invisible or unintelligible to others. We are not therefore surprised to find that Plato himself has nowhere clearly explained his doctrine of ideas or that his school in a later generation like his contemporaries Glaucon and Adeimantus, were unable to follow him in this region of speculation. In the *Sophist*, where he is refuting the scepticism which maintained either that there was no such thing as predication or that all might be predicated of all he arrives at the conclusion that some ideas combine with some but not all with all. But he makes only one or two steps forward on this path—he nowhere attains to any connected system of ideas or even to a knowledge of the most elementary relations of the sciences to one another (see *infra*)

Book V I was going to enumerate the four forms of vice or decline in states when Polemarchus—he was sitting a little farther from me than Adeimantus—taking him by the coat and leaning towards him said something in an undertone of which I only caught the words ‘Shall we let him off?’ Certainly not, said Adeimantus raising his voice. Whom I said are you not going to let off? You? he said. Why? Because we think that you are not dealing fairly with us in omitting women and children, of whom you have shily disposed under the general formula that friends have all things

in common And was I not right? Yes he replied, but there are many sorts of communism or community and we want to know which of them is right The company as you have just heard, are resolved to have a further explanation Thrasymachus said Do you think that we have come hither to dig for gold, or to hear you discourse? Yes I said but the discourse should be of a reasonable length Glaucon added, Yes Socrates and there is reason in spending the whole of life in such discussions but pray without more ado tell us how this community is to be carried out, and how the interval between birth and education is to be filled up Well I said the subject has several difficulties—What is possible? is the first question What is desirable? is the second Fear not he replied for you are speaking among friends That I replied is a sorry consolation I shall destroy my friends as well as myself Not that I mind a little innocent laughter but he who kills the truth is a murderer

Then, said Glaucon laughing in case you should murder us we will acquit you beforehand and you shall be held free from the guilt of deceiving us

Socrates proceeds —The guardians of our state are to be watch dogs as we have already said Now dogs are not divided into hes and shes—we do not take the masculine gender out to hunt and leave the females at home to look after their puppies They have the same employments—the only difference between them is that the one sex is stronger and the other weaker But if women are to have the same employments as men they must have the same education—they must be taught music and gymnastics and the art of war I know that a great joke will be made of their riding on horseback and carrying weapons the sight of the naked old wrinkled women showing their agility in the palaestra will certainly not be a vision of beauty and may be expected to become a famous jest But we must not mind the wits there was a time when they might have laughed at our present gymnastics All is habi people have at last found out that the exposure is better than the concealment of the

person, and now they laugh no more Evil only should be the subject of ridicule

The first question is whether women are able either wholly or partially to share in the employments of men And here we may be charged with inconsistency in making the proposal at all For we started originally with the division of labour and the diversity of employments was based on the difference of nature But is there no difference between men and women? Nay are they not wholly different? *There* was the difficulty Glaucon, which made me unwilling to speak of family relations However when a man is out of his depth, whether in a pool or in an ocean, he can only swim for his life, and we must try to find a way of escape if we can

The argument is that different natures have different uses and the natures of men and women are said to differ But this is only a verbal opposition We do not consider that the difference may be purely nominal and accidental for example a bald man and a hairy man are opposed in a single point of view but you cannot infer that because a bald man is a cobbler a hairy man ought not to be a cobbler Now why is such an inference erroneous? Simply because the opposition between them is partial only like the difference between a male physician and a female physician not running through the whole nature, like the difference between a physician and a carpenter And if the difference of the sexes is only that the one beget and the other bear children this does not prove that they ought to have distinct educations Admitting that women differ from men in capacity do not men equally differ from one another? Has not nature scattered all the qualities which our citizens require indifferently up and down among the two sexes? and even in their peculiar pursuits are not women often though in some cases superior to men ridiculously enough surpassed by them? Women are the same in kind as men, and have the same aptitude or want of aptitude for medicine or gymnastic or war but in a less degree One woman will be a good guardian, another not and the good must be chosen to be the colleagues of

our guardians. If however their natures are the same the inference is that their education must also be the same. There is no longer anything unnatural or impossible in a woman learning music and gymnastic. And the education which we give them will be the very best far superior to that of cobblers and will train up the very best women, and nothing can be more advantageous to the State than this. Therefore let them strip clothed in their chastity and share in the toils of war and in the defence of their country. He who laughs at them is a fool for his pains.

The first wave is past and the argument is compelled to admit that men and women have common duties and pursuits. A second and greater wave is rolling on—community of wives and children. Is this either expedient or possible? The expediency I do not doubt. I am not so sure of the possibility. Nay, I think that a considerable doubt will be entertained on both points. I meant to have escaped the trouble of proving the first, but as you have detected the little stratagem I must even submit. Only allow me to feed my fancy like the solitary in his walks with a dream of what might be, and then I will return to the question of what can be.

In the first place our rulers will enforce the laws and make new ones where they are wanted, and their allies or ministers will obey. You, as legislator have already selected the men and now you shall select the women. After the selection has been made, they will dwell in common houses and have their meals in common, and will be brought together by a necessity more certain than that of mathematics. But they cannot be allowed to live in licentiousness—that is an unholy thing which the rulers are determined to prevent. For the avoidance of this holy marriage festivals will be instituted and their holiness will be in proportion to their usefulness. And here Glaucon, I should like to ask (as I know that you are a breeder of birds and animals) Do you not take the greatest care in the mating? Certainly. And there is no reason to suppose that less care is required in the marriage of

human beings. But then our rulers must be skillful physicians of the State for they will often need a strong dose of falsehood in order to bring about desirable unions between their subjects. The good must be paired with the good and the bad with the bad and the offspring of the one must be reared and of the other destroyed in this way the flock will be preserved in prime condition. Hymeneal festivals will be celebrated at times fixed with an eye to population and the brides and bridegrooms will meet at them and by an ingenious system of lots the rulers will contrive that the brave and the fair come together and that those of inferior breed are paired with inferiors—the latter will ascribe to chance what is really the invention of the rulers. And when children are born the offspring of the brave and fair will be carried to an enclosure in a certain part of the city and there attended by suitable nurses the rest will be hurried away to places unknown. The mothers will be brought to the fold and will suckle the children care however must be taken that none of them recognize their own offspring and if necessary other nurses may also be hired. The trouble of watching and getting up at night will be transferred to attendants. Then the wives of our guardians will have a fine easy time when they are having children. And quite right too I said that they should.

The parents ought to be in the prime of life which for a man may be reckoned at thirty years—from twenty five when he has passed the point at which the speed of life is greatest to fifty five and at twenty years for a woman—from twenty to forty. Any one above or below those ages who partakes in the hymeneals shall be guilty of impiety also every one who forms a marriage connexion at other times without the consent of the rulers. This latter regulation applies to those who are within the specified ages after which they may range at will provided they avoid the prohibited degrees of parents and children or of brothers and sisters which last, however are not absolutely prohibited if a dispensation be procured. But how shall we know the degrees of

affinity when all things are common? The answer is that brothers and sisters are all such as are born seven or nine months after the espousals and their parents those who are then espoused and every one will have many children and every child many parents

Socrates proceeds I have now to prove that this scheme is advantageous and also consistent with our entire polity. The greatest good of a State is unity the greatest evil discord and distraction. And there will be unity where there are no private pleasures or pains or interests—where if one member suffers all the members suffer if one citizen is touched all are quickly sensitive and the least hurt to the little finger of the State runs through the whole body and vibrates to the soul. For the true State like an individual is injured as a whole when any part is affected. Every State has subjects and rulers who in a democracy are called rulers and in other States masters but in our State they are called saviours and allies and the subjects who in other States are termed slaves are by us termed nurturers and paymasters and those who are termed comrades and colleagues in other places are by us called fathers and brothers. And whereas in other States members of the same government regard one of their colleagues as a friend and another as an enemy in our State no man is a stranger to another for every citizen is connected with every other by ties of blood; and these names and this way of speaking will have a corresponding reality—brother father sister mother repeated from infancy in the ears of children will not be mere words. Then again the citizens will have all things in common and having common property they will have common pleasures and pains.

Can there be strife and contention among those who are of one mind or lawsuits about property when men have nothing but their bodies which they call their own or suits about violence when every one is bound to defend himself? The permission to strike when insulted will be an antidote to the knife and will prevent disturbances in the State. But no younger man will strike an elder reverence will prevent

him from laying hands on his kindred and he will fear that the rest of the family may retaliate. Moreover our citizens will be rid of the lesser evils of life—there will be no flattery of the rich, no sordid household cares, no bo rowing and not paying. Compared with the citizens of other States ours will be Olympic victors and crowned with b'essings greater still—hey and their children having a better maintenance during life and after death an honourable burial. Nor has the happiness of the individual been sacrificed to the happiness of the State (cp v 419 E)—our Olympic victor has not been turned into a cobbler but he has a happiness beyond that of any cobbler. At the same time if any conceited youth begins to dream of appropriating the State to himself, he must be reminded that half is better than the whole.

I should certainly advise him to stay where he is when he has the promise of such a brave life.

But is such a community possible?—as among the animals so also among men and if possible in what way possible? About war there is no difficulty—the principle of communism is adapted to military service. Parents will take their children to look on at a battle just as potters' boys are trained to the business by looking on at the wheel. And to the parents themselves as to other animals the sight of their young ones will prove a great incentive to bravery. Young warriors must learn but they must not run into danger although a certain degree of risk is worth incurring when the benefit is great. The young creatures should be placed under the care of experienced veterans and they should have wings—that is to say swift and tractable steeds on which they may fly away and escape. One of the first things to be done is to teach a youth to ride.

Cowards and deserters shall be degraded to the class of husbandmen—gentlemen who allow themselves to be taken prisoners may be presented to the enemy. But what shall be done to the hero? First of all he shall be crowned by all the youths in the army—secondly he shall receive the right hand of fellowship—and thirdly do you think that

there is any harm in his being kissed? We have already determined that he shall have more wives than others in order that he may have as many children as possible. And at a feast he shall have more to eat—we have the authority of Homer for honouring brave men with long chutes which is an appropriate compliment because meat is a very strengthening thing. Fill the bowl then, and give the best seats and meats to the brave—may they do them good! And he who dies in battle will be at once declared to be of the golden race and will as we believe, become one of Hesiod's guardian angels. He shall be worshipped after death in the manner prescribed by the oracle and not only he, but all other benefactors of the State who die in any other way shall be admitted to the same honours.

The next question is How shall we treat our enemies? Shall Hellenes be enslaved? No for there is too great a risk of the whole race passing under the yoke of the barbarians. Or shall the dead be despoiled? Certainly not for that sort of thing is an excuse for skulking and has been the ruin of many an army. There is meanness and feminine malice in making an enemy of the dead body when the soul which was the owner has fled—like a dog who cannot reach his assailants and quarrels with the stones which are thrown at him instead. Again the arms of Hellenes should not be offered up in the temples of the Gods they are a pollution, for they are taken from brethren. And on similar grounds there should be a limit to the devastation of Hellenic territory—the houses should not be burnt nor more than the annual produce carried off. For war is of two kinds civil and foreign the first of which is properly termed discord and only the second war and war between Hellenes is in reality civil war—a quarrel in a family which is ever to be regarded as unpatriotic and unnatural, and ought to be prosecuted with a view to reconciliation in a true phil Hellenic spirit as of those who would chasten but not utterly enslave. The war is not against a whole nation who are a friendly multitude of men women, and children, but only against a few guilty

persons when they are punished peace will be restored. That is the way in which Hellenes should war against one another—and against barbarians as they war against one another now.

But, my dear Socrates, you are forgetting the main question. Is such a State possible? I grant all and more than you say about the blessedness of being one family—fathers, brothers, mothers, daughters going out to war together—but I want to ascertain the possibility of this ideal State. You are too unmerciful. The first wave and the second wave I have hardly escaped, and now you will certainly drown me with the third. When you see the towering crest of the wave I expect you to take pity. Not a whit.

Well, then, we were led to form our ideal polity in the search after justice, and the just man answered to the just State. Is this ideal at all the worse for being impracticable? Would the picture of a perfectly beautiful man be any the worse because no such man ever lived? Can any reality come up to the idea? Nature will not allow words to be fully realized, but if I am to try and realize the ideal of the State in a measure, I think that an approach may be made to the perfection of which I dream by one or two. I do not say slight, but possible changes in the present constitution of States. I would reduce them to a single one—the great wave, as I call it. *Until then, kings are philosophers or philosophers are kings, cities will never cease from ill, no nor the human race, nor will our ideal polity ever come into being.* I know that this is a hard saying, which few will be able to receive. Socrates, all the world will take off his coat and rush upon you with sticks and stones, and therefore I would advise you to prepare an answer. You got me into the scrape, I said. And I was right, he replied, however I will stand by you as a sort of do-nothing, well-meaning ally. Having the help of such a champion, I will do my best to maintain my position. And first I must explain of whom I speak and what sort of natures these are who are to be philosophers and rulers. As you are a man of p . . . e, you

will not have forgotten how indiscriminate lovers are in their attachments they love all, and turn blemishes into beauties The snub nosed youth is said to have a winning grace the beak of another has a royal look the featureless are faultless the dark are manly the fair angels the sickly have a new term of endearment invented expressly for them which is honey pale Lovers of wine and lovers of ambition also desire the objects of their affection in every form Now here comes the point —The philosopher too is a lover of knowledge in every form he has an insatiable curiosity

But will curiosity make a philosopher? Are the lovers of sights and sounds who let out their ears to every chorus at the Dionysiac festivals to be called philosophers? They are not true philosophers but only an imitation Then how are we to describe the true?

You would acknowledge the existence of abstract ideas such as justice beauty good, evil which are severally one yet in their various combinations appear to be many Those who recognize these realities are philosophers whereas the other class hear sounds and see colours and understand their use in the arts but cannot attain to the true or waking vision of absolute justice or beauty or truth they have not the light of knowledge but of opinion, and what they see is a dream only Perhaps he of whom we say the last will be angry with us can we pacify him without revealing the disorder of his mind? Suppose we say that, if he has knowledge we rejoice to hear it but knowledge must be of something which is as ignorance is of something which is not and there is a third thing which both is and is not and is matter of opinion only Opinion and knowledge then having distinct objects must also be distinct faculties. And by 'faculties' I mean powers unseen and distinguishable only by the difference in their objects as opinion and knowledge differ since the one is liable to err but the other is unerring and is the mightiest of all our faculties If being is the object of knowledge and not being of ignorance and these are the two extremes must lie between them, and may

be called darker than the one and brighter than the other. This intermediate or contingent matter is and is not at the same time and partakes both of existence and of non-existence. Now I would ask my good friend who denies abstract beauty and justice and affirms a many beautiful and a many just whether everything he sees is not in some point of view different—the beautiful ugly the pious impious the just unjust? Is not the double also the half and are not heavy and light relative terms which pass into one another? Everything is and is not, as in the old riddle—A man and a man shot and did not shoot a bird and not a bird with a stone and not a stone. The mind cannot be fixed on either alternative and these ambiguous intermediate, erring half lighted objects which have a disorderly movement in the region between being and not being, are the proper matter of opinion as the immutable objects are the proper matter of knowledge. And he who grovels in the world of sense and has only this uncertain perception of things is not a philosopher but a lover of opinion only.

The fifth book is the new beginning of the Republic in which the community of property and of family are first maintained, and the transition is made to the kingdom of philosophers. For both of these Plato after his manner has been preparing in some chance words of Book IV (424 A) which fall unperceived on the reader's mind as they are supposed at first to have fallen on the ear of Glaucon and Adeimantus. The paradoxes as Morgenstern terms them of this book of the Republic will be reserved for another place a few remarks on the style and some explanations of difficulties may be briefly added.

First, there is the image of the waves which serves for a sort of scheme or plan of the book. The first wave the second wave the third and greatest wave come rolling in and we hear the roar of them. All that can be said of the extravagance of Plato's proposals is anticipated by himself. Nothing is more admirable than the hesitation with which he proposes the sole text, *Until kings are philosophers, &c.*

or the reaction from the sublime to the ridiculous when Glaucon describes the manner in which the new truth will be received by mankind.

Some defects and difficulties may be noted in the execution of the communistic plan. Nothing is told us of the application of communism to the lower classes nor is the table of prohibited degrees capable of being made out. It is quite possible that a child born at one hymeneal festival may marry one of its own brothers or sisters or even one of its parents at another. Plato is afraid of incestuous unions but at the same time he does not wish to bring before us the fact that the city would be divided into families of those born seven and nine months after each hymeneal festival. If it were worth while to argue seriously about such fancies we might remark that while all the old affinities are abolished the newly prohibited affinity rests not on any natural or rational principle but only upon the accident of children having been born in the same month and year. Nor does he explain how the lots could be so manipulated by the legislature as to bring together the fairest and best. The singular expression (460 E) which is employed to describe the age of five and twenty may perhaps be taken from some poet.

In the delineation of the philosopher the illustrations of the nature of philosophy derived from love are more suited to the apprehension of Glaucon the Athenian man of pleasure, than to modern tastes or feelings (cp v 474, 475). They are partly facetious but also contain a germ of truth. That science is a whole remains a true principle of inductive as well as of metaphysical philosophy and the love of universal knowledge is still the characteristic of the philosopher in modern as well as in ancient times.

At the end of the fifth book Plato introduces the figment of contingent matter which has exercised so great an influence both on the Ethics and Theology of the modern world and which occurs here for the first time in the history of philosophy. He did not remark that the degrees of knowledge in the subject have nothing corresponding to them in the

object. With him a word must answer to an idea and he could not conceive of an opinion which was an opinion about nothing. The influence of analogy led him to invent parallels and conjugates and to overlook facts. To us some of his difficulties are puzzling only from their simplicity we do not perceive that the answer to them is tumbling out at our feet. To the mind of early thinkers the conception of not being was dark and mysterious (Sophist 254 A) they did not see that this terrible apparition which threatened destruction to all knowledge was only a logical determination. The common term under which through the accidental use of language, two entirely different ideas were included was another source of confusion. Thus through the ambiguity of *δοκεῖν φαίνεται εοικειν κ-λ* Plato attempting to introduce order into the first chaos of human thought seems to have confused perception and opinion, and to have failed to distinguish the contingent from the relative. In the Theaetetus the first of these difficulties begins to clear up in the Sophist the second and for this as well as for other reasons both these dialogues are probably to be regarded as later than the Republic.

THE REPUBLIC

BOOK I

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE

SOCRATES *who is the narrator*

CEPHALUS.

GLAUCON

THRASYMACHUS

ADIMANTUS

CLEITOPHON

POLEMARCHUS

And others who are mute auditors

The scene is laid in the house of Cephalus at the Piræus a dithyrambic whole dialog narrated by Socrates the day after it actually took place at Timæus Hermocrates Critias, and a lameless person who are introduced in the Timæus.

I WENT down yesterday to the Piræus with Glaucon the stepson of Ariston that I might offer up my prayers to the goddess¹ and also because I wanted to see in what manner they would celebrate the festival, which was a new thing I was delighted with the procession of the inhabitants but that of the Thracians was equally if not more, beautiful When we had finished our prayers and viewed the spectacle, B we turned in the direction of the city and at that instant Polemarchus the son of Cephalus chanced to catch sight of us from a distance as we were starting on our way home and told his servant to run and bid us wait for him The servant took hold of me by the cloak behind and said Polemarchus desires you to wait

Bendis, the Thracian Art

I turned round and asked him where his master was

There he is said the youth, coming after you if you will only wait

C Certainly we will said Glaucón and in a few minutes Polemarchus appeared and with him Adeimantus Glaucón's brother Niceratus the son of Nicias and several others who had been at the procession

Polemarchus said to me I perceive Socrates that you and your companion are already on your way to the city

You are not far wrong I said

But do you see, he rejoined how many we are?

Of course

And are you stronger than all these? for if not you will have to remain where you are

May there not be the alternative, I said, that we may persuade you to let us go?

But can you persuade us if we refuse to listen to you? he said

Certainly not replied Glaucón

Then we are not going to listen of that you may be assured.

328 Adeimantus added Has no one told you of the torch race on horseback in honour of the goddess which will take place in the evening?

With horses! I replied That is a novelty Will horsemen carry torches and pass them one to another during the race?

Yes said Polemarchus and not only so but a festival will be celebrated at night which you certainly ought to see. Let us rise soon after supper and see this festival there will be a gathering of young men and we will have a good

B talk. Stay then, and do not be perverse.

Glaucon said I suppose since you insist that we must
Very good, I replied

Accordingly we went with Polemarchus to his house and
there we found his brothers Lysias and Euthydemus and
with them Thrasymachus the Chalcedonian Charmantides
the Paeanian and Cleitophon the son of Aristonymus There
too was Cephalus the father of Polemarchus whom I had
not seen for a long time and I thought him very much aged
He was seated on a cushioned chair and had a garland on his
head, for he had been sacrificing in the court and there
were some other chairs in the room arranged in a semicircle,
upon which we sat down by him He saluted me eagerly
and then he said —

You don't come to see me, Socrates, as often as you ought
If I were still able to go and see you I would not ask you
to come to me But at my age I can hardly get to the city
and therefore you should come oftener to the Piræus For
let me tell you, that the more the pleasures of the body fade
away the greater to me is the pleasure and charm of conver-
sation Do not then deny my request but make our house
your resort and keep company with these young men we
are old friends and you will be quite at home with us

I replied There is nothing which for my part I like better
Cephalus than conversing with aged men for I regard
them as travellers who have gone a journey which I too may
have to go and of whom I ought to inquire whether the way
is smooth and easy or rugged and difficult And this is
a question which I should like to ask of you who have arrived
at that time which the poets call the threshold of old age
—Is life harder towards the end, or what report do you give
of it?

29 I will tell you, Socrates he said what my own feeling is. Men of my age flock together we are birds of a feather as the old proverb says and at our meetings the tale of my acquaintance commonly is—I cannot eat I cannot drink the pleasures of youth and love are fled away there was a good time once but now that is gone, and life is no longer life.

B Some complain of the slights which are put upon them by relations and they will tell you sadly of how many evils their old age is the cause. But to me, Socrates these complainers seem to blame that which is not really in fault. For if old age were the cause I too being old, and every other old man would have felt as they do. But this is not my own experience nor that of others whom I have known. How well I remember the aged poet Sophocles when in answer

C to the question How does love suit with age Sophocles— are you still the man you were? Peace he replied most gladly have I escaped the thing of which you speak. I feel as if I had escaped from a mad and furious master. His words have often occurred to my mind since and they seem as good to me now as at the time when he uttered them. For certainly old age has a great sense of calm and freedom when the passions relax their hold, then, as Sophocles says

D we are freed from the grasp not of one mad master only but of many. The truth is Socrates that these regrets and also the complaints about relations are to be attributed to the same cause which is not old age but men's characters and tempers. For he who is of a calm and happy nature will hardly feel the pressure of age but to him who is of an opposite disposition youth and age are equally a burden.

I listened in admiration and wanting to draw him out

E that he might go on—Yes Cephalus I said but I rather

suspect that people in general are not convinced by you when you speak thus they think that old age sits lightly upon you not because of your happy disposition, but because you are rich and wealth is well known to be a great comforter

You are right, he replied they are not convinced and there is something in what they say not however so much as they imagine I might answer them as Themistocles answered the Scirphian who was abusing him and saying that he was famous not for his own merits but because he was an Athenian If you had been a native of my country 330 or I of yours neither of us would have been famous And to those who are not rich and are impatient of old age, the same reply may be made for to the good poor man old age cannot be a light burden, nor can a bad rich man ever have peace with himself

May I ask Cephalus whether your fortune was for the most part inherited or acquired by you?

Acquired! Socrates do you want to know how much I acquired? In the art of making money I have been midway between my father and grandfather for my grandfather whose name I bear doubled and trebled the value of his patrimony that which he inherited being much what I possess now but my father Lysanias reduced the property below what it is at present and I shall be satisfied if I leave to these my sons not less but a little more than I received

That was why I asked you the question, I replied because I see that you are indifferent about money which is a characteristic rather of those who have inherited their fortunes than of those who have acquired them, the makers of fortunes have a second love of money as a creation of their own resembling the affection of authors for their own

poems or of parents for their children, besides that natural love of it for the sake of use and profit which is common to them and all men. And hence they are very bad company for they can talk about nothing but the praises of wealth.

That is true he said

D Yes that is very true but may I ask another question?—What do you consider to be the greatest blessing which you have reaped from your wealth?

One he said, of which I could not expect easily to convince others. For let me tell you Socrates that when a man thinks himself to be near death fears and cares enter into his mind which he never had before the tales of a world below and the punishment which is exacted there of deeds done here were once a laughing matter to him but now he is tormented with the thought that they may be true either from the weakness of age or because he is now drawing nearer to that other place he has a clearer view of these things suspicions and alarms crowd thickly upon him, and he begins to reflect and consider what wrongs he has done to others. And when he finds that the sum of his transgressions is great he will many a time like a child start up in his sleep for fear and he is filled with dark forebodings. But to him
 E who is conscious of no sin sweet hope as Pindar charmingly says is the kind nurse of his age

Hope, he says cherishes the soul of him who lives in justice and holiness and is the nurse of his age and the companion of his journey —hope which is mightiest to sway the restless soul of man

How admirable are his words! And the great blessing of
 B riches I do not say to every man but to a good man, is, that he has had no occasion to deceive or to defraud others.

either intentionally or unintentionally and when he departs to the world below he is not in any apprehension about offerings due to the gods or debts which he owes to men. Now to this peace of mind the possession of wealth greatly contributes and therefore I say that setting one thing against another of the many advantages which wealth has to give to a man of sense this is in my opinion the greatest.

Well said, Cephalus I replied but as concerning justice C
what is it?—to speak the truth and to pay your debts—no more than this? And even to this are there not exceptions? Suppose that a friend when in his right mind has deposited arms with me and he asks for them when he is not in his right mind ought I to give them back to him? No one would say that I ought or that I should be right in doing so any more than they would say that I ought always to speak the truth to one who is in his condition.

You are quite right he replied D

But then, I said, speaking the truth and paying your debts is not a correct definition of justice.

Quite correct, Socrates if Simonides is to be believed, said Polemarchus interposing.

I fear said Cephalus that I must go now for I have to look after the sacrifices, and I hand over the argument to Polemarchus and the company.

Is not Polemarchus your heir? I said.

To be sure he answered and went away laughing to the sacrifices.

Tell me then O thou heir of the argument what did E
Simonides say, and according to you truly say about justice?

He said that the repayment of a debt is just, and in saying so he appears to me to be right

I should be sorry to doubt the word of such a wise and inspired man, but his meaning though probably clear to you is the reverse of clear to me. For he certainly does not mean, as we were just now saying that I ought to return a deposit of arms or of anything else to one who asks for it 332 when he is not in his right senses, and yet a deposit cannot be denied to be a debt

True

Then when the person who asks me is not in his right mind I am by no means to make the return?

Certainly not

When Simonides said that the repayment of a debt was justice he did not mean to include that case?

Certainly not for he thinks that a friend ought always to do good to a friend and never evil

B You mean that the return of a deposit of gold which is to the injury of the receiver if the two parties are friends is not the repayment of a debt—that is what you would imagine him to say?

Yes

And are enemies also to receive what we owe to them?

To be sure he said they are to receive what we owe them, and an enemy as I take it owes to an enemy that which is due or proper to him—that is to say evil

Simonides then after the manner of poets would seem C to have spoken darkly of the nature of justice for he really meant to say that justice is the giving to each man what is proper to him and thus he termed a debt

That must have been his meaning he said.

By heaven I replied and if we asked him what due or proper thing is given by medicine and to whom what answer do you think that he would make to us?

He would surely reply that medicine gives drugs and meat and drink to human bodies

And what due or proper thing is given by cookery and to what?

Seasoning to food

D

And what is that which justice gives and to whom?

If Socrates we are to be guided at all by the analogy of the preceding instances then justice is the art which gives good to friends and evil to enemies

That is his meaning then?

I think so

And who is best able to do good to his friends and evil to his enemies in time of sickness?

The physician.

Or when they are on a voyage, amid the perils of the sea? E

The pilot

And in what sort of actions or with a view to what result is the just man most able to do harm to his enemy and good to his friend?

In going to war against the one and in making alliances with the other

But when a man is well my dear Polemarchus there is no need of a physician?

No

And he who is not on a voyage has no need of a pilot?

No

Then in time of peace justice will be of no use?

I am very far from thinking so

333 You think that justice may be of use in peace as well as in war?

Yes

Like husbandry 'or the acquisition of corn?

Yes

Or like shoemaking for the acquisition of shoes—that is what you mean?

Yes

And what similar use or power of acquisition has justice in time of peace?

In contracts Socrates justice is of use

And by contracts you mean partnerships?

Exactly

B But is the just man or the skilful player a more useful and better partner at a game of draughts?

The skilful player

And in the laying of bricks and stones is the just man a more useful or better partner than the builder?

Quite the reverse

Then in what sort of partnership is the just man a better partner than the harp player as in playing the harp the harp player is certainly a better partner than the just man?

In a money partnership

Yes Polemarchus but surely not in the use of money for you do not want a just man to be your counsellor in the purchase or sale of a horse a man who is knowing about horses would be better for that would he not?

Certainly

And when you want to buy a ship the shipwright or the pilot would be better?

True.

Then what is that out use of silver or gold in which the
 just man is to be preferred?

When you want a deposit to be kept safely

You mean when money is not wanted but allowed to lie?

Precisely

That is to say justice is useful when money is useless?

That is the inference

D

And when you want to keep a pruning-hook safe then
 justice is useful to the individual and to the state but when
 you want to use it, then the art of the vine-dresser?

Clearly

And when you want to keep a shield or a lyre and not to
 use them you would say that justice is useful but when
 you want to use them then the art of the soldier or of the
 musician?

Certainly

And so of all other things —justice is useful when they are
 useless and useless when they are useful?

That is the inference

Then justice is not good for much But let us consider E
 this further point Is not he who can best strike a blow in
 a boxing match or in any kind of fighting best able to ward
 off a blow?

Certainly

And he who is most skilful in preventing or escaping¹ ✓
 from a disease is best able to create one?

True?

And he is the best guard of a camp who is best able to
 lead a march upon the enemy?

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Certainly

Then he who is a good keeper of anything is also a good thief?

That I suppose is to be inferred

Then if the just man is good at keeping money, he is good at stealing it

That is implied in the argument

Then after all the just man has turned out to be a thief
And this is a lesson which I suspect you must have learnt
B out of Homer for he speaking of Autolycus the maternal
grandfather of Odysseus, who is a favourite of his affirms
that

He was excellent above all men in theft and perjury

And so you and Homer and Simonides are agreed that
justice is an art of theft to be practised however for the
good of friends and for the harm of enemies',—that was
what you were saying?

No certainly not that, though I do not now know what
I did say but I still stand by the latter words

C Well, there is another question By friends and enemies
do we mean those who are so really or only in seeming?

Surely he said a man may be expected to love those whom
he thinks good and to hate those whom he thinks evil

Yes but do not persons often err about good and evil
many who are not good seem to be so and conversely?

That is true

Then to them the good will be enemies and the evil will
be their friends?

True

And in that case they will be right in doing good to the
D evil and evil to the good?

Clearly

But the good are just and would not do an injustice?

True

Then according to your argument it is just to injure those who do no wrong?

Nay Socrates the doctrine is immoral

Then I suppose that we ought to do good to the just and harm to the unjust?

I like that better

But see the consequence —Many a man who is ignorant of human nature has friends who are bad friends and in that case he ought to do harm to them and he has good enemies whom he ought to benefit but if so we shall be saying the very opposite of that which we affirmed to be the meaning of Simonides

Very true he said and I think that we had better correct an error into which we seem to have fallen in the use of the words friend and enemy

What was the error Polemarchus? I asked.

We assumed that he is a friend who seems to be or who is thought good

And how is the error to be corrected?

We should rather say that he is a friend who is as well as seems good and that he who seems only and is not good 335 only seems to be and is not a friend and of an enemy the same may be said.

You would argue that the good are our friends and the bad our enemies?

Yes

And instead of saying simply as we did at first that it is just to do good to our friends and harm to our 336 enemies, we

should further say It is just to do good to our friends when they are good and harm to our enemies when they are evil?

B Yes, that appears to me to be the truth

But ought the just to injure any one at all?

Undoubtedly he ought to injure those who are both wicked and his enemies

When horses are injured are they improved or deteriorated?

The latter

Deteriorated that is to say in the good qualities of horse not of dogs?

Yes of horses

And dogs are deteriorated in the good qualities of dogs and not of horses?

Of course.

C And will not men who are injured be deteriorated in that which is the proper virtue of man?

Certainly

And that human virtue is justice?

To be sure

Then men who are injured are of necessity made unjust?

That is the result

But can the musician by his art make men unmusical?

Certainly not

Or the horseman by his art make them bad horsemen?

Impossible

And can the just by justice make men unjust or peaking

D generally can the good by virtue make them bad?

Assuredly not

Any more than heat can produce cold?

It cannot.

Or drought m e?

Clearly not.

Nor can the good harm any one?

Impossible.

And the just is the good?

Certainly.

Then to injure a friend or any one else is not the act of a just man but of the opposite who is the unjust?

I think that what you say is quite true, Socrates.

Then if a man says that justice consists in the repayment of debts and that good is the debt which a just man owes to his friends and evil the debt which he owes to his enemies—to say this is not wise for it is not true if as has been clearly shown, the injuring of another can be in no case just.

I agree with you, said Polemarchus.

Then you and I are prepared to take up arms against any one who attributes such a saying to Simonides or Bias or Pittacus or any other wise man or seer?

I am quite ready to do battle at your side, he said.

Shall I tell you whose I believe the saying to be?

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Whose?

I believe that Pericles or Perdiccas or Nerves or Ismenias the Theban or some other rich and mighty man who had a great opinion of his own power was the first to say that justice is doing good to your friends and harm to your enemies.

Most true, he said.

Yes, I said, but if this definition of justice also breaks down, what other can be offered?

Several times in the course of the discussion Thrasymachus had made an attempt to get the argument into his own hands and had been put down by the rest of the company who

wanted to hear the end. But when Polemarchus and I had done speaking and there was a pause, he could no longer hold his peace and gathering himself up he came at us like a wild beast seeking to devour us. We were quite panic-stricken at the sight of him.

He roared out to the whole company. What folly Socrates C has taken possession of you all? And why sillybillies do you knock under to one another? I say that if you want really to know what justice is, you should not only ask but answer and you should not seek honour to yourself from the refutation of an opponent, but have your own answer for there is many a one who can ask and cannot answer D And now I will not have you say that justice is duty or advantage or profit or gain or interest for this sort of nonsense will not do for me. I must have clearness and accuracy

I was panic stricken at his words and could not look at him without trembling. Indeed I believe that if I had not fixed my eye upon him I should have been struck dumb but when I saw his fury rising I looked at him first and was E therefore able to reply to him.

Thrasymachus, I said, with a quiver don't be hard upon us. Polemarchus and I may have been guilty of a little mistake in the argument but I can assure you that the error was not intentional. If we were seeking for a piece of gold you would not imagine that we were knocking under to one another and so losing our chance of finding it. And why when we are seeking for justice a thing more precious than many pieces of gold, do you say that we are weakly yielding to one another and not doing our utmost to get at the truth? Nay my good friend we are most willing and anxious to do

o, but the fact is that we cannot. And if so you people who know all things should pity us and not be angry with us.

How characteristic of Socrates! he replied with a bitter laugh—that is your ironical style! Did I not foresee—have I not already told you, that whatever he was asked he would refuse to answer, and try irony or any other shuffle in order that he might avoid answering?

You are a philosopher. Thrasymachus I replied, and well know that if you ask a person what numbers make up twelve taking care to prohibit him whom you ask from answering B twice six or three times four or six times two or four times three for this sort of nonsense will not do for me—then obviously if that is your way of putting the question no one can answer you. But suppose that he were to retort, Thrasy-machus what do you mean? If one of these numbers which you interdict be the true answer to the question, am I falsely to say some other number which is not the right one?—is that your meaning? —How would you answer him? G

Just as if the two cases were at all alike! he said.

Why should they not be? I replied and even if they are not but only appear to be so to the person who is asked, ought he not to say what he thinks, whether you and I forbid him or not?

I presume then that you are going to make one of the interdicted answers?

I dare say that I may notwithstanding the danger if upon reflection I approve of any of them.

But what if I give you an answer about justice other and D better he said than any of these? What do you deserve to have done to you?

Done to me as becomes the ignorant, I must earn from the wise—that is what I deserve to have done to me

What and no payment! a pleasant notion!

I will pay when I have the money I replied

But you have Socrates said Glaucon and you Thrasymachus need be under no anxiety about money for we will all make a contribution for Socrates

E Yes he replied and then Socrates will do as he always does—refuse to answer himself but take and pull to pieces the answer of some one else

Why my good friend I said how can any one answer who knows and says that he knows just nothing and who even if he has some faint notions of his own, is told by a man of authority not to utter them? The natural thing is that
338 the speaker should be some one like yourself who professes to know and can tell what he knows Will you then kindly answer, for the edification of the company and of myself?

Glaucon and the rest of the company joined in my request and Thrasymachus as any one might see was in reality eager to speak for he thought that he had an excellent answer and would distinguish himself But at first he affected to insist on my answering at length he consented to begin
B Behold he said, the wisdom of Socrates he refuses to teach himself and goes about learning of others to whom he never even says Thank you.

That I learn of others I replied, is quite true but that I am ungrateful I wholly deny Money I have none and therefore I pay in praise which is all I have and how ready I am to praise any one who appears to me to speak well you will very soon find out when you answer for I expect that you will answer well

Listen then he said I proclaim that justice is nothing else than the interest of the stronger And now why do you not praise me? But of course you won't

Let me first understand you, I replied Justice as you say is the interest of the stronger What Thrasymachus is the meaning of this? You cannot mean to say that because Polydamas the pancratiast, is stronger than we are and finds the eating of beef conducive to his bodily strength that to eat beef is therefore equally for our good who are weaker than he is and right and just for us?

That's abominable of you Socrates you take the words in the sense which is most damaging to the argument

Not at all my good sir I said I am trying to understand them and I wish that you would be a little clearer

Well he said have you never heard that forms of government differ there are tyrannies and there are democracies, and there are aristocracies?

Yes I know

And the government is the ruling power in each state?

Certainly

And the different forms of government make laws democratical, aristocratical tyrannical, with a view to their several interests, and these laws, which are made by them for their own interests are the justice which they deliver to their subjects and him who transgresses them they punish as a breaker of the law and unjust And that is what I mean when I say that in all states there is the same principle of justice, which is the interest of the government and as the government must be supposed to have power the only reasonable conclusion is that everywhere there is one principle of justice, which is the interest of the stronger

Now I understand you, I said and whether you are right or not I will try to discover But let me remark that in defining justice you have yourself used the word interest which you forbade me to use It is true however that in your definition the words of the stronger are added.

B A small addition you must allow he said

Great or small never mind about that we must first inquire whether what you are saying is the truth Now we are both agreed that justice is interest of some sort but you go on to say of the stronger about this addition I am not so sure and must therefore consider further

Proceed

I will and first tell me Do you admit that it is just for subjects to obey their rulers?

I do

C But are the rulers of states absolutely infallible, or are they sometimes liable to err?

To be sure he replied they are liable to err

Then in making their laws they may sometimes make them rightly and sometimes not?

True

When they make them rightly they make them agreeably to their interest when they are mistaken contrary to their interest you admit that?

Yes

And the laws which they make must be obeyed by their subjects — and that is what you call justice?

Doubtless

D Then justice according to your argument, is not only obedience to the interest of the stronger but the reverse?

What is that you are saying? he asked.

I am only repeating what you are saying, I believe. But let us consider. Have we not admitted that the rulers may be mistaken about their own interest in what they command and also that to obey them is justice? Has not that been admitted?

Yes.

Then you must also have acknowledged justice not to be for the interest of the stronger, when the rulers unintentionally command things to be done which are to their own injury. For if as you say justice is the obedience which the subject renders to their commands in that case O wisest of men is there any escape from the conclusion that the weaker are commanded to do not what is for the interest but what is for the injury of the stronger?

Nothing can be clearer. Socrates, said Polemarchus.

Yes said Cleitophon interposing if you are allowed to be his witness 340

But there is no need of any witness said Polemarchus for Thrasymachus himself acknowledges that rulers may sometimes command what is not for their own interest and that for subjects to obey them is justice.

Yes Polemarchus — Thrasymachus said that for subjects to do what was commanded by their rulers is just.

Yes Cleitophon but he also said that justice is the interest of the stronger and while admitting both these propositions he further acknowledged that the stronger may command the weaker who are his subjects to do what is not for his own interest whence follows that justice is the injury quite as much as the interest of the stronger.

But said Cleitophon he meant by the interest of the stronger what the stronger thought to be his interest, that

was what the weaker had to do and this was affirmed by him to be justice

Those were not his words rejoined Polemarchus

C Never mind I replied if he now says that they are let us accept his statement Tell me Thrasymachus I said did you mean by justice what the stronger thought to be his interest whether really so or not?

Certainly not he said Do you suppose that I call him who is mistaken the stronger at the time when he is mistaken?

Yes I said my impression was that you did so when you admitted that the ruler was not infallible but might be sometimes mistaken

D You argue like an informer Socrates Do you mean for example, that he who is mistaken about the sick is a physician in that he is mistaken? or that he who errs in arithmetic or grammar is an arithmetician or grammarian at the time when he is making the mistake in respect of the mistake? True we say that the physician or arithmetician or grammarian has made a mistake but this is only a way of speaking for the fact is that neither the grammarian nor any other person of skill ever makes a mistake in so far as he is what his name implies they none of them err unless their skill fails them and then they cease to be skilled artists No artist or sage or ruler errs at the time when he is what his name implies though he is commonly said to err and I adopted the common mode of speaking But to be perfectly accurate since you are such a lover of accuracy we should say that the ruler in so far as he is a ruler is unerring and being unerring always commands that which is for his own interest and the subject is required to execute his com-

mands and therefore as I said at first and now repeat justice is the interest of the stronger

Indeed Thrasymachus and do I really appear to you to argue like an informer?

Certainly he replied

And do you suppose that I ask these questions with any design of injuring you in the argumen ?

Nay he replied, suppose is not the word—I know it but you will be found out, and by sheer force of argument B you will never prevail.

I shall not make the attempt, my dear man but to avoid any misunderstanding occurring between us in future let me ask, in what sense do you speak of a ruler or stronger whose interest, as you were saying he being the superior it is just that the inferior should execute—is he a ruler in the popular or in the strict sense of the term?

In the strictest of all senses he said And now cheat and play the informer if you can I ask no quarter at your hands But you never will be able never

And do you imagine I said, that I am such a madman as to C try and cheat Thrasymachus? I might as well shave a lion

Why he said you made the attempt a minute ago and you failed

Enough I said of these civilities It will be better that I should ask you a question Is the physician taken in that strict sense of which you are speaking a healer of the sick or a maker of money? And remember that I am now speaking of the true physician.

A healer of the sick, he replied

And the pilot—that is to say the true pilot—is he a captain of ships or a mere sailor?

A captain of sailors

D The circumstance that he sails in the ship is not to be taken into account neither is he to be called a sailor the name pilot by which he is distinguished has nothing to do with sailing but is significant of his skill and of his authority over the sailors

Very true he said

Now I said every art has an interest?

Certainly

For which the art has to consider and provide?

Yes that is the aim of art

And the interest of any art is the perfection of it—this and nothing else?

E What do you mean?

I mean what I may illustrate negatively by the example of the body Suppose you were to ask me whether the body is self-sufficing or has wants I should reply Certainly the body has wants for the body may be ill and require to be cured and has therefore interests to which the art of medicine ministers and this is the origin and intention of medicine as you will acknowledge Am I not right?

342 Quite right he replied

But is the art of medicine or any other art faulty or deficient in any quality in the same way that the eye may be deficient in sight or the ear fail of hearing and therefore requires another art to provide for the interests of seeing and hearing—has art in itself I say any similar liability to fault or defect, and does every art require another supplementary art to provide for its interests and that another and another without end? Or have the arts to look only after their own interests? Or have they no need either of

themselves or of another? having no faults or defects, they have no need to correct them either by the exercise of their own art or of any other they have only to consider the interest of their subject matter For every art remains pure and faultless while remaining true—that is to say while perfect and unimpaired Take the words in your precise sense and tell me whether I am not right

Yes clearly

Then medicine does not consider the interest of medicine but the interest of the body?

True he said

Nor does the art of horsemanship consider the interests of the art of horsemanship but the interests of the horse neither do any other arts care for themselves for they have no needs they care only for that which is the subject of their art?

True he said

But surely Thrasy machus the arts are the superiors and rulers of their own subjects?

To this he assented with a good deal of reluctance

Then I said no science or art considers or enquires the interest of the stronger or superior but only the interest of the subject and weaker D

He made an attempt to contest this proposition also but finally acquiesced

Then I continued, no physician in so far as he is a physician, considers his own good in what he prescribes but the good of his patient for the true physician is also a ruler having the human body as a subject and is not a mere money maker that has been admitted?

Yes

And the pilot likewise, in the strict sense of the term, is a ruler of sailors and not a mercenary?

B That has been admitted

And such a pilot and ruler will provide and prescribe for the interest of the sailor who is under him and not for his own or the ruler's interest?

He gave a reluctant Yes

Then I said, Thrasymachus there is no one in any rule who in so far as he is a ruler, considers or enjoins what is for his own interest but always what is for the interest of his subject or suitable to his art to that he looks and that alone he considers in everything which he says and does

343 When we had got to this point in the argument and every one saw that the definition of justice had been completely upset Thrasymachus, instead of replying to me, said Tell me Socrates have you got a nurse?

Why do you ask such a question I said when you ought rather to be answering?

Because she leaves you to snivel and never wipes your nose she has not even taught you to know the shepherd from the sheep

What makes you say that? I replied

B Because you fancy that the shepherd or shepherder fattens or tends the sheep or oxen with a view to their own good and not to the good of himself or his master and you further imagine that the rulers of states if they are true rulers never think of their subjects as sheep and that they are not studying their own advantage day and night Oh
C no and so entirely astray are you in your ideas about the just and unjust as not even to know that justice and the just are in reality another's good that is to say the interest

of the ruler and stronger and the loss of the subject and servant and injustice the opposite for the unjust is lord over the truly simple and just he is the stronger and his subjects do what is for his interest and minus as to his happiness which is very far from being their own Consider D further most foolish Socrates that the just is always a loser in comparison with the unjust First of all in private contracts wherever the unjust is he partner of the just you will find that when the partnership is dissolved, the unjust man has always more and the just less Secondly in their dealings with the State when there is an income tax the just man will pay more and the unjust less on the same amount of income and when there is anything to be received the one gains nothing and the other much Observe E also what happens when they take an office, there is the just man neglecting his affairs and perhaps suffering other losses and getting nothing out of the public, because he is just moreover he is hated by his friends and acquaintance for refusing to serve them in unlawful ways But all this is reversed in the case of the unjust man I am speaking as before of injustice on a large scale in which the advantage 344 of the unjust is most apparent and my meaning will be most clearly seen if we turn to that highest form of injustice in which the criminal is the happiest of men, and the sufferers or those who refuse to do injustice are the most miserable—that is to say tyranny which by fraud and force takes away the property of others not little by little but wholesale comprehending in one things sacred as well as profane private and public for which acts of wrong if he were B detected perpetrating any one of them singly he would be punished and incur great disgrace—they who do such wrong

in particular cases are called robbers of temples and man stealers and burglars and swindlers and thieves. But when a man besides taking away the money of the citizens has made slaves of them then instead of these names of reproach, he is esteemed happy and blessed, not only by the citizens but by all who hear of his having achieved the consummation of injustice. For mankind censure injustice fearing that they may be the victims of it and not because they shrink from committing it. And thus as I have shown Socrates in justice when on a sufficient scale has more strength and freedom and mastery than justice and as I said at first justice is the interest of the stronger whereas injustice is a man's own profit and interest.

Then Thrasymachus when he had thus spoken having like a bath man, deluged our ears with his words had a mind to go away. But the company would not let him they insisted that he should remain and defend his position and I myself added my own humble request that he would not leave us. Thrasymachus I said to him, excellent man how suggestive of your remarks! And are you going to run away before you have fairly taught or learned whether they are true or false? Is the attempt to determine the way of man's life so small a matter in your eyes—to determine how life may be passed by each one of us to the greatest advantage?

And do I differ from you, he said, as to the importance of the inquiry?

You appear rather I replied to have no care or thought about us Thrasymachus—whether we live better or worse from not knowing what you say you know is to you a matter of indifference. Pray friend, do not keep your knowledge to yourself we are a large party and any benefit which you

confer upon us will be amply rewarded. For my own part I openly declare that I am not convinced and that I do not believe injustice to be more gainful than justice even if uncontrolled and allowed to have free play For granting that there may be an unjust man who is able to commit injustice either by fraud or force still this does not convince me of the superior advantage of injustice and there may be others who are in the same predicament with myself Perhaps we may be wrong, if so you in your wisdom should convince us that we are mistaken in preferring justice to injustice

And how am I to convince you he said if you are not already convinced by what I have just said what more can I do for you? Would you have me put the proof bodily into your souls?

Heaven forbid! I said I would only ask you to be consistent or if you change change openly and let there be no deception For I must remark, Thrasymachus if you will recall what was previously said, that although you began by defining the true physician in an exact sense you did not observe a like exactness when speaking of the shepherd you thought that the shepherd as a shepherd tends the sheep not with a view to their own good but like a mere diner or banqueter with a view to the pleasures of the table or again as a trader for sale in the market, and not as a shepherd Ye surely the art of the shepherd is concerned only with the good of his subjects, he has only to provide the best for them, since the perfection of the state is already ensured whenever all the requirements of it are satisfied And that was what I was saying just now about the ruler I conceived that the art of the ruler considered as ruler whether in a state or in private life, could only regard the good of his

flock or subjects whereas you seem to think that the rulers in states that is to say the true rulers like being a authority Think! Nay I am sure of it

Then why in the case of lesser offices do men never take them willingly without payment unless under the idea that they govern for the advantage not of themselves but of others? Let me ask you a question Are not the several arts different by reason of their each having a separate function? And my dear illustrious friend do say what you think that we may make a little progress

Yes that is the difference he replied

And each art gives us a particular good and not merely a general one—medicine for example gives us health navigation safety at sea and so on?

Yes he said

B And the art of payment has the special function of giving pay but we do not confuse this with other arts any more than the art of the pilot is to be confused with the art of medicine because the health of the pilot may be improved by a sea voyage You would not be inclined to say would you that navigation is the art of medicine at least if we are to adopt your exact use of language?

Certainly not

Or because a man is in good health when he receives pay you would not say that the art of payment is medicine?

I should not

Nor would you say that medicine is the art of receiving pay because a man takes fees when he is engaged in healing?

C Certainly not

And we have admitted I said that the good of each art is specially confined to the art?

Yes

Then if there be any good which all artists have in common that is to be attributed to something of which they all have the common use?

True he replied

And when the artist is benefited by receiving pay the advantage is gained by an additional use of the art of pay which is not the art professed by him?

He gave a reluctant assent to this

Then he pay is not derived by the several artists from D their respective arts But the truth is that while the art of medicine gives health, and the art of the builder builds a house another art attends them which is the art of pay The various arts may be doing their own business and benefiting that over which they preside but would the artist receive any benefit from his art unless he were paid as well?

I suppose not

But does he therefore confer no benefit when he works for E nothing?

Certainly he confers a benefit

Then now Thrasy Machus there is no longer any doubt that neither arts nor governments provide for their own interests but as we were before saying they rule and provide for the interests of their subjects who are the weaker and not the stronger—to their good they attend and not to the good of the superior And this is the reason my dear Thrasy Machus why as I was just now saying no one is willing to govern because no one likes to take in hand the reformation of evils which are not his concern without remuneration For in the execution of his work, and in 347 giving his orders to another the true does not regard

his own interest* but always that of his subjects and therefore in order that rulers may be willing to rule, they must be paid in one of three modes of payment money or honour or a penalty for refusing

What do you mean Soc rates? said Glaucon The first two modes of payment are intelligible enough, but what the penalty is I do not understand or how a penalty can be a payment

You mean that you do not understand the nature of this payment which to the best men is the great inducement to rule? Of course you know that ambition and avarice are held to be as indeed they are a disgrace?

Very true

And for this reason I said, money and honour have no attraction for them good men do not wish to be openly demanding payment for governing and so to get the name of hirelings* nor by secret'y helping themselves out of the public revenues to get the name of thieves And not being ambitious they do not care about honour Wherefore necessity must be laid upon them and they must be induced to serve from the fear of punishment And this as I imagine is the reason why the forwardness to take office, instead of waiting to be compelled has been deemed dishonourable Now the worst part of the punishment is that he who refuses to rule is liable to be ruled by one who is worse than himself And the fear of this as I conceive induces the good to take office not because they would but because they cannot help —not under the idea that they are going to have any benefit or enjoyment themselves but as a necessity and because they are not able to commit the task of ruling to any one who is better than themselves or indeed as good For there

is reason to think that if a city were composed entirely of good men then to avoid office would be as much an object of contention as to obtain office is at present then we should have plain proof that the true ruler is not meant by nature to regard his own interest but that of his subjects and every one who knew this would choose rather to receive a benefit from another than to have the trouble of conferring one So far am I from agreeing with Thrasymachus that E justice is the interest of the stronger This latter question need not be further discussed at present but when Thrasymachus says that the life of the unjust is more advantageous than that of the just his new statement appears to me to be of a far more serious character Which of us has spoken truly? And which sort of life, Glaucon do you prefer?

I for my part deem the life of the just to be the more advantageous he answered

Did you hear all the advantages of the unjust which 348 Thrasymachus was rehearsing?

Yes I heard him he replied, but he has not convinced me

Then shall we try to find some way of convincing him if we can that he is saying what is not true?

Most certainly he replied

If I said, he makes a set speech and we make another recounting all the advantages of being just and he answers and we rejoin, there must be a numbering and measuring of the goods which are claimed on either side, and in the end we shall want judges to decide but if we proceed in our inquiry as we lately did by making admissions to one another we shall unite the offices of judge and advocate in our own persons

Very good, he said.

And which method do I understand you to prefer I said
That which you propose

Well then, Thrasy machus I said suppose you begin at
the beginning and answer me You say that perfect injustice
1 more gainful than perfect justice?

C Yes that is what I say and I have given you my reasons
And what is your view about them? Would you call one
of them virtue and the other vice?

Certainly

I suppose that you would call justice virtue and injustice
vice?

What a charming notion! So likely too seeing that I
affirm injustice to be profitable and justice not

What else then would you say?

The opposite he replied

And would you call justice vice?

No, I would rather say sublime simplicity

D Then would you call injustice malignity?

No I would rather say discretion

And do the unjust appear to you to be wise and good?

Yes he said at any rate those of them who are able to be
perfectly unjust and who have the power of subduing states
and nations, but perhaps you imagine me to be talking
of cutpurses Even this profession if undetected has advan-
tages though they are not to be compared with those of
which I was just now speaking

E I do not think that I misapprehend your meaning Thrasy
machus I replied but still I cannot hear without amaze-
ment that you class injustice with wisdom and virtue, and
justice with the opposite

Certainly I do so class them

The just does not seek advantage over the just I 348E

Now I said you are on more substantial and almost unanswerable ground for if the injustice which you were maintaining to be profitable had been admitted by you as by others to be vice and deformity an answer might have been given to you on received principles but now I perceive that you will call injustice honourable and strong and to the unjust you will attribute all the qualities which were attributed by us before to the just, seeing that you do not hesitate to rank injustice with wisdom and virtue.

You have guessed most infallibly he replied

Then I certainly ought not to shrink from going through with the argument so long as I have reason to think that you, Thrasymachus are speaking your real mind for I do believe that you are now in earnest and are not amusing yourself at our expense

I may be in earnest or not, but what is that to you?—to refute the argument is your business

Very true I said that is what I have to do But will you be so good as answer yet one more question? Does the just man try to gain any advantage over the just?

Far otherwise if he did he would not be the simpleminded creature which he is

And would he try to go beyond just action?

He would not

And how would he regard the attempt to gain an advantage over the unjust would that be considered by him as just or unjust?

He would think it just and would try to gain the advantage, but he would not be able

Whether he would or would not be able, I said, is not to the point My question is only whether the just man, C

while refusing to have more than another just man would wish and claim to have more than the unjust?

Yes he would

And what of the unjust—does he claim to have more than the just man and to do more than is just?

Of course he said for he claims to have more than all men

And the unjust man will strive and struggle to obtain more than the unjust man or action in order that he may have more than all?

True

We may put the matter thus I said—the just does not desire more than his like but more than his unlike whereas the unjust desires more than both his like and his unlike?

D Nothing he said can be better than that statement

And the unjust is good and wise and the just is neither?

Good again he said

And is not the unjust like the wise and good and the just unlike them?

Of course he said he who is of a certain nature is like those who are of a certain nature he who is not not

Each of them I said is such as his like is?

Certainly he replied

Very good Thrasymachus I said and now to take the case of the arts you would admit that one man is a musician E and another not a musician?

Yes

And which is wise and which is foolish?

Clearly the musician is wise and he who is not a musician is foolish

And he is good in as far as he is wise and bad in as far as he is foolish

Then se does not seek advantage over the wise I 349E

Yes

And you would say the same sort of thing of the physician?

Yes

And do you think, my excellent friend that a musician when he adjusts the lyre would desire or claim to exceed or go beyond a musician in the tightening and loosening the strings?

I do not think that he would

But he would claim to exceed the non musician?

Of course

And what would you say of the physician? In prescribing meats and drinks would he wish to go beyond another physician or beyond the practice of medicine?

He would not

But he would wish to go beyond the non physician?

Yes

And about knowledge and ignorance in general see whether you think that any man who has knowledge ever would wish to have the choice of saying or doing more than another man who has knowledge. Would he not rather say or do the same as his like in the same case?

That I suppose can hardly be denied

And what of the ignorant? would he not desire to have more than either the knowing or the ignorant? B

I dare say

And the knowing is wise?

Yes

And the wise is good?

True

Then the wise and good will not desire to gain more than his like, but more than his unlike and opposite? ✓

I suppose so

Whereas he bad and ignorant will desire to gain more than both?

Yes

But did we not say Thrasyarchus that the unjust goes beyond both his like and unlike? Were not these your words?

They were

C And you also said that the just will not go beyond his like but his unlike?

Yes

Then the just is like the wise and good and the unjust like the evil and ignorant?

That is the inference

And each of them is such as his like is?

That was admitted

Then the just has turned out to be wise and good and the unjust evil and ignorant

Thrasyarchus made all these admissions not fluently as D I repeat them but with extreme reluctance it was a hot summer's day and the perspiration poured from him in torrents and then I saw what I had never seen before Thrasyarchus blushing As we were now agreed that justice was virtue and wisdom and injustice vice and ignorance I proceeded to another point

Well I said Thrasyarchus that matter is now settled but were we not also saying that injustice had strength do you remember?

Yes I remember he said but do not suppose that I approve of what you are saying or have no answer if however I were to answer you would be quite certain to accuse me of haranguing therefore either permit me to have my

say out or if you would rather ask, do so and I will answer

Very good as they say to story telling old women and will nod Yes and No

Certainly not, I said if contrary to your real opinion

Yes he said I will to please you since you will not let me speak What else would you have?

Nothing in the world, I said and if you are so disposed I will ask and you shall answer

Proceed

Then I will repeat the question which I asked before in order that our examination of the relative nature of justice 351 and injustice may be carried on regularly A statement was made that injustice is stronger and more powerful than justice, but now justice having been identified with wisdom and virtue, is easily shown to be stronger than injustice if injustice is ignorance this can no longer be questioned by any one But I want to view the matter Thrasymachus in a different way You would not deny that a state may be unjust and may be unjustly attempting to enslave other states or may have already enslaved them and may be holding many of them in subjection?

True he replied and I will add that the best and most perfectly unjust state will be most likely to do so

I know I said, that such was your position but what I would further consider is whether this power which is possessed by the superior state can exist or be exercised without justice or only with justice

If you are right in your view and justice is wisdom or then only with justice but if I am right then without justice

I am delighted, Thrasymachus to see you not only nodding

assent and dissent but making answers which are quite excellent

'That is out of civility to you' he replied.

You are very kind I said and would you have the goodness also to inform me whether you think that a state or an army or a band of robbers and thieves or any other gang of evil doers could act at all if they injured one another?

D No indeed he said, they could not

But if they abstained from injuring one another then they might act together better?

Yes

And this is because injustice creates divisions and hatreds and fighting and justice imparts harmony and friendship is not that true Thrasymachus?

I agree he said, because I do not wish to quarrel with you

How good of you I said but I should like to know also whether injustice having this tendency to arouse hatred, wherever existing among slaves or among freemen will not make them hate one another and set them at variance and render them incapable of common action?

Certainly

E And even if injustice be found in two only will they not quarrel and fight, and become enemies to one another and to the just?

They will

And suppose injustice abiding in a single person, would your wisdom say that she loses or that she retains her natural power?

Let us assume that she retains her power

Yet is not the power which injustice exercises of such a nature that wherever she takes up her abode, whether in

a city in an army in a family or in any other body that body is to begin with rendered incapable of united action, by reason of seditious and distraction and does it not become its own enemy and at variance with all that opposes it and with the just? Is not this the case?

Yes certainly

And is not injustice equally fatal when existing in a single person in the first place rendering him incapable of action because he is not at unity with himself and in the second place making him an enemy to himself and the just? Is not that true Thrasymachus?

Yes

And O my friend I said surely the gods are just? ✓

Granted that they are

But if so the unjust will be the enemy of the gods and the just will be their friend?

Feast away in triumph, and take your fill of the argument I will not oppose you lest I should displease the company

Well then, proceed with your answers and let me have the remainder of my repast. For we have already shown that the just are clearly wiser and better and abler than the unjust and that the unjust are incapable of common action nay more that to speak as we did of men who are evil acting at any time vigorously together is not strictly true, for if they had been perfectly evil, they would have laid hands upon one another but it is evident that there must have been some remnant of justice in them which enabled them to combine if there had not been they would have injured one another as well as their victims, they were but half villains in their enterprises for had they been whole villains and utterly unjust, they would have been utterly

D is capable of action That, as I believe is the truth of the matter and not what you said at first But whether the just have a better and happier life than the unjust is a further question which we also proposed to consider I think that they have and for the reasons which I have given but still I should like to examine further for no light matter is at stake nothing less than the rule of human life

Proceed

I will proceed by asking a question Would you not say that a horse has some end?

E I should

And the end or use of a horse or of anything would be that which could not be accomplished or not so well accomplished by any other thing?

I do not understand he said

Let me explain Can you see except with the eye?

Certainly not

Or hear except with the ear?

No

These then may be truly said to be the ends of these organs?

They may

553 But you can cut off a vine branch with a dagger or with a chisel, and in many other ways?

Of course

And yet not so well as with a pruning hook made for the purpose?

True

May we not say that this is the end of a pruning hook?

We may

Then now I think you will have no difficulty in under-

standing my meaning when I asked the question whether the end of anything would be that which could not be accomplished or not so well accomplished, by any other thing?

I understand your meaning he said and assent B

And that to which an end is appointed has also an excellence? Need I ask again whether the eye has an end?

It has

And has not the eye an excellence?

Yes

And the ear has an end and an excellence also?

True

And the same is true of all other things they have each or them an end and a special excellence?

That is so

Well and can the eyes fulfil their end if they are wanting in their own proper excellence and have a defect instead? C

How can they he said if they are blind and cannot see?

You mean to say if they have lost their proper excellence which is sight but I have not arrived at that point yet. I would rather ask the question more generally and only inquire whether the things which fulfil their ends fulfil them by their own proper excellence and fail of fulfilling them by their own defect?

Certainly he replied

I might say the same of the ears when deprived of their own proper excellence they cannot fulfil their end?

True

And the same observation will apply to all other things? D

I agree

Well and has not the soul an end which no body else can fulfil for ple, to superintend and co and

deliberate and the like Are not these functions proper to the soul, and can they rightly be assigned to any other?

To no other

And is not life to be reckoned among the ends of the soul?

Assuredly he said

And has not the soul an excellence also?

Yes

E And can she or can she not fulfil her own ends when deprived of that excellence?

She cannot

1 Then an evil soul must necessarily be an evil ruler and
1 superintendent and the good soul a good ruler?

Yes necessarily

2 And we have admitted that justice is the excellence of
✓ 1 the soul, and injustice the defect of the soul?

That has been admitted

✓ Then the just soul and the just man will live well and the
✓ unjust man will live ill?

That is what your argument proves

✓ 34 And he who lives well is blessed and happy and he who
✓ 1 is ill the reverse of happy?

Certainly

✓ Then the just is happy, and the unjust miserable?

So be it

But happiness and not misery is profitable

Of course

✓ Then my blessed Thrasymachus injustice can never be
more profitable than justice

Let this Socrates he said, be your entertainment at the
Bendisidea

For which I am indebted to you, I said now that you have

grown gentle towards me and have left off scolding. Nevertheless I have not been well entertained but that was my own fault and not yours. As an epicure snatches a taste of every dish which is successively brought to table he not having allowed himself time to enjoy the one before so have I gone from one subject to another without having discovered what I sought at first the nature of justice. I left that inquiry and turned away to consider whether justice is virtue and wisdom or evil and folly and when there arose a further question about the comparative advantages of justice and injustice I could not refrain from passing over to that. And the result of the whole discussion has been that I know nothing at all. For I know not what justice is and therefore I am not likely to know whether it is or is not a virtue nor can I say whether the just man is happy or unhappy.

Steph With these words I was thinking that I had made an end
 357 of the discussion but the end in truth proved to be only
 a beginning For Glaucon who is always the most pugnacious of men was dissatisfied at Thrasymachus' retirement he wanted to have the battle out So he said to me
 Socrates do you wish really to persuade us or only to seem
 B to have persuaded us that to be just is always better than to be unjust?

I should wish really to persuade you I replied if I could.

Then you certainly have not succeeded Let me ask you now —How would you arrange goods—are there not some which we welcome for their own sakes and independently of their consequences as for example harmless pleasures and enjoyments which delight us at the time although nothing follows from them?

I agree in thinking that there is such a class I replied
 C Is there not also a second class of goods such as knowledge sight health which are desirable not only in themselves but also for their results?

Certainly I said

And would you not recognize a third class such as gymnastic and the care of the sick, and the physician's art also the various ways of money making—these do us good but we regard them as disagreeable and no one would choose them
 D for their own sakes but only for the sake of some reward or result which flows from them?

There is I said, this third class also But why do you ask?

Because I want to know in which of the three classes you would place justice?

In the highest class I replied —among those goods which he who would be happy desires both for their own sake and for the sake of their results

Then the many are of another mind they think that justice is to be reckoned in the troublesome class among goods which are to be pursued for the sake of rewards and of reputation but in themselves are disagreeable and rather to be avoided

I know I said that this is their manner of thinking and that this was the thesis which Thrasymachus was maintaining just now when he censured justice and praised injustice. But I am too stupid to be convinced by him

I wish, he said, that you would hear me as well as him and then I shall see whether you and I agree. For Thrasymachus seems to me like a snake to have been charmed by your voice sooner than he ought to have been but to my mind the nature of justice and injustice have not yet been made clear. Setting aside their rewards and results I want to know what they are in themselves, and how they inwardly work in the soul. If you please, then, I will revive the argument of Thrasymachus. And first I will speak of the nature and origin of justice according to the common view of them. Secondly I will show that all men who practise justice do so against their will, of necessity but not as a good. And thirdly I will argue that there is reason in this view for the life of the unjust is after all better far than the life of the just —if what they say is true. Socrates since I myself am not of their opinion. But still I acknowledge that I am perplexed when I hear the voices of thus and myriads of

other : dining in my ears and on the other hand I have never yet heard the superiority of justice to injustice maintained by any one in a satisfactory way I want to hear justice praised in respect of itself then I shall be satisfied and you are the person from whom I think that I am most likely to hear this and therefore I will praise the unjust life to the utmost of my power and my manner of speaking will indicate the manner in which I desire to hear you too praising justice and censuring injustice Will you say whether you approve of my proposal?

Indeed I do nor can I imagine any theme about which a man of sense would oftener wish to converse

E I am delighted he replied to hear you say so and shall begin by speaking as I proposed, of the nature and origin of justice

They say that to do injustice is by nature good to suffer injustice evil but that the evil is greater than the good And so when men have both done and suffered injustice and have had experience of both not being able to avoid the one and obtain the other they think that they had better agree among themselves to have neither hence there arise laws and mutual covenants and that which is ordained by law is termed by them lawful and just. This they affirm to be the origin and nature of justice—it is a mean or compromise between the best of all which is to do injustice and not be punished, and the worst of all which is to suffer injustice without the power of retaliation and justice being at a muddle point between the two is tolerated not as a good but as the lesser evil and honoured by reason of the inability of men to do injustice. For no man who is worthy to be called a man would ever submit to such an agreement if he were

able to resist he would be mad if he did. Such is the received account of Socrates of the nature and origin of justice.

Now that those who practise justice do so involuntarily and because they have not the power to be unjust will best appear if we imagine something of this kind: having given credit both to the just and the unjust power to do what they will let us watch and see whether desire will lead them: then we shall discover in the very act the just and unjust man to be proceeding along the same road following their interest which all natures deem to be their good and are only diverted into the path of justice by the force of law. The liberty which we are supposing may be most completely given to them in the form of such a power as is said to have been possessed by Gyges the ancestor of Croesus the Lydian. According to the tradition Gyges was a shepherd in the service of the king of Lydia: there was a great storm, and an earthquake made an opening in the earth at the place where he was feeding his flock. Amazed at the sight he descended into the opening where among other marvels he beheld a hollow brazen horse having doors at which he stooping and looking in saw a dead body of stature as appeared to him more than human and having nothing on but a gold ring: this he took from the finger of the dead and reascended. Now the shepherds met together according to custom that they might send their monthly report about the flocks to the king: into their assembly he came having the ring on his finger and as he was sitting among them he chanced to turn the collet of the ring inside his hand when instantly he became invisible to the rest of the company and

they began to speak of him as if he were no longer present
 360 He was astonished at this and again touching the ring he
 turned the collet outwards and appeared he made several
 trials of the ring and always with the same result—when he
 turned the collet inwards he became invisible when outwards
 he reappeared Whereupon he contrived to be chosen one
 of the messengers who were sent to the court where as
 B soon as he arrived he seduced the queen and with her help
 conspired against the king and slew him and took the king
 dom Suppose now that there were two such magic rings
 and the just put on one of them and the unjust the other no
 man can be imagined to be of such an iron nature that he
 would stand fast in justice No man would keep his hands
 off what was not his own when he could safely take what he
 C liked out of the market or go into houses and take with any
 one at his pleasure or kill or release from prison whom he
 would and in all respects be like a god among men Then
 the actions of the just would be as the actions of the unjust
 they would both come at last to the same point And this
 we may truly affirm to be a great proof that a man is just
 no willingly or because he thinks that justice is any good to
 him individually but of necessity for wherever any one
 thinks that he can safely be unjust there he is unjust For
 D all men believe in their hearts that injustice is far more
 profitable to the individual than justice and he who argues
 as I have been supposing will say that they are right I
 you could imagine any one obtaining this power of becoming
 invisible and never doing any wrong or touching what was
 another's he would be thought by the lookers on to be
 a most wretched idiot although they would praise him to
 one another's faces and keep up appearances with one

another from a fear that they too might suffer injustice
Enough of this

Now if we are to form a real judgement of the life of the just and unjust we must isolate them there is no other way and how is the isolation to be effected? I answer Let the unjust man be entirely unjust and the just man entirely just nothing is to be taken away from either of them, and both are to be perfectly furnished for the work of their respective lives First let the unjust be like other distinguished masters of craft like the skilful pilot or physician who knows intuitively his own powers and keeps ³⁶¹ within their limits and who if he fails at any point is able to recover himself So let the unjust make his unjust attempts in the right way and be hidden if he means to be great in his injustice (he who is found out is nobody) for the highest reach of injustice is to be deemed just when you are not Therefore I say that in the perfectly unjust man we must assume the most perfect injustice there is to be no deduction, but we must allow him, while doing the most unjust acts to have acquired the greatest reputation for justice If he have taken a false step he must be able to recover himself he must be one who can speak with effect, if any of his deeds come to light, and who can force his way where force is required by his courage and strength, and command of money and friends And at his side let us place the just man in his nobleness and simplicity wishing as Aeschylus says to be and not to seem good There must be no seeming for if he seem to be just he will be honoured and rewarded, and then we shall not know whether he is just for the sake of justice or for the sake of honours and rewards therefore, let him be clothed in justice only and have no

o her covering and he must be imagined in a state of the opposite to the former. Let him be the best of men and let him be thought the worst: then he will have been put to the proof and we shall see whether he will be affected by the fear of infamy and its consequences. And let him continue thus to the hour of death, being just and seeming to be unjust. When both have reached the uttermost extreme, the one of justice and the other of injustice, let judgement be given which of them is the happier of the two.

Heavens! my dear Glaucon, I said, how energetically you polish them up for the decision, first one and then the other, as if they were two statues.

I do my best, he said. And now that we know what they are like, there is no difficulty in tracing out the sort of life which awaits either of them. This I will proceed to describe, but as you may think the description a little too coarse, I ask you to suppose Socrates, that the words which follow are not mine—Let me put them in the mouths of the eulogists of injustice. They will tell you that the just man who is thought unjust will be scourged, racked, bound—will have his eyes burnt out, and at last, after suffering every kind of evil, he will be impaled. Then he will understand that he ought to seem only and not to be just: the words of Aeschylus may be more truly spoken of the unjust than of the just. For the unjust is pursuing a reality, he does not live with a view to appearances—he wants to be really unjust and not to seem only.—

His mind has a soil deep and fertile

Out of which spring his prudent counsels¹

In the first place, he is thought just, and therefore bears rule

in the city he can marry whom he will and give in marriage to whom he will also he can trade and deal where he likes and always to his own advantage because he has no misgivings about injustice and at every contest whether in public or private, he gets the better of his antagonists and gains at their expense and is rich and out of his gains he can benefit his friends and harm his enemies moreover he can offer sacrifices and dedicate gifts to the gods abundantly and magnificently and can honour the gods or any man whom he wants to honour in a far better style than the just and therefore he is likely to be dearer than they are to the gods And thus Socrates gods and men are said to unite in making the life of the unjust better than the life of the just

I was going to say something in answer to Glaucon, when Democritus his brother interposed Socrates he said you do not suppose that there is nothing more to be urged?

Why what else is there? I answered

The strongest point of all has not been even mentioned he replied

Well then according to the proverb Let brother help brother —if he fails in any part do you assist him although I must confess that Glaucon has already said quite enough to lay me in the dust and take from me the power of helping justice

Nonsense, he replied. But let me add something more There is another side to Glaucon's argument about the praise and censure of justice and injustice which is equally required in order to bring out what I believe to be his meaning Parents and tutors are always telling their sons and their wards that they are to be just but why? not for the sake of 6,

justice, but for the sake of character and reputation in the hope of obtaining for him who is reputed just some of those offices marriages and the like which Glaucon has enumerated among the advantages accruing to the unjust from the reputation of justice. More, however is made of appearances by this class of persons than by the others for they throw in the good opinion of the gods and will tell you of a shower of benefits which the heavens as they say rain upon the pious and this accords with the testimony of the noble Hesiod and Homer the first of whom says, that the gods make the oaks of the just—

To bear acorns at their summit and bees in the middle
And the sheep are bowed down with the weight of their
fleeces ¹

and many other blessings of a like kind are provided for them. And Homer has a very similar strain for he speaks of one whose fame is—

As the fame of some blameless king who like a god
Maintains justice to whom the black earth brings forth
C Wheat and barley whose rees are bowed with fruit
And his sheep never fail to bar and the sea gives him
fish ²

Still grander are the gifts of heaven which Musaeus and his son ³ vouchsafe to the just they take them down into the world below where they have the saints lying on couches at a feast, everlastingly drunk, crowned with garlands their idea seems to be that an immortality of drunkenness is the highest meed of virtue. Some extend their rewards yet further the posterity as they say of the faithful and just

shall survive to the third and fourth generation. This is the style in which they praise justice. But about the wicked there is another strain: they bury them in a slough in Hades and make them carry water in a sieve: also while they are yet living they bring them to infamy and inflict upon them the punishments which Glaucon described as the portion of the just who are reputed to be unjust: nothing else does their invention supply. Such is their manner of praising the one and censuring the other.

Once more Socrates I will ask you to consider another way of speaking about justice and injustice which is not confined to the poets but is found in prose writers. The universal⁵⁶⁴ voice of mankind is always declaring that justice and virtue are honourable but grievous and toilsome and that the pleasures of vice and injustice are easy of attainment and are only censured by law and opinion. They say also that honesty is for the most part less profitable than dishonesty and they are quite ready to call wicked men happy and to honour them both in public and private when they are rich or in any other way influential while they despise and overlook those who may be weak and poor even though acknowledging them to be better than the others. But most extraordinary of all is their mode of speaking about virtue and the gods: they say that the gods apportion calamity and misery to many good men and good and happiness to the wicked. And mendicant prophets go to rich men's doors and persuade them that they have a power committed to them by the gods of making an atonement for a man's own or his ancestor's sins by sacrifices or charms with rejoicings and feasts and they promise to harm an enemy whether just or unjust at a small cost with magic arts and incantations binding

heaven as they say to execute their will And the poets are the authorities to whom they appeal, now smoothing the path of vice with the words of Hesiod —

We may be had in abundance without trouble the way is smooth and the dwelling place is near But before virtue the gods have set toil ¹

and a tedious and uphill road then citing Homer as a witness that the gods may be influenced by men for he also says —

The gods too may be turned from their purpose and men pay to them and avert their wrath by sacrifices and soothing entreaties and by libations and the odour of fat, when they have sinned and transgressed ²

And they produce a host of books written by Musaeus and Orpheus who were children of the Moon and the Muses—ha is what they say—according to which they perform their ritual and persuade not only individuals but whole cities that expiations and atonements for sin may be made by sacrifices and amusements which fill a vacant hour and are equally at the service of the living and the dead the latter 365 port they call mysteries and they redeem us from the pains of hell but if we neglect them no one knows what awaits us

He proceeded And now when the young hear all this said about virtue and vice and the way in which gods and men regard them how are their minds likely to be affected, my dear Socrates—those of them I mean who are quick witted and, like bees on the wing light on every flower and from all that they hear are prone to draw conclusions as to what manner of persons they should be and in what way they

should walk if they would make the best of life? Probably B
the youth will say to himself in the words of Pindar—

Can I by justice or by crooked ways of deceit ascend a
tower which may be a fortress to me all my days

For what men say is that if I am really just and am not also
thought just, profit there is none but the pain and loss on
the other hand are unmistakable. But if though unjust
I acquire the reputation of justice a heavenly life is promised
to me. Since then, as philosophers prove, appearance tyrannizes
over truth and is lord of happiness to appearance I
must devote myself. I will describe around me a picture
and shadow of virtue to be the vestibule and exterior of my
house behind I will trail the subtle and crafty fox as
Archilochus gretest of sages recommends. But I hear
some one exclaiming that the concealment of wickedness is
often difficult to which I answer Nothing great is easy. D
Nevertheless the argument indicates this if we would be
happy to be the path along which we should proceed. With
a view to concealment we will establish secret brotherhoods
and political clubs. And there are professors of rhetoric who
teach the art of persuading courts and assemblies and so
partly by persuasion and partly by force I shall make unlaw-
ful gains and not be punished. Still I hear a voice saying
that the gods cannot be deceived neither can they be
compelled. But what if there are no gods? or suppose
them to have no care of human things—why in either case
should we mind about concealment? And even if there E
are gods and they do care about us yet we know of them
only from tradition and the genealogies of the poets and
these are the very persons who say that they may be influenced

and turned by sa u es and soo hing entreat es and by offerings Let us be consis ent then and believe both or neither If the poets speak truly why then we had better
 66 be unjust and offer of the fruits of injustice for if we are just although we may escape the vengeance of heaven we shall lose the gains of injustice but if we are unjust we shall keep the ga ns and by our sinning and praying and praying and sinning the gods will be propia ed and we shall not be panished But there is a world below in which either we or our posterity will suffer for our unjust de ds Yes my friend will be the reflection but there are mysteries and atoning deities and these have great power That is
 B what mighty cit es declare and the children of the gods who we e their poets and prophets bear a like testimony

On what princip e then shall we any longer choose justice rather than the worst njustice? when if we only unite the latter with a deceitful regard to appearances we shall fare to our mind both with gods and men, in life and after death as the most nume ous and the highest authorities tell us
 C Knowing all this Socrates how can a man who has any superiority of mind or person or rank or wealth be willing to honour just ce or indeed to re r in from laughing when he hears justice praised? And even if there should be some one who is able to d sp ove the truth of my words and who is satisfied that justice is best still he is not angry with the unjust but is very ready to forgive them because he also
 D knows that men are not just of their own free will unless peradventure there be some one whom the divinity within him may have nspired with a hatred of injustice or who has attained knowledge of the truth—but no other man He only blames in us ce who ow ng to cowardice or age

Is justice in itself the greatest good? II 366 D

or some weakness has not the power of being unjust. And this is proved by the fact that when he obtains the power he immediately becomes unjust as far as he can be.

The cause of all this Socrates was indicated by us at the beginning of the argument when my brother and I told you how astonished we were to find that of all the professing panegyrists of justice—beginning with the ancient heroes of whom any memorial has been preserved to us and ending with the men of our own time—no one has ever blamed injustice or praised justice except with a view to the glories, honours and benefits which flow from them. No one has ever adequately described either in verse or prose the true essential nature of either of them abiding in the soul, and invisible to any human or divine eye. I have shown that of all the things of a man's soul which he has within him, justice is the greatest good and injustice the greatest evil. Had this 367 been the universal strain had you sought to persuade us of this from our youth upwards we should not have been on the watch to keep one another from doing wrong but every one would have been his own watchman because afraid, if he did wrong of harbouring in himself the greatest of evils. I dare say that Thrasymachus and others would seriously hold the language which I have been merely repeating and would even stronger than these about justice and injustice grossly as I conceive perverting their true nature. But I speak in this vehement manner as I must frankly confess to you B because I want to hear from you the opposite side and I would ask you to show not only the superiority which justice has over injustice but what effect they have on the possessor of them which makes the one to be a good and the other an evil to him. And please as Glaucon requested a

you to exclude reputations for unless you take away from each of them his true reputation and add on the false, we shall say that you do not praise justice but the appearance of it we shall think that you are only exhorting us to keep injustice dark and that you really agree with Thrasymachus in thinking that justice is another's good and the interest of the stronger and that injustice is a man's own profit and interest though injurious to the weaker. Now as you have admitted that justice is one of that highest class of goods which are desired indeed for their results but in a far greater degree for their own sakes—like sight or hearing or knowledge or health or any other real and natural and not merely conventional good—I would ask you in your praise of justice to regard one point only I mean the essential good and evil which justice and injustice work in the possessors of them. Let others praise justice and censure injustice magnifying the rewards and honours of the one and abusing the other that is a manner of arguing which, coming from them I am ready to tolerate but from you who have spent your whole life in the consideration of this question, unless I hear the contrary from your own lips I expect something better. And therefore, I say no only prove to us that justice is better than injustice but show what they either of them do to the possessor of them which makes the one to be a good and the other an evil whether seen or unseen by gods and men.

I had always admired the genius of Glaucon and Adeimantus but on hearing these words I was quite delighted and said Sons of an illustrious father that was not a bad beginning of the Elegiac verses which the admirer of Glaucon made in honour of you after you had distinguished yourselves at the battle of M_g---

Sons of Anston he sang divine offspring of an illustrious
hero

The epithet is very appropriate for there is something truly divine in being able to argue as you have done for the superiority of injustice and remaining unconvinced by your own arguments. And I do believe that you are not convinced—B this I infer from your general character for had I judged only from your speeches I should have mistrusted you. But now the greater my confidence in you the greater is my difficulty in knowing what to say. For I am in a strait between two on the one hand I feel that I am unequal to the task and my inability is brought home to me by the fact that you were not satisfied with the answer which I made to Phrasymachus proving, as I thought the superiority which justice has over injustice. And yet I cannot refuse to help while breath and speech remain to me. I am afraid that there would be an impiety in being present when justice is evil spoken of and not lifting up a hand in her defence. C And therefore I had best give such help as I can.

Glaucon and the rest entreated me by all means not to let the question drop but to proceed in the investigation. They wanted to arrive at the truth first about the nature of justice and injustice, and secondly about their relative advantages. I told them what I really thought that the inquiry would be of a serious nature and would require very good eyes. Seeing then I said that we are no great wits I think that D we had better adopt a method which I may illustrate thus, suppose that a short-sighted person had been asked by some one to read small letters from a distance and it occurred to some one else that they might be found in another place which was larger and in which the letters were larger—if

they were the same and he could read the larger letters first and then proceed to the lesser—this would have been thought a rare piece of good fortune

Very true said Adeimantus but how does the illustration apply to our inquiry?

I will tell you I replied justice which is the subject of our inquiry is as you know sometimes spoken of as the virtue of an individual and sometimes as the virtue of a State.

True he replied.

And is not a State larger than an individual?

It is

Then in the larger the quantity of justice is likely to be larger and more easily discernible I propose therefore that we inquire into the nature of justice and injustice first as they appear in the State and secondly in the individual, proceeding from the greater to the lesser and comparing them

That he said is an excellent proposal

And if we imagine the State in process of creation we shall see the justice and injustice of the State in process of creation also

I dare say

When the State is completed there may be a hope that the object of our search will be more easily discovered

Yes far more easily

But ought we to attempt to construct one? I said, for to do so as I am inclined to think, will be a very serious task. Reflect therefore

I have reflected said Adeimantus, and am anxious that you should proceed.

A State I said rises as I conceive out of the needs of mankind no one is self-sufficing but all of us have many wants. Can any other origin of a State be imagined?

There can be no other.

Then as we have many wants and many persons are needed to supply them one takes a helper for one purpose and another for another and when these partners and helpers are gathered together in one habitation the body of inhabitants is termed a State.

True he said.

And they exchange with one another and one gives and another receives under the idea that the exchange will be for their good.

Very true.

Then I said let us begin and create in idea a State and yet the true creator is necessity who is the mother of our invention.

Of course he replied.

Now the first and greatest of necessities is food which is the condition of life and existence.

Certainly.

The second is a dwelling and the third clothing and the like.

True.

And now let us see how our city will be able to supply this great demand. We may suppose that one man is a husbandman, another a builder some one else a weaver—shall we add to them a shoemaker or perhaps some other purveyor to our bodily wants?

Quite right.

The barest notion of a State must include four or five men.

E Clearly

And how will they proceed? Will each bring the result of his labours into a common stock?—the individual husbandman for example producing for four and labouring four times as long and as much as he need in the provision of food with which he supplies others as well as himself or will he have nothing to do with others and not be at the trouble of producing for them, but provide for himself alone
370 a fourth of the food in a fourth of the time and in the remaining three fourths of his time be employed in making a house or a coat or a pair of shoes having no partnership with others, but supplying himself all his own wants?

Ademantus thought that he should aim at producing food only and not at producing everything

Probably I replied that would be the better way and when I hear you say this, I am myself reminded that we are
B not all alike there are diversities of natures among us which are adapted to different occupations

Very true

And will you have a work better done when the workman has many occupations or when he has only one?

When he has only one.

Farther there can be no doubt that a work is spoiled when not done at the right time?

No doubt

For business is not disposed to wait until the doer of the business is at leisure but the doer must follow up what he
C is doing and make the business his first object

He must

And if so we must infer that all things are produced more plentifully and easily and of a better quantity when one man

does one thing which is natural to him and does it at the right time and leaves other things

Undoubtedly

Then more than four citizens will be required for the husbandman will not make his own plough or mattock or other implements of agriculture if they are to be good for anything. Neither will the builder make his tools—and he too needs many—and in like manner the weaver and shoe maker

True

Then carpenters and smiths and many other artisans will be sharers in our little State which is already beginning to grow?

True

Yet even if we add neatherds, shepherds and other herdsmen in order that our husbandmen may have oxen to plough with and builders as well as husbandmen may have draught cattle and curriers and weavers fleeces and hides—still our State will not be very large

That is true yet neither will it be a very small State which contains all these

Then again, there is the situation of the city—to find a place where nothing need be imported is wellnigh impossible

Then there must be another class of citizens who will bring the required supply from another city?

There must.

But if the trader goes empty handed having nothing, which they require who would supply his need, he will come back empty-handed.

That is c

And therefore what they produce at home must be not only enough for themselves but such both in quantity and quality as to accommodate those from whom their wants are supplied

Very true

Then more husbandmen and more artisans will be required

They will

Not to mention the importers and exporters who are called merchants?

Yes

Then we shall want merchants?

We shall

And if our chandise is to be carried over the sea skilful sailors will also be needed and in considerable numbers?

Yes in considerable numbers?

Then again within the city how will they exchange their productions? To secure such an exchange was as you will remember one of our principal objects when we formed them into a society and constituted a State

Clearly they will buy and sell

Then they will need a market place, and a money token for purposes of exchange

Certainly

C Suppose now that a husbandman or an artisan brings some production to market and he comes at a time when there is no one to exchange with him,—is he to leave his calling and sit idle in the market place?

Not at all he will find people there who seeing the want, undertake the office of salesmen In well ordered States they are commonly those who are the weakest in bodily strength

and therefore of little use for any other purpose their duty is to be in the market and to give money in exchange for goods to those who desire to sell and to take money from those who desire to buy

This want then creates a class of retail traders in our State Is not retailer the term which is applied to those who sit in the market place engaged in buying and selling while those who wander from one city to another are called merchants?

Yes he said

And there is another class of servants who are intellectually hardly on the level of companionship still they have plenty of bodily strength for labour which accordingly they sell and are called if I do not mistake hirelings hire being the name which is given to the price of their labour

True

Then hirelings will help to make up our population?

Yes

And now Adimantus is our State matured and perfected?

I think so

Where then is justice and where is injustice and in what part of the State did they spring up?

Probably in the dealings of these citizens with one another. 372
I cannot imagine that they are more likely to be found anywhere else

I dare say that you are right in your suggestion, I said we had better think the matter out and not shrink from the inquiry

Let us then consider first of all what will be their way of life now that we have thus established them Will they not produce corn, and wine, and clothes and shoes, and build

houses for themselves? And when they are housed they will work in summer commonly stripped and barefoot but in winter substantially clothed and shod. They will feed on barley meal and flour of wheat baking and kneading them making noble cakes and loaves these they will serve up on a mat of reeds or on clean leaves themselves reclining the while upon beds strewn with yew or myrtle. And they and their children will feast drinking of the wine which they have made wearing garlands on their heads and hymning the praises of the gods in happy converse with one another. And they will take care that their families do not exceed their means having an eye to poverty or war.

But said Glaucon interposing you have not given them a relish to their meal.

True I replied I had forgotten of course they must have a relish—salt, and olives and cheese and they will boil roots and herbs such as country people prepare for a dinner we shall give them figs and peas and beans and they will roast myrtle berries and acorns at the fire drinking in moderation. And with such a diet they may be expected to live in peace and health to a good old age and bequeath a similar life to their children after them.

Yes Socrates he said and if you were providing for a city of pigs how else would you feed the beasts?

But what would you have Glaucon? I replied.

Why he said, you should give them the ordinary conveniences of life. People who are to be comfortable are accustomed to lie on sofas and dine off tables and they should have sauces and sweets in the modern style.

Yes I said, now I understand the question which you would have me consider is not only how a State but how

a luxurious State is created and possibly there is no harm in
I for in such a State we shall be more likely to see how
justice and injustice originate. In my opinion the true and
healthy constitution of the State is the one which I have
described. But if you wish also to see a State at fever heat
I have no objection. For I suspect that many will not be
satisfied with the simpler way of life. They will be for
adding sofas and tables and other furniture also dainties
and perfumes and incense and courtesans and cakes all these
not of one sort only, but in every variety we must go beyond
the necessities of which I was at first speaking such as houses
and clothes and shoes the arts of the painter and the
embroiderer will have to be set in motion and gold and ivory
and all sorts of materials must be procured.

True he said

B

Then we must enlarge our borders for the original
healthy State is no longer sufficient. Now will the city have
to fill and swell with a multitude of callings which are no
required by any natural want such as the whole tribe of
humours and actors of whom one large class have to do with
forms and colours another will be the votaries of music—
poets and their attendant train of rhapsodist players
dancers, contractors also makers of divers kinds of articles
including women's dresses. And we shall want more servants
We'll not tutors be also in request, and nurses wet and dry
trewomen and barbers as well as confectioners and cooks
and swineherds, too who were not needed and therefore had
no place in the former edition of our State, but are needed
now? They must not be forgotten and there will be
animals of many other kinds, if people eat them.

Certainly

D And living in this way we shall have much greater need of physicians than heretofore?

Much greater

And the country which was enough to support the original inhabitants will be too small now and not enough

Quite true

Then a slice of our neighbours' land will be wanted by us for pasture and tillage and they will want a slice of ours if like ourselves they exceed the limit of necessity and give themselves up to the unlimited accumulation of wealth?

E That Socrates will be inevitable

And so we shall go to war Glaucon Shall we not?

Most certainly he replied.

Then without determining as yet whether war does good or harm, thus much we may affirm that now we have discovered war to be derived from causes which are also the causes of almost all the evils in States private as well as public

Undoubtedly

And our State must once more enlarge and this time the enlargement will be nothing short of a whole army which 3/4 will have to go out and fight with the invaders for all that we have as well as for the things and persons whom we were describing above

Why? he said are they not capable of defending themselves?

No I said not if we were right in the principle which was acknowledged by all of us when we were framing the State the principle as you will remember was that one man cannot practise many arts with success

Very true he said

But is not war an art?

B

Certainly

And an art requiring as much attention as shoemaking?

Quite true

And the shoemaker was not allowed by us to be a husbandman or a weaver or a builder—in order that we might have our shoes well made—but to him and to every other worker was assigned one work for which he was by nature fitted and at that he was to continue working all his life long and at no other—he was not to let opportunities slip and then he would become a good workman. Now nothing can be more important than that the work of a soldier should be well done. But is war an art so easily acquired that a man may be a warrior who is also a husbandman or shoemaker or other artisan although no one in the world would be a good dice or draught player who merely took up the game as a recreation, and had not from his earliest years devoted himself to this and nothing else? No tools will make a man a skilled workman or master of defence nor be of any use to him who has not learned how to handle them and has never bestowed any attention upon them. How then will he who takes up a shield or other implement of war become a good fighter all in a day whether with heavy armed or any other kind of troops?

Yes he said the tools which would teach men their own use would be beyond price.

And the higher the duties of the guardian I said the more time, and skill, and art and application will be needed by him?

No doubt he replied

Will he not also require natural aptitude for his calling?

y

Then it will be our duty to select if we can natures which are fitted for the task of guarding the city?

It will

And the selection will be no easy matter I said but we must be brave and do our best

375 We must

Is not the noble youth very like a well bred dog in respect of guarding and watching?

What do you mean?

I mean that both of them ought to be quick to see, and swift to overtake the enemy when they see him and strong too if when they have caught him they have to fight with him.

All these qualities he replied will certainly be required by them

Well and you guardian must be brave if he is to fight well?

Certainly

And is he likely to be brave who has no spirit whether horse or dog or any other animal? Have you never observed how invincible and unconquerable is spirit and how the presence of it makes the soul of any creature to be absolutely fearless and indomitable?

I have

Then now we have a clear notion of the bodily qualities which are required in the guardian

True

And also of the mental ones his soul is to be full of spirit?

Yes

But are not these spirited natures apt to be savage with one another and with everybody else

A difficult y by no means easy to overcome he replied

Whereas I said they ought to be dangerous to their enemies and gentle to their friends if not they will destroy themselves without waiting for their enemies to destroy them

True he said

What is to be done then? I said how shall we find gentle nature which has also a great spirit for the one is the contradiction of the other?

True

He will not be a good guardian who is wanting in either of these two qualities and yet the combination of them appears to be impossible and hence we must infer that to be a good guardian is impossible

I am afraid that what you say is true he replied

Here feeling perplexed I began to think over what had preceded—My friend I said no wonder that we are in a perplexity for we have lost sight of the image which we had before us

What do you mean? he said

I mean to say that there do exist natures gifted with those opposite qualities

And where do you find them?

Many animals I replied, furnish examples of them our friend the dog is a very good one you know that well bred dogs are perfectly gentle to their familiars and acquaintances and the reverse to strangers

Yes I know

Then there is nothing impossible or out of the order of nature in our finding a guardian who has a similar combination of qualities?

y not.

Would not he who is fitted to be a guardian besides the spumed nature need to have the qualities of a philosopher?

I do not apprehend your meaning

376 The trait of which I am speaking I replied may be also seen in the dog and is remarkable in the animal.

What trait?

Why a dog wherever he sees a stranger is angry when an acquaintance he welcomes him although the one has never done him any harm nor the other any good Did this never strike you as curious?

The matter never struck me before but I quite recognise the truth of your remark.

And surely this instinct of the dog is very charming --
 E your dog is a true philosopher

Why?

Why because he distinguishes the face of a friend and of an enemy only by the criterion of knowing and not knowing And must not an animal be a lover of learning who determines what he likes and dislikes by the test of knowledge and ignorance?

Most assuredly

And is not the love of learning the love of wisdom which is philosophy?

They are the same he replied

And may we not say confidently of man also that he who is likely to be gentle to his friends and acquaintances must by nature be a lover of wisdom and knowledge?

That we may safely affirm.

Then he who is to be a really good and noble guardian of the State will require to unite in himself philosophy and spirit and swiftness and strength?

Undoubtedly

Then we have found the desired natures and now that we have found them how are they to be reared and educated? Is not this an inquiry which may be expected to throw light on the greater inquiry which is our final end—How do justice and injustice grow up in States? for we do not want either to omit what is to the point or to draw out the argument to an inconvenient length

Ademantus thought that the inquiry would be of great service to us

Then I said my dear friend the task must not be given up even if somewhat long

Certainly not.

Come then, and let us pass a leisure hour in story telling and our story shall be the education of our heroes

By all means

E

And what shall be their education? Can we find a better than the traditional sort?—and this has two divisions, gymnastic for the body and music for the soul

True

Shall we begin education with music and go on to gymnastic afterwards?

By all means

And when you speak of music do you include literature or not?

I do

And literature may be either true or false?

Yes

And the young should be trained in both kinds and we begin with the false?

I do not understand your meaning, he said.

You know I said that we begin by telling children stories which though not wholly destitute of truth are in the main fictitious and these stories are told them when they are not of an age to learn gymnastics

Very true

That was my meaning when I said that we must teach music before gymnastics

Quite right he said

You know also that the beginning is the most important part of any work, especially in the case of a young and tender thing for that is the time at which the character is being formed and the desired impression is more readily taken

Quite true

And shall we just carelessly allow children to hear any casual tales which may be devised by casual persons and to receive into their minds ideas for the most part the very opposite of those which we should wish them to have when they are grown up?

We cannot

Then the first thing will be to establish a censorship of the writers of fiction and let the censors receive any tale of fiction which is good and reject the bad and we will desire mothers and nurses to tell their children the authorized ones only Let them fashion the mind with such tales even more fondly than they mould the body with their hands but most of those which are now in use must be discarded.

Of what tales are you speaking? he said

You may find a model of the lesser in the greater I said for they are necessary of the same type and there is the same spirit in both of them.

Very likely he replied but I do not as yet know what you would term the greater

Those I said, which are narrated by Homer and Hesiod and the rest of the poets who have ever been the great story tellers of mankind.

But which stories do you mean, he said, and what fault do you find with them?

A fault which is most serious I said the fault of telling a lie and what is more a bad lie

But when is this fault committed?

Whenever an erroneous representation is made of the nature of gods and heroes—as when a painter paints a portrait not having the shadow of a likeness to the original

Yes he said, that sort of thing is certainly very blameable but what are the stories which you mean?

First of all I said, there was that greatest of all lies in high places which the poet told about Uranus and which was a bad lie too—I mean what Hesiod says that Uranus did, and how Cronus retaliated on him¹ The doings of Cronus 378 and the sufferings which in turn his son inflicted upon him even if they were true, ought certainly not to be lightly told to young and thoughtless persons if possible they had better be buried in silence But if there is an absolute necessity for their mention a chosen few might hear them in a mystery and they should sacrifice not a common [Eleusinian] pig but some huge and unprocurable victim and then the number of the hearers will be very few indeed

Why yes said he, those stories are extremely objectionable.

Yes Adeimantus they are stories not to be repeated in our State, the young man should not be told that in com

nothing the worst of crimes he is far from doing anything outrageous and that even if he chastises his father when he does wrong in whatever manner he will only be following the example of the first and greatest among the gods

I entirely agree with you he said in my opinion those stories are quite unfit to be repeated

Neither if we mean our future guardians to regard the habit of quarrelling among themselves as of all things the basest should any word be said to them of the wars in heaven and of the plots and fightings of the gods against one another for they are not true No we shall never mention the battles of the giants or let them be embroidered on garments and we shall be silent about the innumerable other quarrels of gods and heroes with their friends and relatives If they would only believe us we would tell them that quarrelling is unholy and that never up to this time has there been any quarrel between citizens this is what old men and old women should begin by telling children and when they grow up the poets also should be told to compose for them in a similar spirit¹ But the narrative of Hephaestus binding Here his mother or now on another occasion Zeus sent him flying for taking her part when she was being beaten and all the battles of the gods in Homer—these tales must not be admitted into our State whether they are supposed to have an allegorical meaning or not For a young person cannot judge what is allegorical and what is literal anything that he receives into his mind at that age is likely to become indelible and unalterable and therefore it is most important that the tales which the young first hear should be models of virtuous thoughts

There you are right he replied but if any one asks where are such models to be found and of what tales are you speaking—how shall we answer him?

I said to him You and I Ademantus at this moment, 379 are not poets but founders of a State now the founders of a State ought to know the general forms in which poets should cast their tales and the limits which must be observed by them but to make the tales is not their business

Very true he said but what are these forms of theology which you mean?

Something of this kind I replied —God is always to be represented as he truly is whatever be the sort of poetry, epic lyric or tragic in which the representation is given

Right

And is he not truly good? and must he not be represented as such?

Certainly

And no good thing is hurtful?

No indeed

And that which is not hurtful hurts not?

Certainly not

And that which hurts not does no evil

No

And can that which does no evil be a cause of evil?

Impossible

And the good is advantageous?

Yes

And therefore the cause of well being?

Yes

It follows therefore that the good is not the cause of all things but of the good only?

C Assuredly

Then God if he be good, is not the author of all things as the many assert but he is the cause of a few things only and not of most things that occur to men For few are the goods of human life and many are the evils and the good is to be attributed to God alone of the evils the causes are to be sought elsewhere, and not in him

That appears to me to be most true he said

Then we must not listen to Homer or to any other poet who is guilty of the folly of saying that two casks

Lie at the threshold of Zeus full of lots one of good, the other of evil lots ¹

and that he to whom Zeus gives a mixture of the two

Sometimes meets with evil fortune at other times with good

but that he to whom is given the cup of unmingled ill,

Him wild hunger drives over the beauteous earth

E And again—

Zeus who is the dispenser of good and evil to us

And if any one asserts that the violation of oaths and treaties, which was really the work of Pandarus ² was brought about by Athene and Zeus or that the strife and contention of the gods was instigated by Themis and Zeus ³ he shall not have our approval neither will we allow our young men to hear the words of Aeschylus that

God plants guilt among men when he desires utterly to destroy a house

And if a poet writes of the sufferings of Niobe—the subject

of the tragedy in which these ambiguous verses occur—or of the house of Pelops or of the Trojan war or on any similar theme either we must not permit him to say that these are the works of God or if they are of God he must devise some explanation of them such as we are seeking he must say that God did what was just and right and they were the better for being punished but that those who are punished are miserable and that God is the author of their misery—the poet is not to be permitted to say though he may say that the wicked are miserable because they require to be punished and are benefited by receiving punishment from God but that God being good is the author of evil to any one is to be strenuously denied, and not to be said or sung or heard in verse or prose by any one whether old or young in any well ordered commonwealth Such a fiction is suicidal ruinous impious

I agree with you he replied and am ready to give my assent to the law

Let this then be one of our rules and principles concerning the gods to which our poets and reciters will be expected to conform—that God is not the author of all things but of good only

That will do he said

And what do you think of a second principle? Shall I ask you whether God is a magician and of a nature to appear insidiously now in one shape and now in another—sometimes himself changing and passing into many forms sometimes deceiving us with the semblance of such transformations or is he one and the same immutably fixed in his own proper image?

I cannot answer you, he said without more thought

Well, I said but if we suppose a change in anything that change must be effected either by the thing itself or by some other thing?

Most certainly

And things which are at their best are also least liable to be altered or discomposed for example when healthiest and strongest the human frame is least liable to be affected by meats and drinks and the plant which is in the fullest vigour also suffers least from winds or the heat of the sun or any similar causes

Of course

381 And will not the bravest and wisest soul be least confused or deranged by any external influence?

True

And the same principle as I should suppose applies to all composite things—furniture, houses garments when good and well made they are least altered by time and circumstances

Very true

B Then everything which is good whether made by art or nature or both is least liable to suffer change from without?

True.

But surely God and the things of God are in every way perfect?

Of course they are

Then he can hardly be compelled by external influence to take many shapes?

He cannot

But may he not change and transform himself?

Clearly, he said, that must be the case if he is changed at all.

And will he then change himself for the better and fairer
or for the worse and more unsightly?

If he change at all he can only change for the worse for we cannot suppose him to be deficient either in virtue or beauty

Very true Ademantus but then would any one, whether God or man desire to make himself worse?

Impossible

Then it is impossible that God should ever be willing to change being as is supposed, the fairest and best that is conceivable every God remains absolutely and for ever in his own form

That necessarily follows he said in my judgement

Then I said, my dear friend, let none of the poets tell us that

The gods taking the disguise of strangers from other lands walk up and down cities in all sorts of forms¹

and let no one slander Proteus and Thetis neither let any one elate in tragedy or in any other kind of poetry introduce Here disguised in the likeness of a priestess asking an alms

For the life giving daughters of Inachus the river of Argos

—let us have no more lies of that sort Neither must we have mothers under the influence of the poets scaring their children with a bad version of these myths—telling how certain gods as they say Go about by night in the likeness of so many strangers and in divers forms but let them

take heed lest they make cowards of their children and at the same time speak blasphemy against the gods

Heaven forbid he said

But although the gods are themselves unchangeable still by witchcraft and deception they may make us think that they appear in various forms?

Perhaps he replied

Well but can you imagine that God will be willing to lie whether in word or deed or to put forth phantom of himself?

382 I cannot say he replied

Do you not know I said that the true lie if such an expression may be allowed is hated of gods and men

What do you mean? he said.

I mean that no one is willingly deceived in that which is the truest and highest part of himself or about the truest and highest matters there above all he is most afraid or a lie having possession of him.

Still, he said I do not comprehend you

B The reason is I replied that you attribute some profound meaning to my words but I am only saying that deception, or being deceived or uninformed about the highest realities in the highest part of themselves which is the soul and in that part of them to have and to hold the lie is what mankind least like—that I say is what they utterly detest

There is nothing more hateful to them

And as I was just now remarking this ignorance in the soul of him who is deceived may be called the true lie for the lie in words is only a kind of imitation and shadowy image of a previous affection of the soul not pure unadulterated falsehood. Am I not right?

Perfectly right

The true lie is na ed not only by the gods but also by men?

Y s

Whereas the lie in words is in certain cases useful and not hateful in dealing with enemies—that would be an instance or again when those whom we call our friends in a fit of madness or illusion are going to do some harm then it is useful and is a sort of medicine or preventive also in the tales of mythology of which we were just now speaking—D because we do not know the truth about ancient times we make falsehood as much like truth as we can and so turn it to account

Very true he said

But can any of these reasons apply to God? Can we suppose that he is ignorant of antiquity and therefore has recourse to invention?

That would be ridiculous he said

Then the living poet has no place in our idea of God?

I should say not

Or perhaps he may tell a lie because he is afraid of enemies?

That is inconceivable

E

But he may have friends who are senseless or mad?

But no mad or senseless person can be a friend of God

Then no motive can be imagined why God should lie?

None whatever

Then the superhuman and divine is absolutely incapable of falsehood?

Yes

Then is God perfectly simple and true both in word and

deed he changes not he deceives no ether by sign or
world by dream or waking vision

33 Your thoughts he said are the reflection of my own

You agree with me then I said that this is the second
type or form in which we should write and speak about
divine things The gods are not magicians who transform
themselves neither do they deceive mankind in any way

I grant that

Then although we are admirers of Homer we do not
admire the lying dream which Zeus sends to Agamemnon
neither will we praise the verses of Aeschylus in which Thetis
B says that Apollo at her nuptials

Was celebrating in song her fair progeny whose days were
to be long and to know no sickness And when he had
spoken of my lot as in all things blessed of heaven he raised
a note of triumph and cheered my soul And I thought
that the word of Phoebus being divine and full of prophecy
would not fail And now he himself who uttered the strain
he who was present at the banquet and who said this—he
it is who has slain my son —

C These are the kind of sentiments about the gods which
will arouse our anger and he who utters them shall be
refused a chorus neither shall we allow teachers to make
use of them in the instruction of the young meaning as we
do that our guardians, as far as men can be should be true
worshippers of the gods and like them

I entirely agree he said in these principles and promise
to make them my laws

¹ Omitting κα α φαντασις

² From a lost play

BOOK III

SOON then I said are our principles of 'eology—some S.eph. tales are to be told and others are not to be told to our disciples from their youth upwards if we mean them to honour the gods and their parent and o value men and women with one another 36

Yes and I think that our principles are right he said.

But if they are to be courageous must they not learn other lessons besides these, and lessons of such a kind as will take away the fear of death? Can any man be courageous who has the fear of death in him?

Certainly not he said.

And can he be fearless of death, or will he choose death in battle rather than defeat and slavery who believes the world below to be real and terrible?

Impossible.

Then we must assume a control over the narrators of this class of tales as well as over the others and beg them not simply to revile but rather to commend the world below intimating to them that their descriptions are untrue and C will do harm to our future warriors.

That will be our duty he said.

Then I said we shall have to obliterate many obnoxious passages, beginning with the verses

I would rather be a serf on the land of a poor and portionless man than rule over all the dead who have come to naught 1

We must also expunge the verse which tells us how Pluto feared,

D Lest the mansions grim and squalid which the gods abhor should be seen both of mortals and immortals ¹

And again —

O heavens verily in the house of Hades there is soul and ghostly form but no mind at all ²

Again of Tiresias —

[To him even after death did Persephone grant mind] that he alone should be wise but the other souls are fitting shades ³

Again —

The soul flying from the limbs had gone to Hades lamenting her fate leaving manhood and youth ⁴

Again —

387 And the soul, with shrilling cry passed like smoke beneath the earth ⁵

And —

As bats in hollow of mystic cavern whenever any of them has dropped out of the string and falls from the rock fly shrilling and cling to one another so did they with shrilling cry hold together as they moved ⁶

B And we must beg Homer and the other poets not to be angry if we strike out these and similar passages not because they are unpoetical or unattractive to the popular ear but because the greater the poetical charm of them, the less are they meet for the ears of boys and men who are meant to be free, and who should fear slavery more than death

Il. xx 64

Ib. xxi 103

Od. x 490

Il. xv 850

Ib. xxii. 60.

Od. xx 6.

Undoubtedly

Also we shall have to reject all the terrible and appalling names which describe the world below—Cocytus and Styx, hosts under the earth and sapless shades and any similar words of which the very mention causes a shudder to pass through the inmost soul of him who hears them. I do not say that these horrible stories may not have a use of some kind, but there is a danger that the nerves of our guardians may be rendered too excitable and effeminate by them.

There is a real danger, he said.

Then we must have no more of them.

True.

Another and a nobler strain must be composed and sung by us.

Clearly.

And shall we proceed to get rid of the weepings and wailings of famous men?

They will go with the rest.

But shall we be right in getting rid of them? Reflect: our principle is that the good man will not consider death terrible to any other good man who is his comrade.

Yes, that is our principle.

And therefore he will not so row for his departed friend as though he had suffered anything terrible?

He will not.

Such an one as we further maintain, is sufficient for himself and his own happiness, and therefore is least in need of other men.

True, he said.

And for this reason the loss of a son or brother or the deprivation of fortune is to him of all men least terrible.

Assuredly

And therefore he will be least likely to lament and will bear with the greatest equanimity any misfortune of this sort which may befall him

Yes he will reel such a misfortune far less than another

Then we shall be right in getting rid of the lamentations of famous men, and making them over to women (and not 388 even to women who are good for anything) or to men of a baser sort that those who are being educated by us to be the defenders of their country may scorn to do the like

That will be very right

Then we will once more enreat Homer and the other poets not to depict Achilles¹ who is the son of a goddess first lying on his side then on his back, and then on his face then starting up and sailing in a frenzy along the shores of the barren sea now taking the sooty ashes in both his hands² and pouring them over his head or weeping and wailing in the various modes which Homer has delineated Nor should he describe Priam the kinsman of the gods as pining and beseeching

Rolling in the dirt calling each man loudly by his name³

Still more earnestly will we beg of him at all events not to introduce the gods lamenting and saying

C Alas! my misery! Alas! that I bore the bravest to my sorrow⁴

But if he must introduce the gods at any rate let him not dare so completely to misrepresent the greatest of the gods, as to make him say—

Il xxiv 10

Ib xvii 25

² Ib xxii 414

Ib xvii 4.

O heavens ! with my eyes verily I behold a dear friend
of mine chased round and round the city and my heart is
sorrowful ¹

Or again —

Woe is me that I am fated to have Sarpedon dearest of
men to me subdued at the hands of Patroclus the son of D
Menoeus ²

For if my sweet Ademantus our youth seriously listen to
such unworthy representations of the gods instead of laugh-
ing at them as they ought hardly will any of them deem that
he himself being but a man can be dishonoured by similar
actions neither will he rebuke any inclination which may
arise in his mind to say and do like him And instead of
having any shame or self control he will be always whining
and lamenting on slight occasions

Yes he said that is most true E

Yes I replied but that surely is what ought not to be as
the argument has just proved to us and by that proof we
must abide until it is disproved by a better

It ought not to be

Neither ought our guardians to be given to laughter For
a fit of laughter which has been indulged to excess almost
always produces a violent reaction

So I believe

Then persons of worth even if only mortal men must not
be represented as overcome by laughter and still less must
such a representation of the gods be allowed

Still less of the gods as you say he replied 389

Then we shall not suffer such an expression to be used
about the gods as that of Homer when he describes how

Inextinguishable laughter arose among the blessed gods when they saw Hephaestus bustling about the mansion ¹

On your views we must not admit them

On my views if you like to father them on me that we must not admit them is certain

Again truth should be highly valued if as we were saying a lie is useless to the gods and useful only as a medicine to men then the use of such medicines should be restricted to physicians, private individuals have no business with them

Clearly not he said

Then if any one at all is to have the privilege of lying the rulers of the State should be the persons and they in their dealings either with enemies or with their own citizens may be allowed to lie for the public good. But nobody else should meddle with anything of the kind and although the rulers have this privilege for a private man to lie to them in return is to be deemed a more heinous fault than for the patient or the pupil of a gymnasium not to speak the truth about his own bodily illnesses to the physician or to the trainer or for a sailor not to tell the captain what is happening about the ship and the rest of the crew and how things are going with himself or his fellow sailors

Most true he said

If then the ruler catches anybody beside himself lying in the State,

Any of the craftsmen whether he be priest or physician or carpenter ²

he will punish him for introducing a practice which is equally subversive and destructive of ship or State

Most certainly he said, if our idea of the State is ever
called out

In the next place our youth must be temperate

Certainly

Are not the chief elements of temperance speaking
generally obedience to commanders and self control in
sensual pleasures?

True

Then we shall approve such language as that of Diomedes
in Homer

Friend sit still and obey my word

and the verses which follow

The Greeks marched¹ breathing prowess³
in silent awe of their leaders⁴

and other sentiments of the same kind

We shall

What of this line

O heavy with wine who hast the eyes of a dog and the
heart of a stag⁵

and of the words which follow? Would you say that these⁶
or any similar impertinences which private individuals are
supposed to address to their rulers whether in verse or prose
are well or ill spoken?

They are ill spoken

They may very possibly afford some amusement, but they
do not conduce to temperance And therefore they are
likely to do harm to our young men—you would agree with
me there?

Yes

And then again to make the worst of men say that nothing in his opinion is more glorious than

B When the tables are full of bread and meat and the cup-bearer carries round wine which he draws from the bowl and pours into the cups ¹

is it fit or conducive to temperance or a young man to hear such words? Or the verse

The saddest of fates is to die and meet destiny from hunger? ²

What would you say again to the tale of Zeus, who while other gods and men were asleep and he the only person C awake, lay devising plans but forgot them all in a moment through his lust and was so completely overcome at the sight of Here that he would not even go into the hut, but wanted to lie with her on the ground declaring that he had never been in such a state of rapture before even when they first met one another

Without the knowledge of their parents ³

or that other tale of how Hephaestus because of similar goings on cast a chain around Ares and Aphrodite? ⁴

Indeed he said I am strongly of opinion that they ought not to hear that sort of thing

D But any deeds of endurance which are done or told by famous men these they ought to see and hear as for example, what is said in the verses,

He smote his breast and thus reproached his heart,
Endure my heart far worse hast thou endured! ⁵

¹ Od ix 8

Ib xii 542

² Il xiv 281

³ Od viii 266

⁴ Ib xx *

Certainly he said

In the next place we must not let them be receivers of gifts or lovers of money

Certainly not

E

Nor must we sing to them of

Gifts persuading gods and persuading everend kings ¹

Neither is Phoenix the tutor of Achilles to be approved or deemed to have given his pupil good counsel when he told him that he should take the gifts of the Greeks and assist them but that without a gift he should not lay aside his anger Neither will we believe or acknowledge Achilles himself to have been such a lover of money that he took Agamemnon's gifts or that when he had received payment he restored the dead body of Hector but that without payment he was unwilling to do so ²

Undoubtedly he said these are not sentiments which can justly be approved

Loving Homer as I do ³ I hardly like to say that in attributing these feelings to Achilles or in believing that they are truly attributed to him he is guilty of downright impiety As little can I believe the narrative of his insolence to Apollo where he says

Thou hast wronged me O far darter most abominable of deities Verily I would be even with thee if I had only the power ⁴

or his insubordination to the river god, ⁵ on whose divinity he is ready to lay hands or his offering to the dead Patroclus of his own hair ⁶ which had been previously dedicated to the

Quoted by Suidas as attributed to Hesiod ¹ Il ix 510

² Ib xxv i

Cf *infra* x 595

Il. 549

h. xx i 2 347

b 5

other river god Spercheus and that he actually performed this vow or that he dragged Hector round the tomb of Patroclus¹ and slaughtered the captives at the pyre² of all this I cannot believe that he was guilty any more than I can allow our citizens to believe that he the wise Cheiron's pupil the son of a goddess and of Peleus who was the gentlest of men and third in descent from Zeus, was so disordered in his wits as to be at one time the slave of two seemingly inconsistent passions meanness not untainted by avarice combined with overweening contempt of gods and men

You are quite right he replied

And let us equally refuse to believe or allow to be repeated the tale of Theseus son of Poseidon, or of Peritrous son of Zeus going forth as they did to perpetrate a horrid rape or of any other hero or son of a god daring to do such impious and dreadful things as they falsely ascribe to them in our day and let us further compel the poets to declare either that these acts were not done by them or that they were not the sons of gods—both in the same breath they shall not be permitted to affirm We will not have them trying to persuade our youth that the gods are the authors of evil, and that heroes are no better than men—sentiments which, as we were saying are neither pious nor true for we have already proved that evil cannot come from the gods

Assuredly not

And further they are likely to have a bad effect on those who hear them for everybody will begin to excuse his own vices when he is convinced that similar wickednesses are always being perpetrated by—

The kindred of the gods the relatives of Zeus whose

ancestral altar the altar of Zeus is aloft in air on the peak
of Ida

and who have

the blood of deities yet flowing in their veins ¹

And therefore let us put an end to such tales lest they
engender laxity of morals among the young 392

By all means he replied

But now that we are determining what classes of subjects
are or are not to be spoken of let us see whether any have
been omitted by us The manner in which gods and demi-
gods and heroes and the world below should be treated
has been already laid down

Very true

And what shall we say about men That is clearly the
remaining portion of our subject

Clearly so

But we are not in a condition to answer this question at
present my friend

Why not?

Because if I am not mistaken we shall have to say that
about men poets and story tellers are guilty of making the B
gravest misstatements when they tell us that wicked men are
often happy and the good miserable and that injustice is
profitable when undetected but that justice is a man's own
loss and another's gain—these things we shall forbid them
to utter and command them to sing and say the opposite.

To be sure we shall, he replied

But if you admit that I am right in this then I shall

tain that you have implem-ented the principle for which we have been all along contending

I grant the truth of your inference

- C That such things are or are not to be said about men is a question which we cannot determine until we have discovered what justice is and how naturally advantageous to the possessor whether he seem to be just or not

Most true he said

Enough of the subjects of poetry let us now speak of the style and when this has been considered both in matter and manner will have been completely treated

I do not understand what you mean said Adeimantus

- D Then I must make you understand and perhaps I may be more intelligible if I put the matter in this way You are aware I suppose that all mythology and poetry is a narration of events either past present or to come?

Certainly he replied

And narration may be either simple narration, or imitation or a union of the two?

That again he said I do not quite understand

I fear that I must be a ridiculous teacher when I have so much difficulty in making myself apprehended Like a bad speaker therefore I will not take the whole of the subject

- E but will break a piece off in illustration of my meaning You know the first lines of the Iliad in which the poet says that
393 Chryses prayed Agamemnon to release his daughter and that Agamemnon flew into a passion with him whereupon Chryses failing of his object, invoked the anger of the God against the Achaeans Now as far as these lines

And he prayed all the Greeks but especially the two sons of Atreus the chiefs of the people,

the poet is speaking in his own person he never leads us to suppose that he is any one else. But in what follows he takes the person of Chryses and then he does all that he can to make us believe that the speaker is not Homer but the aged priest himself. And in this double form he has cast the entire narrative of the events which occurred at Troy and in Ithaca and throughout the *Odyssey*.

Yes.

And a narrative it remains both in the speech which the poet recites from time to time and in the intermediate passages?

Quite true.

But when the poet speaks in the person of another may we not say that he assimilates his style to that of the person whose as he informs you is going to speak?

Certainly.

And this assimilation of himself to another either by the use of voice or gesture, is the imitation of the person whose character he assumes?

Of course.

Then in this case the narrative of the poet may be said to proceed by way of imitation?

Very true.

Or if the poet everywhere appears and never conceals himself then again the imitation is dropped and his poetry becomes simple narration. However in order that I may make my meaning quite clear and that you may no more say

'I don't understand' I will show how the change might be effected. If Homer had said 'The priest came, having his daughter's ransom in his hands supplicating the Achaeans, and above all the kings and then, instead of speaking in

the person of Chryses he had continued in his own person, the words would have been not imitation but simple narration. The passage would have run as follows (I am no poet and therefore I drop the metre). The priest came and prayed the gods on behalf of the Greeks that they might capture Troy and return safely home, but begged that they would give him back his daughter and take the ransom which he brought and respect the God. Thus he spoke and the other Greeks revered the priest and assented. But Agamemnon was wroth and bade him depart and not come again lest the staff and chaplets of the God should be of no avail to him—the daughter of Chryses should not be released he said—she should grow old with him in Argos. And then he told him to go away and not to provoke him if he intended to get home unscathed. And the old man went away in fear and silence and when he had left the camp he called upon Apollo by his many names reminding him of everything which he had done pleasing to him whether in building his temples or in offering sacrifice and praying that his good deeds might be returned to him and that the Achaeans might expiate his tears by the arrows of the god—and so on.

In this way the whole becomes simple narrative.

I understand he said.

Or you may suppose the opposite case—that the intermediate passages are omitted and the dialogue only left.

That also he said I understand you mean for example as in tragedy.

You have conceived my meaning perfectly and if I mistake not what you failed to apprehend before is now made clear to you that poetry and mythology are in some cases wholly imitative—instances of this are supplied by tragedy.

and comedy there is likewise the opposite style in which the poet is the only speaker—of this the dithyramb affords the best example and the combination of both is found in epic and in several other styles of poetry Do I take you with me?

Yes he said I see now what you meant

I will ask you to remember also what I began by saying that we had done with the subject and might proceed to the style

Yes I remember

In saying this I intended to imply that we must come to some understanding about the mimetic art—whether the poets in narrating their stories are to be allowed by us to imitate and if so whether in whole or in part and in the latter in what parts or should all imitation be prohibited?

You mean I suspect to ask whether tragedy and comedy shall be admitted into our State?

Yes I said but there may be more than this in question I really do not know as yet but whither the argument may blow thither we go

And go we will, he said.

Then Adeimantus let me ask you whether our guardians ought to be imitators or rather has not this question been decided by the rule already laid down that one man can only do one thing well, and not many, and that if he attempt many he will altogether fail of gaining much reputation in any?

Certainly

And this is equally true of imitation no one man can imitate many things as well as he would imitate a single one?

He cannot

Then the same person will hardly be able to play a serious 395

part in life and at the same time to be an imitator and imitate many other parts as well for even when two species of imitation are nearly allied, the same persons cannot succeed in both as for example the writers of tragedy and comedy—did you not just now call them imitations?

Yes I did and you are right in thinking that the same persons cannot succeed in both

Any more than they can be rhododists and actors at once?

True

B Neither are comic and tragic actors the same yet all these things are but imitations

They are so

And human nature Adeimantus appears to have been coined into yet smaller pieces and to be as incapable of imitating many things well as of performing well the actions of which the imitations are copies

Quite true he replied

If then we adhere to our original notion and bear in mind that our guardians setting aside every other business are to
C dedicate themselves wholly to the maintenance of freedom in the State making thus their craft and engaging in no work which does not bear on this end, they ought not to practise to imitate anything else if they imitate at all, they should imitate from youth upward only those characters which are suitable to their profession—the courageous temperate, holy free and like but they should not depict or be skilful at imitating any kind of illiberality or baseness lest from
D what on they should come to be what they imitate Did you never observe how imitations beginning in early youth and continuing far into life at length grow into habits and become a second nature, affecting body voice, and mind?

Yes certainly he said.

Then, I said, we will not allow those for whom we profess a care and of whom we say that they ought to be good men to imitate a woman, whether young or old quarrelling with her husband or striving and vaunting against the gods in conceit of her happiness or when she is in affliction or in sorrow, or weeping and certainly not one who is in sickness love or labour

Very right he said.

Neither must they represent slaves male or female performing the offices of slaves?

They must not

And surely not bad men whether cowards or any others who do the reverse of what we have just been prescribing who scold or mock or revile one another in drink or out of drink, or who in any other manner sin against themselves and their neighbours in word or deed as the manner of such is Neither should they be trained to imitate the action or speech of men or women who are mad or bad for madness like vice is to be known but not to be practised or imitated.

Very true he replied

Neither may they imitate smiths or other artificers or oarsmen or boatswains or the like? B

How can they he said when they are not allowed to apply their minds to the callings of any of these?

Nor may they imitate the neighing of horses the bellowing of bull the murmur of rivers and roar of the ocean thunder and all that sort of thing?

Nay he said, if madness be forbidden neither may they copy the behaviour of madmen

You mean, I said, if I understand you aright, that there is

one sort of narrative style which may be employed by a truly good man when he has anything to say and that another sort will be used by a man of an opposite character and education

And which are these two sorts? he asked

Suppose I answered, that a just and good man in the course of a narration comes on some saying or action of another good man—I should imagine that he will like to personate him, and will not be ashamed of this sort of imitation he will be most ready to play the part of the good man when he is acting firmly and wisely in a less degree when he is overtaken by illness or love or drink or has met with any other disaster But when he comes to a character which is unworthy of him, he will not make a study of that he will disdain such a person and will assume his likeness if at all for a moment only when he is performing some good action at other times he will be ashamed to play a part which he has never practised, nor will he like to fashion and frame himself after the baser models he feels the employment of such an art unless in jest to be beneath him and his mind revolts at it

So I should expect he replied

Then he will adopt a mode of narration such as we have illustrated out of Homer that is to say his style will be both imitative and narrative, but there will be very little of the former and a great deal of the latter Do you agree?

Certainly he said that is the model which such a speaker must necessarily take

But there is another sort of character who will narrate anything and the worse he is the more unscrupulous he will be nothing will be too bad for him and he will be ready to imitate anything not as a joke, but in right good

earnest and before a large company As I was just now saying he will attempt to represent the roll of thunde the noise of wind and hail or the creaking of wheels and pulleys and the various sounds of flutes pipes trumpets and all sorts of instruments he will bark like a dog bleat like a heep, or crow like a cock his entire art will consist in B imitation of voice and gesture, and there will be very little narration

That he said will be his mode of speaking

These, then are the two kinds of style?

Yes

And you would agree with me in saying that one of them is simple and has but slight changes and if the harmony and rhythm are also chosen for their simplicity the result is that the speaker if he speaks correctly is always pretty much the same in style and he will keep within the limits of a single harmony (for the changes are not great) and in like manner he will make use of nearly the same rhythm? C

That is quite true he said

Whereas the other requires all sorts of harmonies and all sorts of rhythms if the music and the style are to correspond because the style has all sorts of changes

That is also perfectly true, he replied

And do not the two styles or the mixture of the two comprehend all poetry and every form of expression in words? No one can say anything except in one or other of them or in both together

They include all, he said

And shall we receive into our State all the three styles or D one only of the two unmixed styles? or would you include the mixed?

I should prefer only to admit the pure imitator of virtue

Yes I said, Adeimantus but the mixed style is also very charming and indeed the pantomimic which is the opposite of the one chosen by you is the most popular style with children and their attendants and with the world in general

I do not deny it

But I suppose you would argue that such a style is unsuitable to our State in which human nature is not twofold or manifold for one man plays one part only?

Yes quite unsuitable

And this is the reason why in our State and in our State only we shall find a shoemaker to be a shoemaker and not a pilot also and a husbandman to be a husbandman and not a dicast also and a soldier a soldier and not a trader also and the same throughout?

True he said

398 And therefore when any one of these pantomimic gentlemen who are so clever that they can imitate anything comes to us and makes a proposal to exhibit himself and his poetry we will fall down and worship him as a sweet and holy and wonderful being but we must also inform him that in our State such as he are not permitted to exist the law will not allow them And so when we have anointed him with myrrh, and set a garland of wool upon his head we shall send him away to another city For we mean to employ for our souls health the rougher and severer poet or story teller who will imitate the style of the virtuous only and will follow those models which we prescribed at first when we began the education of our soldiers

We certainly will, he said if we have the power

Then now my friend I said that part of music or literary education which relates to the story or myth may be considered to be finished for the matter and manner have both been discussed

I think so too he said

Next in order will follow melody and song

C

That is obvious

Every one can see already what we ought to say about them if we are to be consistent with ourselves

I fear said Glaucón laughing that the word every one hardly includes me for I cannot at the moment say what they should be though I may guess

At any rate you can tell that a song or ode has three parts—the words the melody and the rhythm that degree of knowledge I may presuppose?

Yes he said so much as that you may

And as for the words there will surely be no difference between words which are and which are not set to music both will conform to the same laws, and these have been already determined by us?

Yes

And the melody and rhythm will depend upon the words?

Certainly

We were saying when we spoke of the subject matter that we had no need of lamentation and strains of sorrow?

True

And which are the harmonies expressive of sorrow? You are musical and can tell me.

The harmonies which you mean are the mixed or tenor Lydian and the full toned or bass Lydian and such like

These then, I said, must be banished even to the

who have a character to maintain they are of no use, and much less to men.

Certainly

In the next place, drunkenness and softness and indolence are utterly unbecoming the character of our guardians

Utterly unbecoming

And which are the soft or drinking harmonies?

399 The Ionian he replied and the Lydian they are termed relaxed

Well, and are these of any military use?

Quite the reverse he replied and if so the Dorian and the Phrygian are the only ones which you have left

I answered Of the harmonies I know nothing but I want to have one warlike to sound the note or accent which a brave man utters in the hour of danger and stern resolve, or when his cause is failing and he is going to wounds or B death or is overtaken by some other evil, and at every such crisis meets the blows of fortune with firm step and a determination to endure and another to be used by him in times of peace and freedom of action, when there is no pressure of necessity and he is seeking to persuade God by prayer or man by instruction and admonition, or on the other hand, when he is expressing his willingness to yield to persuasion or entreaty or admonition and which represents him when by prudent conduct he has attained his end not carried away by his success but acting moderately and wisely C under the circumstances and acquiescing in the event These two harmonies I ask you to leave the strain of necessity and the strain of freedom the strain of the unfortunate and the strain of the fortunate the strain of courage and the strain of temperance these, I say leave

And these, he replied, are the Dorian and Phrygian harmonies of which I was just now speaking

Then I said if these and these only are to be used in our songs and melodies we shall not want multiplicity of notes or a panharmonic scale?

I suppose not

Then we shall not maintain the artificers of lyres with three corners and complex scales or the makers of any other many stringed curiously harmonized instruments? D

Certainly not.

But what do you say to flute makers and flute-players? Would you admit them into our State when you reflect that in this composite use of harmony the flute is worse than all the stringed instrument put together even the panharmonic music is only an imitation of the flute?

Clea ly not

There remain then only the lyre and the harp for use in the city and the shepherds may have a pipe in the country

That is surely the conclusion to be drawn from the argument

The preferring of Apollo and his instruments o Marsyas E and his instruments is not at all strange I said

Not at all he replied

And so by the dog of Egypt, we have been uncorsciously purging the State which not long ago we termed luxurious

And we have done wisely he replied.

Then let us now finish the purgation I said Next in order to harmonies rhythms will naturally follow, and they should be subject to the same rules, for we ought not to seek out complex systems of metre or metres of every kind but rather to discover what rhythms are the expressions of

to a courageous and harmonious life and when we have found them we shall adapt the foot and the melody to words having a like spirit not the words to the foot and melody To say what these rhythms are will be your duty—you must teach me them as you have already taught me the harmonies

But, indeed he replied I cannot tell you I only know that there are some three principles of rhythm out of which metrical systems are framed just as in sounds there are four notes¹ out of which all the harmonies are composed that is an observation which I have made But of what sort of lives they are severally the imitations I am unable to say

B Then I said we must take Damon into our counsels and he will tell us what rhythms are expressive of meanness or insolence or fury, or other unworthiness and what are to be reserved for the expression of opposite feelings And I think that I have an indistinct recollection of his mentioning a complex Cretic rhythm also a dactylic or heroic and he arranged them in some manner which I do not quite understand making the rhythms equal in the rise and fall of the foot long and short alternating and unless I am mistaken he spoke of an iambic as well as of a trochaic rhythm and assigned to them short and long quantities Also in some cases he appeared to praise or censure the movement of the foot quite as much as the rhythm or perhaps a combination of the two for I am not certain what he meant

¹ e the four notes of the tetrachord

Socrates expresses himself carelessly in accordance with his assumed ignorance of the details of the subject In the first part of the sentence he appears to be speaking of paonic rhythm which are in the ratio of $\frac{3}{4}$ in the second part, of dactylic and anapaestic rhythms which are in the ratio of $\frac{2}{3}$ in the last clause of iambic and trochaic rhythms, which are in the ratio of $\frac{1}{2}$ or $\frac{3}{4}$

These matters however as I was saying had better be referred to Damon himself for the analysis of the subject would be difficult, you know

Rather so I should say

But there is no difficulty in seeing that grace or the absence of grace is an effect of good or bad rhythm

None at all

And also that good and bad rhythm naturally assimilate to a good and bad style and that harmony and discord in like manner follow style for our principle is that rhythm and harmony are regulated by the words and not the words by them

Just so he said they should follow the words

And will not the words and the character of the style depend on the temper of the soul?

Yes

And everything else on the style?

Yes

Then beauty of style and harmony and grace and good rhythm depend on simplicity—I mean the true simplicity of a rightly and nobly ordered mind and character not that other simplicity which is only an euphemism for folly?

Very true he replied.

And if our youth are to do their work in life must they not make these graces and harmonies their perpetual aim

They must

And surely the art of the painter and every other creative and constructive art are full of them—weaving, embroidery architecture and every kind of manufacture also nature animal and vegetable—in all of them there is grace or the absence of grace. And ugliness and discord and inhar-

monious motion are nearly allied to ill words and ill nature, as grace and harmony are the twin sisters of goodness and virtue and bear their likeness

That is quite true he said

But shall our superintendence go no further and are the poets only to be required by us to express the image of the good in their works on pain if they do anything else of expulsion from our State? Or is the same control to be extended to other artists and are they also to be prohibited from exhibiting the opposite forms of vice and intemperance and meanness and indecency in sculpture and building and the other creative arts and is he who cannot conform to this rule of ours to be prevented from practising his art in our State lest the taste of our citizens be corrupted by him? We would not have our guardians grow up amid images of moral deformity as in some noxious pasture and there browse and feed upon many a baneful herb and flower day by day little by little until they silently gather a festering mass of corruption in their own soul Let our artists rather be those who are gifted to discern the true nature of the beautiful and graceful then will our youth dwell in a land of health amid fair sights and sounds and receive the good in everything and beauty the effluence of fair works shall flow into the eye and ear like a health giving breeze from a purer region and insensibly draw the soul from earliest years into likeness and sympathy with the beauty of reason

There can be no nobler training than that he replied.

And therefore, I said, Glaucon, musical training is a more potent instrument than any other because rhythm and harmony find their way into the inward places of the soul on which they mightily fasten imparting grace and making the

soul of him who a rightly educated graceful, or of him who is ill educated ungraceful and also because he who has received this true education of the inner being will most shrewdly perceive omissions or faults in art and nature and with a true taste while he praises and rejoices over and receives into his soul the good and becomes noble and good he will justly blame and hate the bad now in the days of his youth even before he is able to know the reason why and when reason comes he will recognize and salute the friend with whom his education has made him long familiar

Yes he said I quite agree with you in thinking that our youth should be trained in music and on the grounds which you mention

Just as in learning to read, I said, we were satisfied when we knew the letters of the alphabet which are very few, in all their recurring sizes and combinations not slighting them as unimportant whether they occupy a space large or small but everywhere eager to make them out and not hinking ourselves perfect in the art of reading until we recognize them wherever they are found ¹

True—

Or as we recognize the reflection of letters in the water or in a mirror only when we know the letters themselves the same art and study giving us the knowledge of both

Exactly—

Even so, as I maintain neither we nor our guardians whom we have to educate can ever become musical until we and they know the essential forms of temperance courage, liberality magnificence and their kindred, as well as the contrary forms in all their combinations, and can recognize

them and their images wherever they are found not slighting them either in small things or great but believing them all to be within the sphere of one art and study

Most assuredly

D And when a beautiful soul harmonizes with a beautiful form, and the two are cast in one mould that will be the fairest of sights to him who has an eye to see it?

The fairest indeed

And the fairest is also the loveliest?

That may be assumed

And the man who has the spirit of harmony will be most in love with the loveliest but he will not love him who is of an inharmonious soul?

That is true he replied, if the deficiency be in his soul but if there be any merely bodily defect in another he will be patient of it and will love all the same

I perceive I said, that you have or have had experiences of this sort and I agree But let me ask you another question Has excess of pleasure any affinity to temperance?

How can that be? he replied pleasure deprives a man of the use of his faculties quite as much as pain

Or any affinity to virtue in general?

403 None whatever

Any affinity to wantonness and intemperance?

Yes the greatest

And is there any greater or keener pleasure than that of sensual love?

No nor a madder

Whereas true love is a love of beauty and order—temperate and harmonious?

Quite true, he said.

Then no intemperance or madness should be allowed to approach true love?

Certainly not

Then mad or intemperate pleasure must never be allowed to come near the lover and his beloved neither of them can have any part in it if their love is of the right sort?

No indeed Socrates it must never come near them

Then I suppose that in the city which we are founding you would make a law to the effect that a friend should use no other familiarity to his love than a father would use to his son and then only for a noble purpose and he must first have the other's consent and this rule is to limit him in all his intercourse and he is never to be seen going further or if he exceeds, he is to be deemed guilty of coarseness and bad taste

I quite agree, he said.

Thus much of music which makes a fair ending for what should be the end of music if not the love of beauty?

I agree he said

After music comes gymnastic in which our youth are next to be trained

Certainly

Gymnastic as well as music should begin in early years the training in it should be careful and should continue through life Now my belief is --and this is a matter upon which I should like to have your opinion in confirmation of my own, but my own belief is, --not that the good body by any bodily excellence improves the soul, but on the contrary that the good soul, by her own excellence improves the body as far as this may be possible What do you say?

Yes I agree

Then to the mind when adequately trained, we shall be right in handing over the more particular care of the body and in order to avoid perplexity we will now only give the general outlines of the subject

Very good.

That they must abstain from intoxication has been already remarked by us for of all persons a guardian should be the last to get drunk and not know where in the world he is

Yes he said that a guardian should require another guardian to take care of him is ridiculous indeed

But next what shall we say of their food for the men are in training for the great contest of all—are they not?

Yes he said.

404 And will the habit of body of our ordinary athletes be suited to them?

Why not?

I am afraid I said that a habit of body such as they have is but a sleepy sort of thing, and rather perilous to health. Do you not observe that these athletes sleep away their lives and are liable to most dangerous illnesses if they depart in ever so slight a degree from their customary regimen?

Yes I do

Then I said, a finer sort of training will be required for our warrior athletes who are to be like wakeful dogs and to see and hear with the utmost keenness amid the many changes of water and also of food of summer heat and winter cold, which they will have to endure when on a campaign they must not be liable to break down in health

That is my view

The really excellent gymnastic is twin sister of that simple music which we were just now describing

How so

Why I conceive that there is a gymnastic which like our music is simple and good and especially the military gymnastic

What do you mean?

My meaning may be learned from Homer he, you know feeds his heroes at their feasts when they are campaigning on soldiers fare they have no fish, although they are on the shores of the Hellespont and they are not allowed C boiled meats but only roast, which is the food most convenient for soldiers requiring only that they should light a fire, and not involving the trouble of carrying about pots and pans

True

And I can hardly be mistaken in saying that sweet sauces are nowhere mentioned in Homer In proscribing them however he is not singular all professional athletes are well aware that a man who is to be in good condition should take nothing of the kind

Yes he said and knowing this they are quite right in not taking them.

Then you would not approve of Syracusan dinners, and D the refinements of Sicilian cookery?

I think not

Nor if a man is to be in condition would you allow him to have a Corinthian girl as his fair friend?

Certainly not

Neither would you approve of the delicacies as they are thought of Athenian confectionery?

Certainly not

All such feeding and living may be rightly compared by

us to melody and song composed in the panharmonic style,
and in all the rhythms

Exactly

There complexity engendered licence and here disease
whereas simplicity in music was the parent of temperance in
the soul and simplicity in gymnastic of health in the body

Most true he said

405 But when intemperance and diseases multiply in a State
halls of justice and medicine are always being opened and
the arts of the doctor and the lawyer give themselves airs
finding how keen is the interest which not only the slaves but
the freemen of a city take about them

Of course

And yet what greater proof can there be of a bad and
disgraceful state of education than this that not only artisans
and the meaner sort of people need the skill of first rate
physicians and judges but also those who would profess to
B have had a liberal education? Is it not disgraceful and
a great sign of the want of good breeding that a man should
have to go abroad for his law and physic because he has none
of his own at home and must therefore surrender himself
into the hands of other men whom he makes lords and judges
over him?

Of all things he said the most disgraceful

Would you say most I replied when you consider that
there is a further stage of the evil in which a man is not only
a life long litigant passing all his days in the courts either
as plaintiff or defendant, but is actually led by his bad taste
to pride himself on his litigiousness he imagines that he is
C a master in dishonesty able to take every crooked turn, and
wriggle into and out of every hole bending like a withy and

getting out of the way of justice and all for what? in order to gain small points not worth mentioning he not knowing that so to order his life as to be able to do without a napping judge is a far higher and nobler sort of thing Is not that still more disgraceful?

Yes he said, that is still more disgraceful.

Well I said and to require the help of medicine not when a wound has to be cured or on occasion of an epidemic but just because by indolence and a habit of life such as we have D been describing men fill themselves with waters and winds as if their bodies were a marsh compelling the ingenious sons of Asclepius to find more names for diseases, such as flatulence and catarrh is not this too a disgrace?

Yes he said, they do certainly give very strange and new fangled names to diseases

Yes I said, and I do not believe that there were any such diseases in the days of Asclepius and this I infer from the E circumstance that the hero Eurypylus after he has been wounded in Homer drinks a posset of Pramnian wine well besprinkled with barley meal and grated cheese which are 406 certainly inflammatory and yet the sons of Asclepius who were at the Trojan war do not blame the damsel who gives him the drink or rebuke Patroclus who is treating his case

Well he said that was surely an extraordinary drink to be given to a person in his condition

Not so extraordinary I replied, if you bear in mind that in former days as is commonly said, before the time of Herodicus the guild of Asclepius did not practise our present system of medicine which may be said to educate diseases But Herodicus being a trainer and himself of a sickly constitution, by a combination of training and doctoring found

B out a way of torturing first and chiefly himself, and secondly the rest of the world

How was that? he said

By the invention or lingering death for he had a mortal disease which he perpetually tended and as recovery was out of the question he passed his entire life as a valetudinarian he could do nothing but attend upon himself and he was in constant torment whenever he departed in any thing from his usual regimen and so dying hard, by the help of science he struggled on to old age

A rare reward of his skill!

C Yes I said a reward which a man might fairly expect who never understood that if Asclepius did not instruct his descendants in valetudinarian arts the omission arose not from ignorance or inexperience of such a branch of medicine, but because he knew that in all well ordered states every individual has an occupation to which he must attend, and has therefore no leisure to spend in continually being ill. Thus we remark in the case of the artisan but ludicrously enough, do not apply the same rule to people of the richer sort

How do you mean? he said

D I mean this When a carpenter is ill he asks the physician for a rough and ready cure an emetic or a purge or a cautery or the knife—these are his remedies And if some one prescribes for him a course of dietetics and tells him that he must swathe and swaddle his head, and all that sort of thing, he replies at once that he has no time to be ill, and that he sees no good in a life which is spent in nursing his disease to the neglect of his customary employment and therefore bidding good-bye to this sort of physician, he resumes his

ordinary habits and either gets well and lives and does his business or if his constitution fails he dies and has no more trouble

Yes he said, and a man in his condition of life ought to use the art of medicine thus far only

Has he not I said an occupation and what profit would there be in his life if he were deprived of his occupation?

Quite true he said

But with the rich man this is otherwise of him we do not say that he has any specially appointed work which he must perform if he would live

He is generally supposed to have nothing to do

Then you never heard of the saying of Phocylides that as soon as a man has a livelihood he should practise virtue?

Nay he said, I think that he had better begin somewhat sooner

Let us not have a dispute with him about this I said but rather ask ourselves Is the practice of virtue obligatory on the rich man or can he live without it? And if obligatory on him then let us raise a further question whether this dieting of disorders, which is an impediment to the application of the mind in carpentering and the mechanical arts does not equally stand in the way of the sentiment of Phocylides?

Of that he replied, there can be no doubt such excessive care of the body when carried beyond the rules of gymnastic is most inimical to the practice of virtue

¹ Yes indeed I replied, and equally incompatible with the management of a house an army or an office of state and what is most important of all irreconcilable with any kind

Making the answer of begin to and yet not at all.

C of study or thought or self reflection there is a constant suspicion that headache and giddiness are to be ascribed to philosophy and hence all practising or making trial of virtue in the higher sense is absolutely stopped for a man is always fancying that he is being made ill and is in constant anxiety about the state of his body

Yes likely enough

And therefore our politic Asclepius may be supposed to have exhibited the power of his art only to persons who being generally of healthy constitution and habits of life had a definite ailment such as these he cured by purges and operations and bade them live as usual herein consulting the interests of the State but bodies which disease had penetrated through and through he would not have attempted to cure by gradual processes of evacuation and infusion he did not want to lengthen out good for nothing lives or to have weak fathers begetting weaker sons —if a man was not able to live in the ordinary way he had no business to cure him for such a cure would have been of no use either to himself or to the State

Then he said you regard Asclepius as a statesman

Clearly and his character is further illustrated by his sons Note that they were heroes in the days of old and practised the medicines of which I am speaking at the siege of Troy You will remember how when Pandarus wounded Menelaus they

Sucked the blood out of the wound and sprinkled soothing remedies ¹

but they never prescribed what the patient was afterwards to eat or drink in the case of Menelaus, any more than in the

case of Eurypylus, the remedies, as they conceived, were enough to heal any man who before he was wounded was healthy and regular in his habits and even though he did B happen to drink a posset of Pramnian wine he might get well all the same. But they would have nothing to do with unhealthy and intemperate subjects whose lives were of no use either to themselves or others. the art of medicine was not designed for their good, and though they were as rich as Midas the sons of Asclepius would have declined to attend them.

They were very acute persons those sons of Asclepius.

Naturally so I replied. Nevertheless the tragedians and Pindar disobeying our behests although they acknowledge that Asclepius was the son of Apollo say also that he was bribed into healing a rich man who was at the point of death, and for this reason he was struck by lightning. But C we in accordance with the principle already affirmed by us will not believe them when they tell us both —if he was the son of a god we maintain that he was not avaricious or if he was avaricious he was not the son of a god.

All that Socrates is excellent but I should like to put a question to you. Ought there not to be good physicians in a State and are not the best those who have treated the greatest number of constitutions good and bad? and are not D the best judges in like manner those who are acquainted with all sorts of moral natures?

Yes I said I too would have good judges and good physicians. But do you know whom I think good?

Will you tell me?

I will, if I can. Let me nowever note that in the same question you join two things which are not the

How so? he asked

Why I said, you join physicians and judges Now the most skilful physicians are those who from their youth upwards have combined with the knowledge of their art the greatest experience of disease they had better not be robust in health and should have had all manner of diseases in their own persons For the body as I conceive is not the instrument with which they cure the body in that case we could not allow them ever to be or to have been sickly but they cure the body with the mind and the mind which has become and is sick can cure nothing

That is very true he said

409 But with the judge it is otherwise since he governs mind by mind he ought not therefore to have been trained among vicious minds and to have associated with them from youth upwards and to have gone through the whole calendar of crime only in order that he may quickly infer the crimes of others as he might their bodily diseases from his own self consciousness the honourable mind which is to form a healthy judgement should have had no experience or contamination of evil habits when young And this is the reason why in youth good men often appear to be simple and are easily practised upon by the dishonest because they have no examples of what evil is in their own souls

Yes he said they are far too apt to be deceived.

Therefore, I said the judge should not be young he should have learned to know evil, not from his own soul, but from late and long observation of the nature of evil in others knowledge should be his guide not personal experience

Yes, he said that is the ideal of a judge

Yes, I replied, and he will be a good (which is my

answer to your question) for he is good who has a good soul. But the cunning and suspicious nature of which we spoke—he who has committed many crimes and fancies himself to be a master in wickedness when he is amongst his fellows—is wonderful in the precautions which he takes because he judges of them by himself—but when he gets into the company of men of virtue who have the experience of age he appears to be a fool again owing to his unseasonable suspicions—he cannot recognize an honest man, because he has no pattern of honesty in himself—at the same time as the bad are more numerous than the good and he meets with them oftener he thinks himself and is by others thought to be rather wise than foolish.

Most true he said.

Then the good and wise judge whom we are seeking is not this man but the other—for vice cannot know virtue too but a virtuous nature educated by time, will acquire a knowledge both of virtue and vice—the virtuous, and not the vicious man has wisdom—in my opinion.

And in mine also.

This is the sort of medicine, and this is the sort of law which you will sanction in your state. They will minister to better natures giving health both of soul and of body—but those who are diseased in their bodies they will leave to die, and the corrupt and incurable souls they will put an end to themselves.

That is clearly the best thing both for the patients and for the State.

And thus our youth having been educated only in that simple music which as we said inspires temperance will be reluctant to go to law.

Clearly

B And the musician, who keeping to the same track is content to practise the simple gymnastic will have nothing to do with medicine unless in some extreme case

That I quite believe

The very exercises and toils which he undergoes are intended to stimulate the spirited element of his nature and not to increase his strength, he will not like common athletes use exercise and regimen to develop his muscles

Very right he said

C Neither are the two arts of music and gymnastic really designed as is often supposed the one for the training of the soul the other for the training of the body

What then is the real object of them?

I believe I said that the teachers of both have in view chiefly the improvement of the soul

How can that be? he asked

Did you never observe, I said the effect on the mind itself of exclusive devotion to gymnastic or the opposite effect of an exclusive devotion to music?

In what way shown? he said.

D The one producing a temper of hardness and ferocity the other of softness and effeminacy I replied

Yes he said I am quite aware that the mere athlete becomes too much of a savage, and that the mere musician is melted and softened beyond what is good for him

Yet surely I said this ferocity only comes from spirit which if rightly educated, would give courage but if too much intensified is liable to become hard and brutal.

That I quite think

E On the other hand the philosopher will have the quality

of gentleness And this also when too much indulged, will turn to softness but, if educated rightly will be gentle and moderate.

True

And in our opinion the guardians ought to have both the qualities?

Assuredly

And both should be in harmony?

Beyond question.

And the harmonious soul is both temperate and courageous? 411

Yes

And the inharmonious is cowardly and boorish?

Very true.

And, when a man allows music to play upon him and to pour into his soul through the funnel of his ears those sweet and soft and melancholy airs of which we were just now speaking and his whole life is passed in warbling and the delights of song in the first stage of the process the passion or spirit which is in him is tempered like iron and made useful instead of brittle and useless But, if he carries on the softening and soothing process in the next stage he begins to melt and waste until he has wasted away his spirit and cut out the sinews of his soul and he becomes a feeble warr or

Very true

If the element of spirit is naturally weak in him the change is speedily accomplished, but if he have a good deal then the power of music awakening the spirit renders him excitable—on the least provocation he flames up at once and is speedily extinguished instead of having spirit he grows over-irritable and passionate and is quite impracticable.

EXAC IV

And so in gymnastics if a man takes violent exercise and is a great feeder and the reverse of a great student of music and philosophy at first the high condition of his body fills him with pride and spirit and he becomes twice the man that he was

Certainly

And what happens if he do nothing else, and holds no converse with the Muses does not even that intelligence which there may be in him having no taste or any sort of learning or inquiry or thought or culture grow feeble and dull and blind, his mind never waking up or receiving nourishment and his senses not being purged of their mists?

True he said

And he ends by becoming a hater of philosophy uncivilized, never using the weapon of persuasion—he is like a wild beast all violence and fierceress and knows no other way of dealing and he lives in all ignorance and evil conditions, and has no sense of propriety and grace

That is quite true he said

And as there are two principles of human nature one the spirited and the other the philosophical some God as I should say has given mankind two arts answering to them (and only indirectly to the soul and body) in order that these
412 two principles (like the strings of an instrument) may be relaxed or drawn tighter until they are duly harmonized

That appears to be the intention

And he who mingles music with gymnastic in the fairest proportions and best attempers them to the soul may be rightly called the true musician and harmonist in a far higher sense than the tuner of the strings.

You are quite right, Socrates.

And such a presiding genius will be always required in our State if the government is to last

Yes he will be absolutely necessary B

Such, then are our principles of nurture and education. Where would be the use of going into further details about the dances of our citizens or about their hunting and coursing their gymnastic and equestrian contests? For these all follow the general principle and having found that we shall have no difficulty in discovering them

I dare say that there will be no difficulty

Very good, I said then what is the next question? Must we not ask who are to be rulers and who subjects?

Certainly C

There can be no doubt that the elder must rule the younger

Clearly

And that the best of these must rule

That is also clear

Now are not the best husbandmen those who are most devoted to husbandry?

Yes

And as we are to have the best of guardians for our city must they not be those who have most the character of guardians?

Yes

And to this end they ought to be wise and efficient, and to have a special care of the State?

True D

And a man will be most likely to care about that which he loves?

To be sure.

And he will be most likely to love that which he regards as having the same interests with himself and that of which the good or evil fortune is supposed by him at any time most to affect his own?

Very true he replied.

Then there must be a selection. Let us now among the guardians those who in their whole life show the greatest eagerness to do what is for the good of their country and the greatest repugnance to do what is against her interests.

Those are the right men.

And they will have to be watched at every age in order that we may see whether they preserve their resolution and never under the influence either of force or enchantment, forget or cast off their sense of duty to the State.

How cast off? he said.

I will explain to you, I replied. A resolution may go out of a man's mind either with his will or against his will. with his will when he gets rid of a falsehood and learns better against his will whenever he is deprived of a truth.

I understand he said, the willing loss of a resolution. the meaning of the unwilling I have yet to learn.

Why I said do you not see that men are unwillingly deprived of good and willingly of evil? Is not to have lost the truth an evil and to possess the truth a good? and you would agree that to conceive things as they are is to possess the truth?

Yes he replied. I agree with you in thinking that mankind are deprived of truth against their will.

B And is not this involuntary deprivation caused either by theft, or force, or enchantment?

Still, he replied, I do not d you.

I fear that I must have been talking darkly like the tragedians I only mean that some men are changed by persuasion and that others forget argument steals away the hearts of one class and time of the other and thus I call theft Now you understand me

Yes

Those again who are forced are those whom the violence of some pain or grief compels to change their opinion.

I understand, he said and you are quite right

And you would also acknowledge that the enchanted are C those who change their minds either under the softer influence of pleasure or the sterner influence of fear?

Yes he said everything that deceives may be said to enchant

Therefore as I was just now saying we must inquire who are the best guardians of their own conviction that what they think the interest of the State is to be the rule of their lives We must watch them from their youth upwards and make them perform actions in which they are most likely to forge or to be deceived and he who remembers and is not deceived is to be selected and he who fails in the trial is to be rejected. That will be the way?

Yes

And there should also be toils and pains and conflicts prescribed for them, in which they will be made to give further proof of the same qualities

Very right he replied

And then, I said we must try them with enchantments—that is the third sort of test—and see what will be their behaviour like those who take colts amid noise and tumult

to see if they are of a timid nature, so must we take our youth amid terrors of some kind, and again pass them into pleasures and prove them more thoroughly than gold is proved in the furnace that we may discover whether they are armed against all enchantments and of a noble bearing always good guardians of themselves and of the music which they have learned, and retaining under all circumstances a rhythmical and harmonious nature such as will be most serviceable to the individual and to the State. And he who at every age as boy and youth and in mature life has come out of the trial victorious and pure shall be appointed
 114 a ruler and guardian of the State he shall be honoured in life and death and shall receive sepulture and other memorials of honour the greatest that we have to give. But him who fails we must reject. I am inclined to think that this is the sort of way in which our rulers and guardians should be chosen and appointed. I speak generally and not with any pretension to exactness.

And speaking generally I agree with you he said.

B And perhaps the word guardian in the fullest sense ought to be applied to this higher class only who preserve us against foreign enemies and maintain peace among our citizens at home that the one may not have the will or the others the power to harm us. The young men whom we before called guardians may be more properly designated auxiliaries and supporters of the principles of the rulers.

I agree with you he said.

How then may we devise one of those needful falsehoods of which we lately spoke—just one royal lie which may
 C deceive the rulers if that be possible, and at any rate the rest of the city?

What sort of lie? he said.

Nothing new I replied only an old Phœnician¹ tale of what has often occurred before now in other places (as the poets say and have made the world believe) though not in our time and I do not know whether such an event could ever happen again or could now even be made probable if it did

How your words seem to hesitate on your lips!

You will not wonder I replied at my hesitation when you have heard

Speak he said and fear not

Well then I will speak although I really know not how to look you in the face or in what words to utter the audacious fiction which I propose to communicate gradually first to the rulers then to the soldiers and lastly to the people. They are to be told that their youth was a dream and the education and training which they received from us an appearance only in reality during all that time they were being formed and fed in the womb of the earth, where they themselves and their arms and appurtenances were manufactured when they were completed the earth, their mother sent them up and so their country being their mother and also their nurse, they are bound to advise for her good, and to defend her against attacks and her citizens they are to regard as children of the earth and their own brothers

You had good reason he said, to be ashamed of the lie which you were going to tell.

True I replied but there is more coming I have only 415 told you half Citizens we shall say to them in our tale, you

are brothers yet God has framed you differently. Some of you have the power of command and in the composition of these he has mingled gold wherefore also they have the greatest honour, others he has made of silver to be auxiliaries others again who are to be husbandmen and craftsmen he has composed of brass and iron and the species will generally be preserved in the children. But as all are of the same original stock a golden parent will sometimes have a silver son or a silver parent a golden son. And God proclaims as a first principle to the rulers and above all else that there is nothing which they should so anxiously guard or of which they are to be such good guardians as of the purity of the race. They should observe what elements mingle in their offspring for if the son of a golden or silver parent has an admixture of brass and iron then nature orders a transposition of ranks and the eye of the ruler must not be pitiful towards the child because he has to descend in the scale and become a husbandman or artisan just as there may be sons of artisans who having an admixture of gold or silver in them are raised to honour and become guardians or auxiliaries. For an oracle says that when a man of brass or iron guards the State it will be destroyed. Such is the tale is there any possibility of making our citizens believe in it?

Not in the present generation he replied there is no way of accomplishing this but their sons may be made to believe in the tale and their sons sons and posterity after them.

I see the difficulty I replied yet the fostering of such a belief will make them care more for the city and for one another. Enough however of the fiction, which may now fly abroad upon the wings of rumour while we arm our

ear h born heroes, and lead them forth under the command of their rulers Let them look round and select a spot whence they can best suppress insurrection if any prove refractory within and also defend themselves against enemies who like B wolves may come down on the fold from without there let them encamp and when they have encamped, let them sacrifice to the proper Gods and prepare their dwellings

Just so he said

And their dwellings must be such as will shield them against the cold of winter and the heat of summer

I suppose that you mean houses he replied

Yes I said but they must be the houses of soldiers and not of shop keepers

What is the difference? he said

That I will endeavour to explain I replied To keep 416 watch dogs who from want of discipline or hunger or some evil habit or other would turn upon the sheep and worry them and behave not like dogs but wolves would be a foul and monstrous thing in a shepherd?

Truly monstrous he said.

And therefore every care must be taken that our auxiliaries B being stronger than our citizens in y not grow to be too much for them and become savage tyrants instead of friends and allies?

Yes great care should be taken

And would not a really good education furnish the best safeguard?

But they are well-educated already he replied

I cannot be so confident my dear Glaucon I said I am ✓ much more certain that they ought to be, and that true education, whatever that may be, will have the greatest G

tendency to civilize and help them in their relations to one another and to those who are under their protection.

Very true he replied.

And not only their education but their habitations and all that belongs to them, should be such as will neither impair their virtue as guardians nor tempt them to prey upon the poorer citizens. Any man of sense must acknowledge that

He must.

Then now let us consider what will be their way of life if they are to realize our idea of them. In the first place none of them should have any property of his own beyond what is absolutely necessary. neither should they have a private house or store closed against any one who has a mind to enter. their provisions should be only such as are required by trained warriors who are men of temperance and courage. they should agree to receive from the citizens a fixed rate of pay enough to meet the expenses of the year and no more. and they will go to mess and live together like soldiers in a camp. Gold and silver we will tell them that they have from God. the diviner metal is within them and they have therefore no need of the dross which is current among men and ought not to pollute the divine by any such earthly admixture. for that commoner metal has been the source of many unholy deeds but their own is undefiled. And they alone of all the citizens may not touch or handle silver or gold or be under the same roof with them or wear them, or drink from them. And this will be their salvation, and they will be the saviours of the State. But should they ever acquire homes or lands or moneys of their own they will become housekeepers and husbandmen instead of guardians enemies and tyrants instead of allies of the other citizens.

hating and being hated plotting and being plotted against, they will pass their whole life in much greater terror of internal than of external enemies and the hour of ruin both to themselves and to the rest of the State will be at hand. For all which reasons may we not say that thus shall our State be ordered, and that these shall be the regulations appointed by us for our guardians concerning their houses and all other matters?

Yes said Glaucon

BOOK IV

Steph. HERE Ademantus interposed a question How would you
419 answer Socrates said he if a person were to say that you
are making ¹ these people miserable and that they are the
cause of their own unhappiness the city in fact belongs to
them but they are none the better for it whereas other men
acquire lands and build large and handsome houses and
have everything handsome about them offering sacrifices
to the gods on their own account and practising hospitality
no cover as you were saying just now they have gold and
silver and all that is usual among the favourites of fortune
but our poor citizens are no better than mercenaries who
are quartered in the city and are always mounting guard?

420 Yes I said and you may add that they are only fed,
and not paid in addition to their food like other men and
therefore they cannot if they would take a journey of
pleasure they have no money to spend on a mistress or any
other luxurious fancy when, as the world goes is thought
to be happiness and many other accusations of the same
nature might be added

But said he, let us suppose all this to be included in the
charge

B You mean to ask I said what will be our answer?

Yes

If we proceed along the old path my belief I said is
that we shall find the answer And our answer will be that,

¹ Or that for their own good you are making these people miserable.

even as they are, our guardians may very likely be the happiest of men but that our aim in founding the State was not the disproportionate happiness of any one class but the greatest happiness of the whole we thought that in a State which is ordered with a view to the good of the whole we should be most likely to find justice and in the ill ordered State injustice and having found them we might then decide which of the two is the happier At present I take it we are fashioning the happy State not piecemeal or with a view of making a few happy citizens, but as a whole and by and by we will proceed to view the opposite kind of State Suppose that we were painting a statue and some one came up to us and said, Why do you not put the most beautiful colours on the most beautiful parts of the body—the eyes ought to be purple but you have made them black—to him we might fairly answer Sir you would not surely have us beautify the eyes to such a degree that they are no longer eyes consider rather whether by giving this and the other features their due proportion we make the whole beautiful And so I say to you do not compel us to assign to the guardians a sort of happiness which will make them anything but guardians for we too can clothe our husbandmen in royal apparel and set crowns of gold on their heads and bid them till the ground as much as they like and no more Our potters also might be allowed to repose on couches and feast by the fireside, passing round the winecup while their wheel is conveniently at hand and working at pottery only as much as they like in this way we might make every class happy—and then as you imagine the whole State would be happy But do not put this idea into our heads for if we listen to you the husbandman will be no longer a

husbandman the potter will cease to be a potter and no one will have the character of any distinct class in the State. Now this is not of much consequence where the corruption of society and pretension to be what you are not, is confined to cobblers but when the guardians of the laws and of the government are only seeming and not real guardians then see how they turn the State upside down and on the other hand they alone have the power of giving order and happiness to the State. We mean our guardians to be true B saviours and not the destroyers of the State, whereas our opponent is thinking of peasants at a festival, who are enjoying a life of revelry not of citizens who are doing their duty to the State. But, if so, we mean different things and he is speaking of something which is not a State. And therefore we must consider whether in appointing our guardians we would look to their greatest happiness individually or whether this principle of happiness does not rather reside in the State as a whole. But if the latter be the truth, then the guardians C and auxiliaries and all others equally with them, must be compelled or induced to do their own work in the best way. And thus the whole State will grow up in a noble order and the several classes will receive the proportion of happiness which nature assigns to them.

I think that you are quite right

I wonder whether you will agree with another remark which occurs to me

What may that be?

D There seem to be two causes of the deterioration of the arts

What are they?

Wealth I said and poverty

How do they act

The process is as follows When a potter becomes rich, will he, thank you, any longer take the same pains with his art?

Certainly not

He will grow more and more indolent and careless?

Very true

And the result will be that he becomes a worse potter?

Yes he greatly deteriorates

But on the other hand if he has no money and cannot provide himself with tools or instruments he will not work equally well himself nor will he teach his sons or apprentices B to work equally well

Certainly not

Then, under the influence either of poverty or of wealth, wo kmen and their work are equally liable to degenerate?

That is evident

Here then, is a discovery of new evils I said, against which the guardians will have to watch, or they will creep into the city unobserved

What evils?

Wealth I said, and poverty the one is the parent of 422 luxury and indol nce and the other of meanness and viciousness and both of discontent

That is very true he replied but still I should like to know Socrates, how our city will be able to go to war, especially against an enemy who is rich and powerful, 1 deprived of the sinews of war

There would certainly be a difficulty I replied in going to war with one such enemy but there is no difficulty B where there are two of them

How so he asked

In the first place I said if we have to fight our side will be trained warriors fighting against an army of rich men

That is true he said

And do you not suppose Adeimantus that a single boxer who was perfect in his art would easily be a match for two stout and well to do gentlemen who were not boxers?

Hardly if they came upon him at once

What, not I said if he were able to run away and then turn and strike at the one who first came up? And supposing he were to do this several times under the heat of a scorching sun might he not being an expert overturn more than one stout personage?

Certainly he said, there would be nothing wonderful in that

And yet rich men probably have a greater superiority in the science and practice of boxing than they have in military qualities

Likely enough

Then we may assume that our athletes will be able to fight with two or three times their own number?

I agree with you, for I think you right

D And suppose that, before engaging our citizens send an embassy to one of the two cities telling them what is the truth Silver and gold we neither have nor are permitted to have but you may do you therefore come and help us in war and take the spoils of the other city Who on hearing these words would choose to fight against lean wiry dogs rather than with the dogs on their side against fat and tender sheep?

That is not likely and yet there might be a danger to the

poor State if the wealth of many States were to be gathered E into one

But how simple of you to use the term State at all of any but our own !

Why so?

You ought to speak of other States in the plural number not one of them is a city but many cities as they say in the game For indeed any city however small is in fact divided into two one the city of the poor, the other of the rich these are at war with one another, and in either there are 423 many smaller divisions and you would be altogether beside the mark if you treated them all as a single State But if you deal with them as many and give the wealth or power or persons of the one to the others you will always have a great many friends and not many enemies And you State while the wise order which has now been prescribed continues to prevail in her will be the greatest of States I do not mean to say in reputation or appearance, but in deed and truth though she number not more than a thousand defenders A single State which is her equal you will hardly find either among Hellenes or barbarians though many that appear to be as great and many times greater

That is most true, he said

And what, I said, will be the best limit for our rulers to fix when they are considering the size of the State and the amount of territory which they are to include, and beyond which they will not go?

What limit would you propose?

I would allow the State to increase so far as is consistent with unity that, I think is the proper limit.

Very good, he said.

Education the one great principle

Here then, I said is another order which will have to be
veyed to our guardians Let our city be accounted
her large nor small but one and self sufficing
nd surely said he this is not a very severe order which
mpose upon them

nd the oth r said I of which we were sp aling before is
er still—I mean the duty of degrading the offspring of
uardians when inferior and of elevating into the rank
ardians the offspring of the lower classes when naturally
ior The intention was that in the case of the citizens
ally each individual should be put to the use for which
e intended him, one to one work and then every man
l do his own business and be one and not many and
whole city would be one and not many

he said that is not so difficult

regulations which we are prescribing my good
antus are not as might be supposed a number of
inciples but trifles all if care be taken, s the saying
re one great thing—a thing however which I would
all not great but sufficient for our purpose

may that be? he asked.

ation I said, and nurture If our citizens are well
d, and grow into sensible men they will easily see
y through all these as well as other matters which
such for example as marriage the possession of
nd the procreation of children which will all follow
al principle that friends have all things in common,
verb says

all be the best way of settling them.

said, the State if once started well moves with
ing force like a wheel For good n c and

educat on implant good constitutions and these good consti-
tutions taking root in a good education improve more and
more and this improvement affects the breed in man as in B
other animals

Very possibly he said

Then to sum up This is the point to which above all,
the attention of our rulers should be directed—that music
and gymnastic be preserved in their original form, and no
innovation made They must do their utmost to maintain
them intact And when any one says that mankind most
regard

The newest songs which the singers have,¹

they will be af aid that he may be praising, not new songs C
but a new kind of song and this ought not to be praised or
conceived to be the meaning of the poet for any musical
innovation is full of danger to the whole State and ought to
be prohibited So Damon tells me and I can quite believe
him—he says that when modes of music change the funda-
mental laws of the State always change with them.

Yes said Adeimantus and you may add my suffrage to
Damon's and you own

Then I said our guardians must lay the foundations of D
their fortress in music?

Yes he said the lawlessness of which you speak oo easily
steals in.

Yes, I replied, in the form of amusement, and at first
sight it appears harmless

Why, yes he said, and there is no harm were it not that
little by little this spirit of licence, finding a home, imper-
ceptibly penetrates into manners and customs whence,

issuing with greater force it invades contracts between man and man and from contracts goes on to laws and constitutions in utter recklessness ending at last Socrates by an overthrow of all rights private as well as public.

Is that true? I said

That is my belief he replied

Then as I was saying our youth should be trained from the first in a stricter system for if amusements become lawless and the youths themselves become lawless they can never grow up into well conducted and virtuous citizens

Very true he said

And when they have made a good beginning in play and by the help of music have gained the habit of good order then this habit of order in a manner how unlike the lawless play of the others will accompany them in all their actions and be a principle of growth to them and if there be any fallen places in the State will raise them up again

Very true he said

Thus educated, they will invent for themselves any lesser rules which their predecessors have altogether neglected

What do you mean?

B I mean such things as these —when the young are to be silent before their elders how they are to show respect to them by standing and making them sit what honour is due to parents what garments or shoes are to be worn the mode of dressing the hair deportment and manners in general. You would agree with me?

Yes

But there is I think, small wisdom in legislating about such matters—I doubt if it is ever done nor are any precise written enactments about them likely to be lasting

Impossible

It would seem Adeimantus that the direction in which education starts a man will determine his future life Does C not like always attract like?

To be sure

Until some one rare and grand result is reached which may be good, and may be the reverse of good?

That is not to be denied

And for this reason I said I shall not attempt to legislate further about them.

Naturally enough, he replied

Well and about the business of the agora, and the ordinary dealings between man and man or again about agreements with artisans about insult and injury or the commence D men of actions and the appointment of juries what would you say? there may also arise questions about any impositions and exactions of market and harbour dues which may be required and in general about the regulations of markets police harbours and the like But oh heavens! shall we condescend to legislate on any of these particulars?

I think, he said, that there is no need to impose laws about them on good men what regulations are necessary they will E find out soon enough for themselves

Yes I said my friend, if God will only preserve to them the laws which we have given them

And without divine help, said Adeimantus they will go on for ever making and mending their laws and their lives in the hope of attaining perfection.

You would compare them I said to those invalids who having no self-restraint, will not leave off their habits of intemperance?

Exactly

26 Yes I said and what a delightful life they lead ! they are always doctoring and increasing and complicating their disorders and always fancying that they will be cured by any nostrum which anybody advises them to try

Such cases are very common he said with invalids of this sort

Yes I replied , and the charming thing is that they deem him their worst enemy who tells them the truth, which is simply that unless they give up eating and drinking and B wenching and idling neither drug nor cantery nor spell nor amulet nor any other remedy will avail

Charming ! he replied. I see nothing charming in going into a passion with a man who tells you what is right

These gentlemen, I said do not seem to be in your good graces

Assuredly not

Nor would you praise the behaviour of States which act like the men whom I was just now describing For are there not ill ordered States in which the citizens are forbidden C under pain of death to alter the constitution and yet he who most sweetly courts those who live under this regime and indulges them and fawns upon them and is skilful in anticipating and gratifying their humours is held to be a great and good statesman--do not these States resemble the persons whom I was describing ?

Yes he said the States are as bad as the men and I am very far from praising them

D But do you not admire, I said, the coolness and dexterity of these ready ministers of political corruption ?

Yes, he said, I do but not of all of them for there are

some whom the applause of the multitude has deluded into the belief that they are really statesmen, and these are not much to be admired

What do you mean? I said you should have more feeling for them. When a man cannot measure and a great many others who cannot measure declare that he is four cubit E high, can he help believing what they say?

Nay he said certainly not in that case

Well then, do not be angry with them for are they not as good as a p a y trying their hand at paltry reforms such as I was describing they are always fancying that by legislation they will make an end of frauds in contracts and the other rascalities which I was mentioning not knowing that they are in reality cutting off the heads of a hydra?

Yes he said that is just what they are doing 427

I conceive, I said, that the true legislator will not trouble himself with this class of enactments whether concerning laws or the constitution either in an ill ordered or in a well ordered State for in the former they are quite useless and in the latter there will be no difficulty in devising them and many of them will naturally flow out of our previous regulations

What then, he said, is still remaining to us of the work of B legislation?

Nothing to us I replied but to Apollo the god of Delphi there remains the ordering of the greatest and noblest and chiefest things of all

Which are they? he said

The institution of temples and sacrifices, and the entire service of gods demigods and heroes also the ordering of the reprobates of the dead, and the rites which have

to be observed by him who would propitiate the inhabitants of the world below. These are matters of which we are ignorant ourselves and as founders of a city we should be unwise in trusting them to any interpreter but our ancestral deity. He is the god who sits in the centre on the navel of the earth, and he is the interpreter of religion to all mankind.

You are right and we will do as you propose.

But where amid all this is justice? son of Ariston, tell me where. Now that our city has been made habitable, light a candle and search and get your brother and Polemarchus and the rest of our friends to help and let us see where in it we can discover justice and where injustice and in what they differ from one another and which of them the man who would be happy should have for his portion whether seen or unseen by gods and men.

Nonsense, said Glaucon. did you not promise to search yourself saying that for you not to help justice in her need would be an impiety?

I do not deny that I said so and as you remind me I will be as good as my word but you must join.

We will, he replied.

Well then I hope to make the discovery in this way. I mean to begin with the assumption that our State, if rightly ordered is perfect.

That is most certain.

And being perfect is therefore wise and valiant and temperate and just.

That is likewise clear.

And whichever of these qualities we find in the State, the one which is not found will be the residue?

Very good

428

If there were four things and we were searching for one of them, wherever it might be the one sought for might be known to us from the first and there would be no further trouble or we might know the other three first and then the fourth would clearly be the one left

Very true he said.

And is not a similar method to be pursued about the virtues which are also four in number?

Clearly

First among the virtues found in the State wisdom comes into view and in this I detect a certain peculiar ty B

What is that?

The State which we have been describing is said to be wise as being good in counsel?

Very true

And good counsel is clearly a kind of knowledge for not by ignorance, but by knowledge do men counsel well?

Clearly

And the kinds of knowledge in a State are many and diverse?

Of course

There is the knowledge of the carpenter but is that the sort of knowledge which gives a city the title of wise and good in counsel?

Certainly not, that would only give a city the reputation of skill in carpentering

Then a city is not to be called wise because possessing a knowledge which counsels for the best about wooden implements?

Certainly not.

Nor by reason of a knowledge which advises about brazen pots he said nor as possessing any other similar knowledge?

Not by reason of any of them, he said

Nor yet by reason of a knowledge which cultivates the earth that would give the city the name of agricultural?

Yes

Well I said, and is there any knowledge in our recently founded State among any of the citizens which advises not about any particular thing in the State but about the whole and considers how a State can best deal with itself and with other States?

There certainly is

And what is this knowledge, and among whom is it found? I asked

It is the knowledge of the guardians he replied, and is found among those whom we were just now describing as perfect guardians

And what is the name which the city derives from the possession of this sort of knowledge?

The name of good in counsel and truly wise

And will there be in our city more of these true guardians or more smiths?

The smiths he replied, will be far more numerous

Will not the guardians be the smallest of all the classes who receive a name from the profession of some kind of knowledge?

Much the smallest

And so by reason of the smallest part or class and of the knowledge which resides in this presiding and ruling part of itself, the whole State, being thus constituted according to nature will be wise and thus which has the only knowledge

worthy to be called wisdom has been ordained by nature to be of all classes the least

Most true

Thus then I said, the nature and place in the State of one of the four virtues has somehow or other been discovered.

And in my humble opinion very satisfactorily discovered he replied

Again I said there is no difficulty in seeing the nature of courage and in what part that quality resides which gives the name of courageous to the State

How do you mean?

Why I said every one who calls any State courageous or cowardly will be thinking of the part which fights and goes out to war on the State's behalf

No one he replied would ever think of any other

The rest of the citizens may be courageous or may be cowardly but their courage or cowardice will not, as I conceive, have the effect of making the city either the one or the other

Certainly not

The city will be courageous in virtue of a portion of herself which preserves under all circumstances that opinion about the nature of things to be feared and not to be feared in which our legislator educated them and this is what you term courage

I should like to hear what you are saying once more for I do not think that I perfectly understand you

I mean that courage is a kind of salvation.

Salvation of what?

Of the opinion respecting things to be feared what they

are and of what nature, which the law implants through education and I mean by the words under all circumstances' to intimate that in pleasure or in pain or under the influence of desire or fear a man preserves and does not lose this opinion. Shall I give you an illustration?

If you please

You know I said that dyers when they want to dye wool for making the true sea purple begin by selecting their white colour first thus they prepare and dress with much care and pains in order that the white ground may take the purple hue in full perfection. The dyeing then proceeds and whatever is dyed in this manner becomes a fast colour and no washing either with lyes or without them can take away the bloom. But when the ground has not been duly prepared you will have noticed how poor is the look either of purple or of any other colour

Yes he said I know that they have a washed out and ridiculous appearance

Then now I said you will understand what our object was 430 in selecting our soldiers and educating them in music and gymnastic we were contriving influences which would prepare them to take the dye of the laws in perfection and the colour of their opinion about dangers and of every other opinion was to be indelibly fixed by their nurture and training not to be washed away by such potent lyes as pleasure—mightier agent far in washing the soul than any soda or lye or by sorrow fear and desire the mightiest of all other solvents. And this sort of universal saving power of true opinion in conformity with law about real and false dangers I call and maintain to be courage unless you disagree

But I agree, he replied for I suppose that you mean to

exclude mere un instructed courage, such as that of a wild beast or of a slave—this in your opinion, is not the courage which the law ordains and ought to have another name

Most certainly

C

Then I may infer courage to be such as you describe?

Why yes said I you may and if you add the words of a citizen you will not be far wrong—hereafter if you like we will carry the examination further but at present we are seeking not for courage but justice and for the purpose of our inquiry we have said enough

You are right he replied

Two virtues remain to be discovered in the State—first temperance, and then justice which is the end of our search D

Very true

Now can we find justice without troubling ourselves about temperance?

I do not know how that can be accomplished he said nor do I desire that justice should be brought to light and temperance lost sight of and therefore I wish that you would do me the favour of considering temperance first

Certainly I replied I should not be justified in refusing E your request

Then consider he said

Yes I replied I will and as far as I can at present see the virtue of temperance has more of the nature of harmony and symphony than the preceding

How so? he asked

Temperance I replied, is the ordering or controlling of certain pleasures and desires this is curiously enough implied in the saying of a man being his own master' and other traces of the notion may be found in language.

No doubt he said.

There is something ridiculous in the expression 'master of
431 himself', for the master is also the servant and the servant
the master and in all these modes of speaking the same
person is denoted.

Certainly

The meaning is I believe that in the human soul there is
a better and also a worse principle and when the better has
the worse under control, then a man is said to be master of
himself and this is a term of praise but when, owing to
evil education or association the better principle which is
also the smaller is overwhelmed by the greater mass of the
B worse—in this case he is blamed and is called the slave of self
and unprincipled.

Yes there is reason in that.

And now, I said look at our newly created State, and there
you will find one of these two conditions realized for the
State as you will acknowledge may be justly called master
of itself if the words temperance and self mastery truly
express the rule of the better part over the worse.

Yes he said I see that what you say is true.

Let me further note that the manifold and complex pleasures
C and desires and pains are generally found in children and
women and servants and in the freemen so called who are
of the lowest and more numerous class.

Certainly he said.

Whereas the simple and moderate desires which follow
reason, and are under the guidance of mind and true opinion
are to be found only in a few and those the best born and
best educated.

Very true.

These two as you may perceive, have a place in our State and the meaner desires of the many are held down by the virtuous desires and wisdom of the few

That I perceive he said

Then if there be any city which may be described as master of its own pleasures and desires, and master of itself ours may claim such a designation?

Certainly he replied.

It may also be called temperate and for the same reasons?

Yes

And if there be any State in which rulers and subjects will be agreed as to the question who are to rule, that again will be our State?

Undoubtedly

And the citizens being thus agreed among themselves in which class will temperance be found—in the rulers or in the subjects?

In both as I should imagine he replied

Do you observe that we were not far wrong in our guess that temperance was a sort of harmony?

Why so?

Why because temperance is unlike courage and wisdom, each of which resides in a part only, the one making the State wise and the other valiant not so temperance, which extends to the whole and runs through all the notes of the scale and produces a harmony of the weaker and the stronger and the middle class whether you suppose them to be stronger or weaker in wisdom or power or numbers or wealth, or anything else Most truly then may we deem temperance to be the agreement of the naturally superior and inferior, as to the right to rule of either both in states and individuals.

B I entirely agree with you

And so I said, we may consider three out of the four virtues to have been discovered in our State. The last of those qualities which make a state virtuous must be justice if we only knew what that was.

The inference is obvious.

The time then has arrived, Glaucon, when like huntersmen we should surround the cover and look sharp that justice does not seal away and pass on of sight and escape us. For beyond a doubt she is somewhere in this country. Watch therefore and strive to catch a sight of her, and if you see her first let me know.

Would that I could! but you should regard me rather as a follower who has just eyes enough to see what you show him—that is about as much as I am good for.

Offer up a prayer with me and follow.

I will but you must show me the way.

Here is no path, I said, and the wood is dark and perplexing. Still we must push on.

D Let us push on.

Here I saw something. Halloo! I said, I begin to perceive a track, and I believe that the quarry will not escape.

Good news, he said.

Truly, I said, we are stupid fellows.

Why so?

Why, my good sir, at the beginning of our inquiry ages ago here was justice tumbling out at our feet and we never saw her. Nothing could be more ridiculous. Like people who go about looking for what they have in their hands—that was the way with us—we looked not at what we were

seeking, but at what was far off in the distance and therefore I suppose, we missed her

What do you mean?

I mean to say that in reality for a long time past we have been talking of justice and have failed to recognize her

I grow impatient at the length of your exordium

Well then, tell me I said, whether I am right or not 4,3
You remember the original principle which we were always laying down at the foundation of the State that one man should practise one thing only the thing to which his nature was best adapted —now justice is this principle or a part of it

Yes we often said that one man should do one thing only

Further we affirmed that justice was doing one's own business and not being a busybody we said so again and again and many others have said the same to us B

Yes we said so

Then to do one's own business in a certain way may be assumed to be justice Can you tell me whence I derive this inference?

I cannot but I should like to be told

Because I think that this is the only virtue which remains in the State when the other virtues of temperance and courage and wisdom are abstracted and that this is the ultimate cause and condition of the existence of all of them and while remaining in them is also their preservative and we were saying that if the three were discovered by us, C justice would be the fourth or remaining one

That follows of necessity

If we are asked to determine which of these four qualities by its presence contributes most to the excellence of the State, whether the agent of rulers and subjects, or the

preservation in the soldiers of the opinion on which the law
 ordains about the true nature of dangers or wisdom and
 D watchfulness in the rulers or whether this other which I
 am mentioning and which is found in children and women
 slave and freeman, artisan, ruler subject,—the quality I
 mean of every one doing his own work, and not being a
 busybody would claim the palm—the question is not so
 easily answered

Certainly he replied, there would be a difficulty in saying
 which.

Then the power of each individual in the State to do his
 own work appears to compete with the other political virtues
 wisdom, temperance courage

Yes he said

And the virtue which enters into this competition is
 E justice?

Exactly

Let us look at the question from another point of view
 Are not the rulers in a State those to whom you would
 entrust the office of determining suits at law?

Certainly

And are suits decided on any other ground but that a man
 may neither take what is another's nor be deprived of what
 is his own?

Yes that is their principle

Which is a just principle?

Yes

Then on this view also justice will be admitted to be the
 having and doing what is a man's own, and belongs to him?

434 Very true

Think, now and say whether you agree with me or not.

Suppose a carpenter to be doing the business of a cobbler or a cobbler of a carpenter and suppose them to exchange their implements or their duties or the same person to be doing the work of both, or whatever be the change do you think that any great harm would result to the State?

Not much

But when the cobbler or any other man whose nature designed to be a trader having his heart lifted up by wealth or strength or the number of his followers, or any like advantage attempts to force his way into the class of warriors or a warrior into that of legislators and guardians for which he is unfitted and either to take the implements or the duties of the other or when one man is trader legislator and warrior all in one then I think you will agree with me in saying that this interchange and this meddling of one with another is the ruin of the State

Most true

Seeing then, I said, that there are three distinct classes any meddling of one with another or the change of one into another is the greatest harm to the State and may be most correctly termed evil doing?

Precisely

And the greatest degree of evil doing to one's own city would be termed by you injustice?

Certainly

This then is injustice and on the other hand when the trader, the auxiliary and the guardian each do their own business that is justice, and will make the city just

I agree with you

D

We will not I said, be over positive as yet but if on trial this conception of justice be verified in the individual as well

as in the State, there will be no longer any room for doubt if it be not verified we must have a fresh inquiry First let us complete the old investigation which we began as you remember under the impression that if we could previously examine justice on the larger scale there would be less difficulty in discerning her in the individual That larger example appeared to be the State and accordingly we constructed as good a one as we could knowing well that in the good State justice would be found Let the discovery which we made be now applied to the individual—if they agree we shall be satisfied or if there be a difference in the individual we will come back to the State and have another trial of the theory The friction of the two when rubbed together may possibly strike a light in which justice will shine forth and the vision which is then revealed we will fix in our souls

That will be in regular course let us do as you say

I proceeded to ask When two things a greater and less are called by the same name are they like or unlike in so far as they are called the same?

Like he replied

B The just man then if we regard the idea of justice only will be like the just State?

He will

And a State was thought by us to be just when the three classes in the State severally did their own business and also thought to be temperate and valiant and wise by reason of certain other affections and qualities of these same classes?

True he said

And so of the individual we may assume that he has the same three principles in his own soul which are found in

the State and he may be rightly described in the same terms because he is affected in the same manner?

Certainly he said

Once more then O my friend, we have alighted upon an easy question—whether the soul has these three principles or not?

An easy question! Nay rather, Socrates the proverb holds that hard is the good

Very true I said, and I do not think that the method which we are employing is at all adequate to the accurate solution of this question the true method is another and a longer one Still we may arrive at a solution not below the level of the previous inquiry

May we not be satisfied with that? he said —under the circumstances I am quite content

I too I replied shall be extremely well satisfied

Then faint not in pursuing the speculation, he said

Must we not acknowledge I said, that in each of us there are the same principles and habits which there are in the State and that from the individual they pass into the State?—how else can they come there? Take the quality of passion or spirit—it would be ridiculous to imagine that this quality when found in States is not derived from the individuals who are supposed to possess it e.g. the Thracians Scythians and in general the northern nations and the same may be said of the love of knowledge, which is the special characteristic of our part of the world, or of the love of money which may with equal truth, be attributed to the Phoenicians and Egyptians

Exactly so he said

There is no difficulty in understanding this

None whatever

But the question is not quite so easy when we proceed to ask whether these principles are three or one whether that is to say we learn with one part of our nature are angry with another and with a third part desire the satisfaction of our natural appetites or whether the whole soul comes into play in each sort of action—to determine that is the difficulty

Yes he said there lies the difficulty

Then let us now try and determine whether they are the same or different

How can we? he asked

I replied as follows The same thing clearly cannot act or be acted upon in the same part or in relation to the same thing at the same time, in contrary ways and therefore whenever this contradiction occurs in things apparently the same we know that they are really not the same but different

Good

For example I said, can the same thing be at rest and in motion at the same time in the same part?

Impossible

Still I said let us have a more precise statement of terms, lest we should hereafter fall out by the way Imagine the case of a man who is standing and also moving his hands and his head and suppose a person to say that one and the same person is in motion and at rest at the same moment—to such a mode of speech we should object and should rather say that one part of him is in motion while another is at rest

Very true.

And suppose the objector to refine still further and to draw the nice distinction that not only parts of tops but whole tops when they spin round with their pegs fixed on the spot are at rest and in motion at the same time (and he may say the same of anything which revolves in the same spot) his objection would not be admitted by us because in such cases things are not at rest and in motion in the same parts of themselves we should rather say that they have both an axis and a circumference and that the axis stands still, so there is no deviation from the perpendicular and that the circumference goes round. But if while revolving the axis inclines either to the right or left forwards or backwards then in no point of view can they be at rest.

That is the correct mode of describing them, he replied.

Then none of these objections will confuse us or induce us to believe that the same thing at the same time in the same part or in relation to the same thing can act or be acted upon in contrary ways.

Certainly not, according to my way of thinking.

Yet, I said, that we may not be compelled to examine all such objections and prove at length that they are untrue let us assume their absurdity and go forward on the understanding that hereafter, if this assumption turn out to be untrue, all the consequences which follow shall be withdrawn.

Yes he said that will be the best way.

Well, I said, would you not allow that assent and dissent, desire and aversion, attraction and repulsion are all of them opposites whether they are regarded as active or passive (for that makes no difference in the fact of their opposition)?

Yes, he said, they are opposites.

Well, I said, and hunger and thirst, and the desires in

general, and again willing and wishing,—all these you would refer to the classes already mentioned. You would say—would you not?—that the soul of him who desires is seeking after the object of his desire or that he is drawing to himself the thing which he wishes to possess or again when a person wants anything to be given him, his mind, longing for the realization of his desire intimates his wish to have it by a nod of assent, as if he had been asked a question?

Very true

And what would you say of unwillingness and dislike and the absence of desire should not these be referred to the opposite class of repulsion and rejection?

D Certainly

Admitting this to be true of desire generally let us suppose a particular class of desires and out of these we will select hunger and thirst as they are termed which are the most obvious of them?

Let us take that class he said.

The object of one is food and of the other drink?

Yes

And here comes the point is not thirst the desire which the soul has of drink and of drink only no of drink qualified by anything else for example warm or cold, or much or little or in a word drink of any particular sort but if the thirst be accompanied by heat then the desire is of cold drink or if accompanied by cold then of warm drink or if the thirst be excessive then the drink which is desired will be excessive or if not great, the quantity of drink will also be small but thirst pure and simple will desire drink pure and simple which is the natural satisfaction of thirst as food is of hunger?

Yes he said the simple desire is as you say in every case of the simple object and the qualified desire of the qualified object

But here a confusion may arise and I should wish to guard against an opponent starting up and saying that no man desires drink only but good drink or food only but good food for good is the universal object of desire, and thirst, being a desire will necessarily be thirst after good drink and the same is true of every other desire

Yes, he replied the opponent might have something to say

Nevertheless I should still maintain that of relatives some have a quality attached to either term of the relation others are simple and have their correlatives simple

I do not know what you mean

Well you know of course that the greater is relative to the less?

Certainly

And the much greater to the much less?

Yes

And the sometime greater to the sometime less and the greater that is to be to the less that is to be?

Certainly he said

And so of more and less and of other correlative terms, such as the double and the half or again the heavier and the lighter the swifter and the slower and of hot and cold, and of any other relatives —is not this true of all of them?

Yes

And does not the same principle hold in the science? The object of science is knowledge (assuming that to be the true definition) but the object of a particular science is a

D particular kind of knowledge I mean for example that the science of house building is a kind of knowledge which is defined and distinguished from other kinds and is therefore termed architecture

Certainly

Because it has a particular quality which no other has?

Yes

And it has this particular quality because it has an object of a particular kind and this is true of the other arts and sciences?

Yes

Now then if I have made myself clear you will understand my original meaning in what I said about relatives My meaning was that if one term of a relation is taken alone, the other is taken alone if one term is qualified, the other is also qualified I do not mean to say that relatives may not be disparate or that the science of health is healthy or of disease necessarily diseased or that the sciences of good and evil are therefore good and evil but only that when the term science is no longer used absolutely but has a qualified object which in this case is the nature of health and disease it becomes defined and is hence called not merely science but the science of medicine

I quite understand, and I think as you do

439 Would you not say that thirst is one of these essentially relative terms having clearly a relation—

Yes thirst is relative to drink.

And a certain kind of thirst is relative to a certain kind of drink but thirst taken alone is neither of much nor little, nor of good nor bad nor of any particular kind of drink but of drink only?

Certainly

Then the sou^l of the thirsty one in so f r as he is thirsty desires only drink for this he yearns and tries to obtain it? B

That is plain

And if you suppose something which pulls a thirsty soul away f om drink that must be different from the thirsty principle which draws him like a beast to drink for as we were saying the same thing cannot at the same time with the same part of itself act in contra y ways about the same

Impossible

No more than you can say that the hands or the axle push and pull the bow at the same time but what you say is that one hand pushes and the other pulls

Exactly so he replied

C

And might a man be thirsty and yet unwilling to drink?

Yes he said it constantly happens

And in such a case what is one to say? Would you not say that there was something in the soul bidding a man to drink, and something else forbidding him which is other and stronger than the principle which bids him?

I should say so

And the forbidding principle is derived from reason and D that which bids and attracts proceeds from passion and desire?

Clearly

Then we may fairly assume that they are two and that they differ from one another the one with which a man reasons we may call the rational principle of the soul the other with which he loves and hungers and thirsts and feels the flutterings of any other desire may be termed the irrational or appetitive, the ally of sundry pleasures and satisfactions

E Yes he said we may fairly assume them to be different

Then let us finally determine that there are two principles existing in the soul And what of passion, or spirit? Is it a third, or akin to one of the preceding?

I should be inclined to say—akin to desire

Well, I said, there is a story which I remember to have heard and in which I put faith The story is that Leontius the son of Aglaion coming up one day from the Piræus under the north wall on the outside, observed some dead bodies lying on the ground at the place of execution He felt a desire to see them and also a dread and abhorrence of them for a time he struggled and covered his eyes but at length the desire got the better of him and forcing them open he ran up to the dead bodies saying Look ye wretches take your fill of the fair sight.

I have heard the story myself he said

The moral of the tale is that anger at times goes to war with desire, as though they were two distinct things

Yes that is the meaning he said.

And are there not many other cases in which we observe that when a man's desires violently prevail over his reason, he reviles himself and is angry at the violence within him and that in this struggle, which is like the struggle of factions in a State his spirit is on the side of his reason —on the side of the passionate or spirited element to take part with the desires when reason decides that she should not be opposed¹ is a sort of thing which I believe that you never observed occurring in yourself, nor as I should imagine in any one else?

Certainly not

Suppose that a man thinks he has done a wrong to another. C
the nobler he is the less able is he to feel indignant at
suffering such as hunger or cold, or any other pain which
the injured person may inflict upon him—these he deems to
be just and as I say his anger refuses to be excited by
them.

True he said

But when he thinks that he is the sufferer of the wrong
then he boils and chafes and is on the side of what he be-
lieves to be justice and because he suffers hunger or cold
or other pain he is only the more determined to persevere
and conquer His noble spirit will not be quelled until he
either slays or is slain or until he hears the voice of his
shepherd that is, reason bidding his dog bark no more

The illustration is perfect he replied and in our State
as we were saying the auxiliaries were to be dogs and to
hear the voice of the rulers who are their shepherds

I perceive I said, that you quite understand me there is
however a further point which I wish you to consider

What point?

You remember that passion or spirit appeared at first sight
to be a kind of desire but now we should say quite the con-
trary for in the conflict of the soul spirit is arrayed on the
side of the rational principle

Most assuredly

But a further question arises Is passion different from
reason also, or only a kind of reason in which latter case
instead of three principles in the soul there will only be two
the rational and the concupiscent, or rather as the State 441
was composed of three classes, traders auxiliaries counsellors
so may there not be in the individual soul a third element

which is passion or spirit, and when not corrupted by bad education is the natural auxiliary of reason?

Yes he said, there must be a third

Yes I replied, if passion which has already been shown to be different from desire turn out also to be different from reason

But that is easily proved — We may observe even in young children that they are full of spirit almost as soon as they are born whereas some of them never seem to attain to the use of reason and most of them late enough

Excellent I said and you may see passion equally in brute animals which is a further proof of the truth of what you are saying And we may once more appeal to the words of Homer which have been already quoted by us

He smote his breast and thus rebuked his soul ¹

For in this verse Homer has clearly supposed the power which reasons about the better and worse to be different from the unreasoning anger which is rebuked by it

Very true he said

And so a great deal more to say we have reached land and we fairly agreed that the same principles which exist in the State exist also in the individual, and that they are three in number

Exactly

Must we not then infer that the individual is wise in the same way and in virtue of the same quality which makes the State wise?

Certainly

Also that the same quality which constitutes courage in the

¹ Od. xx. 1 quoted *supra*, II. 390 D

State constitutes courage in the individual, and that both the State and the individual bear the same relation to all the other virtues?

Assuredly

And the individual will be acknowledged by us to be just in the same way in which the State is just?

That follows of course

We cannot but remember that the justice of the State consisted in each of the three classes doing the work of its own class?

We are not very likely to have forgotten he said

We must recollect that the individual in whom the several qualities of his nature do their own work will be just and will do his own work?

Yes he said, we must remember that too

And ought not the rational principle which is wise and has the care of the whole soul to rule, and the passionate or spirited principle to be the subject and ally?

Certainly

And as we were saying the united influence of music and gymnastic will bring them into accord nerving and sustaining the reason with noble words and lessons and moderating and soothing and civilizing the wildness of passion by harmony 442 and rhythm?

Quite true he said

And these two thus nurtured and educated, and having learned truly to know their own functions will rule¹ over the

Reading *ὑποτασσέσθων* with Bekker or if the reading *ὑποτασσέσθων* which is found in the MSS. be adopted then the nominative must be supplied from the previous sentence Music and gymnastic will place in authority over This is very awkward, and the awkwardness is increased by the of changing the subject at *ὑποτασσέσθων*

concupiscent which in each of us is the largest part of the soul and by nature most insatiable of gain over this they will keep guard lest, waxing great and strong with the fullness of bodily pleasures as they are termed the concupiscent soul no longer confined to her own sphere should attempt to enslave and rule those who are not her natural born subjects and overturn the whole life of man?

Very true he said

Both together will they not be the best defenders of the whole soul and the whole body against attacks from without the one counselling and the other fighting under his leader and courageously executing his commands and counsels?

True

And he is to be deemed courageous whose spirit retains in pleasure and in pain the commands of reason about what he ought or ought not to fear?

Right he replied

And him we call wise who has in him that little part which rules and which proclaims these commands that part too being supposed to have a knowledge of what is for the interest of each of the three parts and of the whole?

Assuredly

And would you not say that he is temperate who has these same elements in friendly harmony in whom the one ruling principle of reason and the two subject ones of spirit and desire are equally agreed that reason ought to rule, and do not rebel?

Certainly he said that is the true account of temperance whether in the State or individual

And surely I said we have explained again and again how and by virtue of what quality a man will be just.

That is very certain.

And is justice dimmer in the individual and is the form different, or is the same which we found her to be in the State?

There is no difference in my opinion he said.

Because, if any doubt is still lingering in our mind, a few commonplace instances will satisfy us of the truth of what I am saying.

What sort of instances do you mean?

If the case is put to us must we not admit that the just State or the man who is trained in the principles of such a State will be less likely than the unjust to make away with a deposit of gold or silver? Would any one deny this?

No one he replied.

Will the just man or citizen ever be guilty of sacrilege or theft or treachery either to his friends or to his country?

Never.

Neither will he ever break faith where there have been oaths or agreements?

Impossible.

No one will be less likely to commit adultery or to dishonour his father and mother or to fail in his religious duties?

No one.

And the reason is that each part of him is doing its own business whether in ruling or being ruled?

Exactly so.

Are you satisfied then that the quality which makes such men and such states is justice, or do you hope to discover some other?

Not I, indeed.

Then our dream has been realized and the suspicion which we entertained at the beginning of our work of construction, that some divine power must have conducted us to a primary form of justice has now been verified?

Yes certainly

And the division of labour which required the carpenter and the shoemaker and the rest of the citizens to be doing each his own business and not another's was a shadow of justice and for that reason it was of use?

Clearly

But in reality justice was such as we were describing being concerned however not with the outward man, but with the inward which is the true self and concernment of man for the just man does not permit the several elements within him to interfere with one another or any of them to do the work of others—he sets in order his own inner life and is his own master and his own law and at peace with himself and when he has bound together the three principles within him which may be compared to the higher, lower and middle notes of the scale and the intermediate intervals—when he has bound all these together and is no longer many but has become one entirely temperate and perfectly adjusted nature then he proceeds to act, if he has to act whether in a matter of property or in the treatment of the body or in some affair of politics or private business always thinking and calling that which preserves and co-operates with this harmonious condition just and good action, and the knowledge which presides over it wisdom, 444 and that which at any time impairs this condition he will call unjust action and the opinion which presides over it ignorance.

You have said the exact truth, Socrates

Very good and if we were to affirm that we had discovered the just man and the just State and the nature of justice in each of them, we should not be telling a falsehood?

Most certainly not.

May we say so then?

Let us say so

And now I said, injustice has to be considered

Clearly

Must not injustice be a strife which arises among the three B principles—a meddlesomeness and interference and rising up of a part of the soul against the whole, an assertion of unlawful authority which is made by a rebellious subject against a true prince of whom he is the natural vassal,—what is all this confusion and delusion but injustice and intemperance and cowardice and ignorance and every form of vice?

Exactly so

And if the nature of justice and injustice be known, then C the meaning of acting unjustly and being unjust or again, of acting justly will also be perfectly clear?

What do you mean? he said

Why I said, they are like disease and health being in the soul just what disease and health are in the body

How so? he said

Why I said, that which is healthy causes health and that which is unhealthy causes disease

Yes

And just actions cause justice, and unjust actions cause D injustice?

That is certain.

And the creation of health is the institution of a natural

order and government of one by another in the parts of the body and the creation of disease is the production of a state of things at variance with this natural order?

True

And is not the creation of justice the institution of a natural order and government of one by another in the parts of the soul and the creation of injustice the production of a state of things at variance with the natural order?

Exactly so he said.

Then virtue is the health and beauty and well being of the soul and vice the disease and weakness and deformity of the same?

True

And do not good practices lead to virtue, and evil practices to vice?

Assuredly

445 Still our old question of the comparative advantage of justice and injustice has not been answered. Which is the more profitable, to be just and act justly and practise virtue whether seen or unseen of gods and men or to be unjust and act unjustly if only unpunished and unreformed?

In my judgement Socrates the question has now become ridiculous. We know that, when the bodily constitution is gone life is no longer endurable though pampered with all kinds of meats and drinks and having all wealth and all power, and shall we be told that when the very essence of the vital principle is undermined and corrupted, life is still worth having to a man if only he be allowed to do what ever he likes with the single exception that he is not to acquire justice and virtue or to escape from injustice and vice assuming them both to be such as we have described?

Yes I said the question is, as you say ridiculous. Still, as we are near the spot at which we may see the truth in the clearest manner with our own eyes, let us not faint by the way

Certainly not he replied.

Come up hither I said, and behold the various forms of vice those of them I mean which are worth looking at

I am following you, he replied proceed

I said The argument seems to have reached a height from which, as from some tower of speculation a man may look down and see that virtue is one but that the forms of vice are innumerable there being four special ones which are deserving of note

What do you mean? he said

I mean I replied, that there appear to be as many forms of the soul as there are distinct forms of the State

How many?

There are five of the State and five of the soul, I said. D

What are they?

The first I said, is that which we have been describing and which may be said to have two names, monarchy and aristocracy accordingly as rule is exercised by one distinguished man or by many

True he replied

But I regard the two names as describing one form only for whether the government is in the hands of one or many if the governors have been trained in the manner which we have supposed the fundamental laws of the State will be maintained

That is true he replied.

Steph Such is the good and true City or State and the good
 449 and true man is of the same pattern and if this is right every
 other is wrong and the evil is one which affects not only
 the ordering of the State but also the regulation of the
 individual soul and is exhibited in four forms

What are they? he said

I was proceeding to tell the order in which the four evil
 B forms appeared to me to succeed one another when Pole-
 marchus who was sitting a little way off just beyond Ade-
 mantus began to whisper to him stretching forth his
 hand, he took hold of the upper part of his coat by the
 shoulder, and drew him towards him leaning forward him-
 self so as to be quite close and saying something in his ear of
 which I only caught the words Shall we let him off or
 what shall we do?

Certainly not said Ademantus raising his voice

Who is it I said whom you are refusing to let off?

You he said

C I repeated ¹ Why am I especially not to be let off?

Why he said we think that you are lazy and mean to
 cheat us out of a whole chapter which is a very important
 part of the story and you fancy that we shall not notice
 your airy way of proceeding as if it were self evident to
 everybody that in the matter of women and children
 friends have all things in common

And was I not right, Adeimantus?

Yes he said but what is right in this particular case, like everything else requires to be explained for community may be of many kinds Please therefore to say what sort of community you mean We have been long expecting D that you would tell us something about the family life of your citizens—how they will bring children into the world, and rear them when they have arrived and in general what is the nature of this community of women and children—for we are of opinion that the right or wrong management of such matters will have a great and powerful influence on the State for good or for evil And now since the question is still undetermined, and you are taking in hand another State we have resolved as you heard not to let you go until 450 you give an account of all this

To that resolution, said Glaucon you may regard me as saying Agreed

And without more ado said Thrasymachus you may consider us all to be equally agreed.

I said You know not what you are doing in thus assailing me What an argument are you raising about the State! Just as I thought that I had finished and was only too glad that I had laid this question to sleep and was reflecting how fortunate I was in your acceptance of what I then said, you ask me to begin again at the very foundation ignorant of what a hornet's nest of words you are stirring Now I fore B saw this gathering trouble and avoided it

For what purpose do you conceive that we have come here, said Thrasymachus—to look for gold, or to hear discourse?

Yes but discourse should have a limit.

Yes Socrates said Glaucon, and the whole of life is the only limit which wise men assign to the hearing of such discourses. But never mind about us take heart yourself C and answer the question in your own way. What sort of community of women and children is this which is to prevail among our guardians? and how shall we manage the period between birth and education which seems to require the greatest care? Tell us how these things will be.

Yes my simple friend, but the answer is the reverse of easy. Many more doubts arise about this than about our previous conclusions. For the practicability of what is said may be doubted and looked at in another point of view whether the scheme if ever so practicable would be for the best is also doubtful. Hence I feel a reluctance to approach the D subject, lest our aspiration my dear friend should turn out to be a dream only.

Fear not he replied for your audience will not be hard upon you. They are not sceptical or hostile.

I said My good friend, I suppose that you mean to encourage me by these words.

Yes he said.

Then let me tell you that you are doing just the reverse the encouragement which you offer would have been all very well had I myself believed that I knew what I was talking about to declare the truth about matters of high E interest which a man honours and loves among wise men who love him need occasion no fear or faltering in his mind but to carry on an argument when you are yourself only
451 a hesitating inquirer which is my condition, is a dangerous and slippery thing and the danger is not that I shall be laughed at (of which the fear would be childish) but that

I shall miss the truth where I have most need to be sure of my footing and drag my friends after me in my fall. And I pray Nemesis not to visit upon me the woes which I am going to utter. For I do indeed believe that to be an involuntary homicide is a less crime than to be a deceiver about beauty or goodness or justice in the matter of law.¹ And that is a risk which I would rather run among enemies than among friends and therefore you do well to encourage me.²

B

Glaucón laughed and said: Well then, Socrates, in case you and your argument do us any serious injury you shall be acquitted beforehand of the homicide and shall not be held to be a deceiver: take courage then and speak.

Well, I said, the law says that when a man is acquitted he is free from guilt and what holds at law may hold in argument.

Then why should you mind?

Well, I replied, I suppose that I must retrace my steps and say what I perhaps ought to have said before in the proper place. The part of the men has been played out and now properly enough comes the turn of the women. Of them I will proceed to speak, and the more readily since I am invited by you.

For men born and educated like our citizens the only way, in my opinion, of arriving at a right conclusion about the possession and use of women and children is to follow the path on which we originally started, when we said that the men were to be the guardians and watchdogs of the herd.

¹ O¹ inserting *καὶ* before *καταφρονέω* a deceiver about beauty or goodness or principle of justice or law.

Reading *ὅτι τοῦ κατὰ νόμον*.

of women naked in the palaestra exercising with the men, especially when they are no longer young they certainly will not be a vision of beauty any more than the enthusiastic old men who in spite of wrinkles and ugliness continue to frequent the gymnasia

Yes indeed he said according to present notions the proposal would be thought ridiculous

But then, I said as we have determined to speak our minds we must not fear the jests of the wits which will be directed against this sort of innovation how they will talk of women's attainments both in music and gymnastic and above all about their wearing armour and riding upon horseback!

Very true he replied

Yet having begun we must go forward to the rough places of the law at the same time begging of these gentlemen for once in their life to be serious Not long ago as we shall remind them the Hellenes were of the opinion which is still generally received among the barbarians that the sight of a naked man was ridiculous and improper and when first the Cretans and then the Lacedaemonians introduced the custom the wits of that day might equally have ridiculed the innovation

No doubt

But when experience showed that to let all things be uncovered was far better than to cover them up and the ludicrous effect to the outward eye vanished before the better principle which reason asserted then the man was perceived to be a fool who directs the shafts of his ridicule at any other sight but that of folly and vice, or seriously inclines to we grudge the beautiful by any other standard but that of the good!

Very true he replied

First then whether the question is to be put in jest or in earnest let us come to an understanding about the nature of woman Is she capable of sharing either wholly or partially in the actions of men or not at all? And is the art of war one of those arts in which she can or cannot share? That will be the best way of commencing the inquiry and will probably lead to the fairest conclusion

That will be much the best way

Shall we take the other side first and begin by arguing against ourselves in this manner the adversary's position will not be undefended

B Why not? he said

Then let us put a speech into the mouths of our opponents They will say Socrates and Glaucon no adversary need convict you for you yourselves at the first foundation of the State admitted the principle that everybody was to do the one work suited to his own nature And certainly if I am not mistaken such an admission was made by us And do not the natures of men and women differ very much indeed?

And we shall reply Of course they do Then we shall be asked Whether the tasks assigned to men and to women should not be different and such as are agreeable to their different natures? Certainly they should But if so have you not fallen into a serious inconsistency in saying that men and women whose natures are so entirely different, ought to perform the same actions? —What defence will you make for us my good Sir against any one who offers these objections?

That is not an easy question to answer when asked suddenly and I shall and I do beg of you to draw out the case on our side

These are the objections Glaucon, and there are many others of a like kind which I foresaw long ago they made me afraid and reluctant to take in hand any law about the possession and nurture of women and children

By Zeus he said the problem to be solved is anything but easy

Why yes I said, but the fact is that when a man is out of his depth whether he has fallen into a little swimming bath or into mid ocean, he has to swim all the same

Very true

And must not we swim and try to reach the shore we will hope that Arion's dolphin or some other miraculous help may save us?

I suppose so he said

E

Well then let us see if any way of escape can be found We acknowledged—did we not?—that different natures ought to have different pursuits and that men's and women's natures are different And now what are we saying?—that different natures ought to have the same pursuits—this is the inconsistency which is charged upon us

Precisely

Verily Glaucon I said, glorious is the power of the art of contradiction!

Why do you say so?

Because I think that many a man falls into the practice against his will When he thinks that he is reasoning he is really disputing just because he cannot define and divide and so know that of which he is speaking and he will pursue a merely verbal opposition in the spirit of contention and not of fair discussion.

Yes he replied, such is very often the case but what has that to do with us and our argument?

A great deal for there is certainly a danger of our getting unintentionally into a verbal opposition

In what way?

Why we valiantly and pugnaciously insist upon the verbal truth, that different natures ought to have different pursuits, but we never considered at all what was the meaning of sameness or difference of nature or why we distinguished them when we assigned different pursuits to different natures and the same to the same natures

Why no he said that was never considered by us

C I said Suppose that by way of illustration we were to ask the question whether there is not an opposition in nature between bald men and hairy men and if this is admitted by us then if bald men are cobblers we should forbid the hairy men to be cobblers and conversely?

That would be a jest he said

Yes I said a jest and why? because we never meant when we constructed the State that the opposition of natures should extend to every difference but only to those differences which affected the pursuit in which the individual is engaged we should have argued for example that a physician and one who is in mind a physician¹ may be said to have the same nature

True

Whereas the physician and the carpenter have different natures?

Certainly

And if I said the male and female sex appear to differ in

their fitness for any art or pursuit we should say has such pursuit or art ought to be assigned to one or the other of them but if the difference consists only in women bearing and men begetting children, this does not amount to a proof that a woman differs from a man in respect of the sort of education she should receive and we shall therefore continue to maintain that our guardians and their wives ought to have the same pursuits

Very true he said

Next we shall ask our opponent how in reference to any of the pursuits or arts of civic life the nature of a woman differs from that of a man?

That will be quite fair

And perhaps he like yourself will reply that to give a sufficient answer on the instant is not easy but after a little reflection there is no difficulty

Yes perhaps

Suppose then that we invite him to accompany us in the argument and then we may hope to show him that there is nothing peculiar in the constitution of women which would affect them in the administration of the State

By all means

Let us say to him Come now and we will ask you a question —when you spoke of a nature gifted or not gifted in any respect did you mean to say that one man will acquire a thing easily another with difficulty a little learning will lead the one to discover a great deal whereas the other after much study and application no sooner learns than he forgets or again did you mean that the one has a body which is a good servant to his mind, while the body of the other is a hindrance to him would not these be the sort

C of differences which distinguish the man gifted by nature from the one who is ungifted?

No one will deny that

And can you mention any pursuit of mankind in which the male sex has not all these gifts and qualities in a higher degree than the female? Need I waste time in speaking of the art of weaving and the management of pancakes and preserves in which womankind does really appear to be great and in which for her to be beaten by a man is of all things the most absurd?

You are quite right he replied in maintaining the general inferiority of the female sex although many women are in many things superior to many men yet on the whole what you say is true

And if so my friend I said there is no special faculty of administration in a state which a woman has because she is a woman, or which a man has by virtue of his sex but the gifts of nature are alike diffused in both all the pursuits of men are the pursuits of women also but in all of them a woman is inferior to a man

Very true

Then are we to impose all our enactments on men and none of them on women?

That will never do

456 One woman has a gift of healing another not one is a musician and another has no music in her nature?

Very true

And one woman has a turn for gymnastic and military exercises and another is unwarlike and hates gymnastics?

Certainly

And one woman is a philosopher and another is an enemy

of philosophy one has spirit, and another is without spirit?

That is also true

Then one woman will have the temper of a guardian, and another not Was not the selection of the male guardians determined by differences of this sort?

Yes

Men and women alike possess the qualities which make a guardian they differ only in their comparative strength or weakness

Obviously

And those women who have such qualities are to be selected as the companions and colleagues of men who have similar qualities and whom they resemble in capacity and in character

Very true

And ought not the same natures to have the same pursuits?

They ought.

Then as we were saying before there is nothing unnatural in assigning music and gymnastic to the wives of the guardians—to that point we come round again

Certainly not

The law which we then enacted was agreeable to nature, and therefore not an impossibility or mere aspiration and the contrary practice which prevails at present, is in reality a violation of nature

That appears to be true

We had to consider first whether our proposals were possible, and secondly whether they were the most beneficial?

Yes

And the possibility has been acknowledged?

Yes

The very great benef has next to be established?

Quite so

You will admit that the same education which makes a man a good guardian will make a woman a good guardian for D their o ginal nature is the same?

Yes

I should like to ask you a question

What is it?

Would you say tha all men a e equal in excellence or is one man better than anothe ?

The latter

And in the commonwealth which we were founding do you conceive the guardians who have been brough up on our model svstem to be more perfect man, or the cobbles whose education has been cobbling?

What a ridiculous question !

You have answe ed me I replied Well and may we not E further say that our guardians are the best of our citizens?

By far the best

And will not their wives be the best women?

Yes by far the b st

And can there be anything better for the interests of the State than hat the men and women of a State should be as good as possible?

There can be nothing better

7 And this is what the arts of music and gymnastic when present in such manner as we have described, will accomplish?

Certainly

Then we have made an enactment not only possible but in the highest degree beneficia to the State?

True.

Then let the wives of our guardians strip for their virtue will be their robe and let them share in the toils of war and the defence of their country only in the distribution of labours the lighter are to be assigned to the women, who are the weaker natures but in other respects their duties are to be the same And as for the man who laughs at naked women exercising their bodies from the best of motives, in his laughter he is plucking

A fruit of unripe wisdom

and he himself is ignorant of what he is laughing at or what he is about —for that is and ever will be the best of sayings,
That the useful is the noble and the hurtful is the base

Very true

Here then is one difficulty in our law about women which we may say that we have now escaped the wave has not swallowed us up alive for enacting that the guardians of either sex should have all their pursuits in common to the utility and also to the possibility of this arrangement the consistency of the argument with itself bears witness

Yes that was a mighty wave which you have escaped

Yes I said, but a greater is coming you will not think much of this when you see the next.

Go on let me see.

The law I said which is the sequel of this and of all that has preceded is to the following effect — that the wives of our guardians are to be common, and their children are to be common and no parent is to know his own child, nor any child his parent

Yes, he said that is a much greater wave than the other

and the possibility as well as the utility of such a law are more questionable

I do not think I said that there can be any distrust about the very great utility of having wives and children common the possibility is quite another matter and be very much disputed

E I think that a good many doubts may be raised about it

You imply that the two questions must be combined I replied Now I meant that you should admit the utility and in this way as I thought, I should escape from both of them, and then there would remain only the possibility

But that little attempt is detected and therefore you please to give a defence of both

Well I said, I submit to my fate Yet grant me a
 458 favour let me feast my mind with the dream as day dreamers are in the habit of feasting themselves when they are walking alone for before they have discovered any means of effecting their wishes—that is a matter which never troubles them—they would rather not tire themselves by thinking about possibilities but assuming that what they desire is already granted to them they proceed with their plan, and delight in detailing what they mean to do when their wishes come true—that is a way which they have of not doing much good
 B to a capacity which was never good for much Now I myself am beginning to lose heart and I should like with your permission to pass over the question of possibility at present Assuming therefore the possibility of the proposal I shall now proceed to inquire how the rulers will carry out the arrangements and I shall demonstrate that our plan, if executed will be of the greatest benefit to the State and to the guardians First of all then, if you have no objection

I will endeavour with your help to consider the advantages of the measure and hereafter the question of possibility

I have no objection proceed

First, I think that if our rulers and their auxiliaries are to be worthy of the name which they bear there must be a willingness to obey in the one and the power of command in the other the guardians must themselves obey the laws, and they must also imitate the spirit of them in any details which are entrusted to their care

That is right he said

You I said who are their legislator having selected the men will now select the women and give them to them — they must be as far as possible of like natures with them and they must live in common houses and meet at common meals None of them will have anything specially his or her own they will be together and will be brought up together and will associate at gymnastic exercises And so they will be drawn by a necessity of their natures to have intercourse with each other—necessity is not too strong a word I think?

Yes he said —necessity not geometrical but another sort of necessity which lovers know and which is far more convincing and convincing to the mass of mankind

True I said and thus Glaucon like all the rest must proceed after an orderly fashion in a city of the blessed licentiousness is an unholy thing which the rulers will forbid

Yes he said and it ought not to be permitted

Then clearly the next thing will be to make matrimony sacred in the highest degree and what is most beneficial will be deemed sacred?

Exactly

And how can marriages be made most beneficial?—that is

a question which I put to you because I see in your house dogs for hunting and of the nobler sort of birds not a few. Now I beseech you do tell me, have you ever attended to their pairing and breeding?

In what particulars?

Why in the first place although they are all of a good sort are not some better than others?

True

And do you breed from them all indifferently or do you take care to breed from the best only?

From the best

B And do you take the oldest or the youngest or only those of ripe age?

I choose only those of ripe age

And if care was not taken in the breeding your dogs and birds would greatly deteriorate?

Certainly

And the same of horses and of animals in general?

Undoubtedly

Good heavens! my dear friend I said what consummate skill will our rulers need if the same principle holds of the human species!

C Certainly, the same principle holds but why does this involve any particular skill?

Because I said our rulers will often have to practise upon the body corporate with medicines. Now you know that when patients do not require medicines but have only to be put under a regimen the inferior sort of practitioner is deemed to be good enough but when medicine has to be given, then the doctor should be more of a man.

That is quite true he said but to what are you alluding?

I mean, I replied, that our rulers will find a considerable dose of falsehood and deceit necessary for the good of their subjects we were saying that the use of all these things regarded as medicines might be of advantage

And we were very right

And this lawful use of them seems likely to be often needed in the regulations of marriages and births

How so?

Why I said the principle has been already laid down that the best of either sex should be united with the best as often and the inferior with the inferior as seldom as possible and that they should rear the offspring of the one sort of union but not of the other, if the flock is to be maintained in first rate condition Now these goings on must be a secret which the rulers only know or there will be a further danger of our herd as the guardians may be termed, breaking out into rebellion.

Very true

Would we not better appoint certain festivals at which we will bring together the brides and bridegrooms and sacrifices will be offered and suitable hymeneal songs composed by our poets the number of weddings is a matter which must be left to the discretion of the rulers whose aim will be to preserve the average of population? There are many other things which they will have to consider such as the effects of wars and diseases and any similar agencies in order as far as this is possible to prevent the State from becoming either too large or too small

Certainly, he replied.

We shall have to invent some ingenious kind of lots which the less worthy may draw on each occasion of our bringing

them together and then they will accuse their own ill luck and not the rulers

To be sure he said

- B And I think that our braver and better youth besides their other honours and reward might have greater facilities of intercourse with women given them their bravery will be a reason and such fathers ought to have as many sons as possible

True

And the proper officers whether male or female or both, for offices are to be held by women as well as by men—

Yes—

- C The proper officers will take the offspring of the good parents to the pen or fold, and there they will deposit them with certain nurses who dwell in a separate quarter but the offspring of the inferior or of the better when they chance to be deformed will be put away in some mysterious unknown place as they should be

Yes he said that must be done if the breed of the guardians is to be kept pure

- They will provide for their nurture and will bring the mothers to the fold when they are full of milk, taking the greatest possible care that no mother recognizes her own child and other wet nurses may be engaged if more are required. Care will also be taken that the process of suckling shall not be protracted too long and the mothers will have no getting up at night or other trouble but will hand over all this sort of thing to the nurses and attendants

You suppose the wives of our guardians to have a fine easy time of it when they are having children

Why said I and so they ought. Let us, however proceed

with our scheme. We were saying that the parents should be in the prime of life?

Very true

And what is the prime of life? May it not be defined as a period of about twenty years in a woman's life and thirty in a man's?

Which years do you mean to include?

A woman, I said at twenty years of age may begin to bear children to the State, and continue to bear them until forty a man may begin at five and twenty when he has passed the point at which the pulse of life beats quickest and continue to beget children until he be fifty five

Certainly he said, both in men and women those years are the prime of physical as well as of intellectual vigour

Any one above or below the prescribed ages who takes part in the public hymeneals shall be said to have done an unholy and unrighteous thing the child of which he is the father if it steals into life will have been conceived under auspices very unlike the sacrifices and prayers, which at each hymeneal priestesses and priests and the whole city will offer that the new generation may be better and more useful than their good and useful parents whereas his child will be the off spring of darkness and strange lust

Very true, he replied.

And the same law will apply to any one of those within the prescribed age who forms a connexion with any woman in the prime of life without the sanction of the rulers, for we shall say that he is raising up a bastard to the State, uncertified and unconsecrated.

Very true he replied

This applies however only to those who are within the

specified age after that we allow them to range at will,
 C excep that a man may not marry his daughter or his daughter's
 daughter or his mother or his mother's mother and women
 on the other hand, are prohibited from marrying their sons
 or fathers or son's son or father's father and so on in either
 direction And we grant all this accompanying the permis-
 sion with strict orders to prevent any embryo which may
 come into being from seeing the light and if any force
 a way to the birth the parents must understand that the
 offspring of such a union cannot be maintained and arrange
 accordingly

That also he said, is a reasonable proposition But now
 D will they know who are fathers and daughters and so on?

They will never know The way will be this—dating
 from the day of the hymeneal, the bridegroom who was then
 married will call all the male children who are born in the
 seventh and the tenth month afterwards his sons and the
 female children his daughters and they will call him father
 and he will call their children his grandchildren and they
 will call the elder generation grandfathers and grandmothers
 All who were begotten at the time when their fathers and
 mothers came together will be called their brothers and
 E sisters and these as I was saying will be forbidden to inter-
 marry This however is not to be understood as an absolute
 prohibition of the marriage of brothers and sisters if the lot
 favours them and they receive the sanction of the Pythian
 oracle the law will allow them.

Quite right he replied

Such is the scheme Glaucon according to which the
 guardians of our State are to have their wives and families
 in common And now you would have the argument show

that this community is consistent with the rest of our polity and also that nothing can be better—would you not?

Yes certainly

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Shall we try to find a common basis by asking of ourselves what ought to be the chief aim of the legislator in making laws and in the organization of a State—what is the greatest good, and what is the greatest evil, and then consider whether our previous description has the stamp of the good or of the evil?

By all means

Can there be any greater evil than discord and distraction and plurality where unity ought to reign? or any greater good than the bond of unity?

There cannot

And there is unity where there is community of pleasures and pains—where all the citizens are glad or grieved on the same occasions of joy and sorrow?

No doubt

Yes, and where there is no common but only private feeling a State is disorganized—when you have one half of the world triumphing and the other plunged in grief at the same events happening to the city or the citizens? C

Certainly

Such differences commonly originate in a disagreement about the use of the terms *mine* and *not mine*, *his* and *not his*

Exactly so

And is not that the best-ordered State in which the greatest number of persons apply the terms *mine* and *not mine* in the same way to the same thing?

Quite true.

Or that again which most nearly approaches to the condition of the individual—as in the body when but a finger of one of us is hurt the whole frame drawn towards the soul as a centre and forming one kingdom under the ruling power therein feels the hurt and sympathizes all together with the part affected and we say that the man has a pain in his finger and the same expression is used about any other part of the body which has a sensation of pain at suffering or of pleasure at the alleviation of suffering

Very true he replied and I agree with you that in the best ordered State there is the nearest approach to this common feeling which you describe

Then when any one of the citizens experiences any good or evil the whole State will make his case their own and will either rejoice or sorrow with him?

Yes he said that is what will happen in a well ordered State

It will now be time I said for us to return to our State and see whether this or some other form is most in accordance with these fundamental principles

Very good

463 Our State like every other has rulers and subjects?

True

All of whom will call one another citizens?

Of course

But is there not another name which people give to their rulers in other States?

Generally they call them masters but in democratic States they simply call them rulers

And in our State what other name besides that of citizens do the people give the rulers?

Thy a e called saviours and he pers he replied. B

And what do t e rulers call the people?

Their maintainers and foster fathers

And what do th y call them in othe S es?

Slaves

And v hat do the rulers call one another in other States?

Fellow rulers

And what in ours?

Fellow guardians

Did you ever know an example in any other State of a ruler who would speak o' one of his colleagues s his friend and of another as not being his friend?

Yes very often

And the friend he regards and descr bes as one in whom he has an interest and the other as a stranger in whom he C has no interest?

Exactly

But would any of your guardians think or speak of any other guardian as a stranger?

Certainly he would not fo every one whom they meet v ill be regarded by them either as a brother or sister or father or mother or son or daughter or as the child or parent of those who are thus connected with him

Capital I said , but let me ask you once more Shall they be a family in name only or shall they in all their actions be D true to the name? For example in the use of the word father would the care of a father be implied and the filial reverence and duty and obedience to him which the law commands and is the violator of these duties to be regarded as an impious and unrighteous person who is not likely to receive much good either at the hands of God or of man?

Are these to be or not to be the standards which the people will hear repeated in their ears by all the citizens about those who are intimated to them to be their parents and the rest of their kinsfolk?

- B These he said, and none other for what can be more ridiculous than for them to utter the names of family ties with the lips only and not to act in the spirit of them?

Then in our city the language of harmony and concord will be more often heard than in any other. As I was describing before when any one is well or ill the universal word will be with me it is well or it is ill.

46, Most true

And agreeably to this mode of thinking and speaking were we not saying that they will have their pleasures and pains in common?

Yes and so they will.

And they will have a common interest in the same thing which they will alike call 'my own' and having this common interest they will have a common feeling of pleasure and pain?

Yes far more so than in other States.

And the reason of this over and above the general constitution of the State will be that the guardians will have a community of women and children?

That will be the chief reason.

- B And this unity of feeling we admitted to be the greatest good as was implied in our own comparison of a well ordered State to the relation of the body and the members when affected by pleasure or pain?

That we acknowledged, and very rightly.

Then the community of wives and children among our

citizens clearly the source of the greatest good to the State

Certainly

And this agrees with the other principle which we were affirming—that the guardians were not to have houses or lands or any other property—their pay was to be their food which they were to receive from the other citizens and they were to have no private expenses—for we intended them to preserve their true character of guardians

Right he replied

Both the community of property and the community of families as I am saying tend to make them more truly guardians—they will not tear the city in pieces by differing about mine and not mine—each man dragging any acquisition which he has made into a separate house of his own, where he has a separate wife and children and private pleasures and pains—but all will be affected as far as may be by the same pleasures and pains because they are all of one opinion about what is near and dear to them and therefore they all tend towards a common end

Certainly he replied

And as they have nothing but their persons which they can call their own, suits and complaints will have no existence among them—they will be delivered from all those quarrels of which money or children or relations are the occasion.

Of course they will

Neither will trials for assault or insult ever be likely to occur among them. For that equals should defend themselves against equals we shall maintain to be honourable and right—we shall make the protection of the person a matter of necessity

That's good, he said.

Yes and there is a further good in the law viz that if a man has a quarrel with another he will satisfy his resentment then and there and not proceed to more dangerous lengths

Certainly

To the elder shall be assigned the duty of ruling and chastising the younger

Clearly

Nor can there be a doubt that the younger will not strike or do any other violence to an elder unless the magistrates command him nor will he slight him in any way For there are two guardians shame and fear mighty to prevent him shame, which makes men refrain from laying hands on those who are to them in the relation of parents fear that the injured one will be succoured by the others who are his brothers sons fathers

That is true he replied.

Then in every way the laws will help the citizens to keep the peace with one another?

Yes there will be no want of peace

And as the guardians will never quarrel among themselves there will be no danger of the rest of the city being divided either against them or against one another

None whatever

I hardly like even to mention the little meannesses of which they will be rid, for they are beneath notice such for example, as the flattery of the rich by the poor and all the pains and pangs which men experience in bringing up a family and in finding money to buy necessities for their household, borrowing and then repudiating getting how

they can and giving the money into the hands of women and slaves to keep—the many evils of so many kinds which people suffer in this way are mean enough and obvious enough, and not worth speaking of

Yes, he said a man has no need of eyes in order to perceive that

And from all these evils they will be delivered and their life will be blessed as the life of Olympic victors and yet more blessed

How so?

The Olympic victor I said is deemed happy in receiving a part only of the blessedness which is secured to our citizens who have won a more glorious victory and have a more complete maintenance at the public cost. For the victory which they have won is the salvation of the whole State and the crown with which they and their children are crowned is the fullness of all that life needs they receive rewards from the hands of their country while living and after death have an honourable burial

Yes he said, and glorious rewards they are

Do you remember I said how in the course of the previous discussion¹ some one who shall be nameless accused us of 460 making our guardians unhappy—they had nothing and might have possessed all things—to whom we replied that if an occasion offered, we might perhaps hereafter consider this question but that, as at present advised, we would make our guardians truly guardians and that we were fashioning the State with a view to the greatest happiness, not of any particular class but of the whole?

Yes I remember

And what do you say now that the life of our protectors is made out to be far better and nobler than that of Olympic victors—is the life of shoemakers or any other artisans or of husbandmen to be compared with it?

Certainly not

At the same time I ought here to repeat what I have said elsewhere that if any of our guardians shall try to be happy in such a manner that he will cease to be a guardian and is not content with this safe and harmonious life which in our judgement is of all lives the best but infatuated by some youthful conceit of happiness which gets up into his head shall seek to appropriate the whole state to himself then he will have to learn how wisely Hesiod spoke when he said half is more than the whole

If he were to consult me I should say to him Stay where you are when you have the offer of such a life

You agree then I said that men and women are to have a common way of life such as we have described—common education common children and they are to watch over the citizens in common whether abiding in the city or going out to war they are to keep watch together and to hunt together like dogs and always and in all things as far as they are able, women are to share with the men? And in so doing they will do what is best and will not violate but preserve the natural relation of the sexes

I agree with you he replied

The inquiry I said, has yet to be made whether such a community will be found possible—as among other animals so also among men—and if possible in what way possible?

You have anticipated the question which I was about to suggest.

The e no difficulty I said in seeing how war will be E carried on by them

How

Why of course they will go on expeditions together and will take with them any of their children who are strong enough that after the manner of the artisan's child they may look on at the work which they will have to do when they are grown up and be idle looking on they will have to 467 help and be of use in war and to wait upon their fathers and mothers Did you never observe in the arts how the potters boys look on and help long before they touch the wheel?

Yes I have

And shall potters be more careful in educating their children and in giving them the opportunity of seeing and practising their duties than our guardians will be?

The idea is ridiculous he said

There is also the effect on the parents with whom as with other animals the presence of their young ones will be the strongest incentive to valour

That is quite true Socrates and yet if they are defeated which may often happen in war how great the danger is to the children will be lost as well as their parents and the State will never recover

True, I said but would you never allow them to run any risk?

I am far from saying that

Well but if they are ever to run a risk should they not do so on some occasion when, if they escape disaster, they will be the better for it?

Clearly

Whether the future soldiers do or do not see war in the O

days of their youth is a very important matter for the sake of which some risk may fairly be incurred

Yes very important

This then must be our first step—to make our children spectators of war but we must also contrive that they shall be secured against danger then all will be well

True

Their parents may be supposed not to be blind to the risks of war but to know as far as human foresight can what expeditions are safe and what dangerous?

That may be assumed

And they will take them on the safe expeditions and be cautious about the dangerous ones?

True

And they will place them under the command of experienced veterans who will be their leaders and teachers?

Very properly

Still the dangers of war cannot be always foreseen there is a good deal of chance about them?

True

Then against such chances the children must be at once furnished with wings in order that in the hour of need they may fly away and escape

E What do you mean? he said

I mean that we must mount them on horses in their earliest youth and when they have learnt to ride take them on horseback to see war the horses must not be spirited and warlike but the most tractable and yet the swiftest that can be had In this way they will get an excellent view of what is hereafter to be their own business and if there is danger they have only to follow their elder leaders and escape.

I believe that you are right he said.

Next as to war what are to be the relations of your soldiers to one another and to their enemies? I should be inclined to propose that the soldier who leaves his rank or throws away his arms or is guilty of any other act of cowardice, should be degraded into the rank of a husbandman or artisan. What do you think?

By all means I should say

And he who allows himself to be taken prisoner may as well be made a present of to his enemies he is their lawful prey and let them do what they like with him.

Certainly

B

But the hero who has distinguished himself what shall be done to him? In the first place, he shall receive honour in the army from his youthful comrades every one of them in succession shall crown him. What do you say?

I approve

And what do you say to his receiving the right hand of fellowship?

To that too I agree.

But you will hardly agree to my next proposal

What is your proposal?

That he should kiss and be kissed by them

Most certainly and I should be disposed to go further and say Let no one whom he has a mind to kiss refuse to be kissed by him while the expedition lasts So that if there be a lover in the army whether his love be youth or maiden he may be more eager to win the prize of valour

Capital I said That the brave man is to have more wives than others has been already detected and he is to

have first cho ces in such matters more than others in order that he may have as many children as possible?

Agreed.

Again there is another manner in which according to D Homer brave youths should be honoured for he tells how Ajax¹ after he had distinguished himself in battle was rewarded with long chimes which seems to be a compliment appropriate to a hero in the flower of his age being not only a tribute of honour but also a very strengthening thing

Most true he said

Then in this I said Homer shall be our teache and we too at sacrifices and on the like occasions will honour the brave according to the measure of their valour whether men or women, with hymns and those other distinctions which we were mentioning also with

E seats of precedence and meats and full cups,²
and in honouring them we shall be at the sam time training them

That he replied, s excellent

Yes I said and when a man dies gloriously in war shall we not say in the first place, that he is of the golden race?

To be sure

Nay have we not the authority of Hesiod for affirming hat when they are dead

469 They are holy angels upon the earth, authors of good
averters of evil the guardians of speech gifted men ?³

Yes and we accept his authority

We must learn of he god how we are to order the sepulture

¹ Ilad vii 321

² Ilad viii 162

Probably Works and Days, 121 foll

of divine and heroic personages and what is to be their special disinction and we must do as he bids?

By all means

And in ages to come we will reverence them and kneel before their sepulchres as at the graves of heroes And not only they but any who are deemed pre eminently good whether they die from age or in any other way shall be admitted to the same honours

That is very right he said

Next how shall our soldiers treat their enemies? What about this?

In what respect do you mean?

First of all in regard to slavery? Do you think it right that Hellenes should enslave Hellenic States or allow others to enslave them if they can help? Should not their custom be to spare them considering the danger which there is that the whole race may one day fall under the yoke of the barbarians?

To spare them is infinitely better

Then no Hellene should be owned by them as a slave that is a rule which they will observe and advise the other Hellenes to observe

Certainly he said they will in this way be united against the barbarians and will keep their hands off one another

Next as to the slain, ought the conquerors I said, to take anything but their armour? Does not the practice of despoiling an enemy afford an excuse for not facing the battle? Cowards skulk about the dead, pretending that they are fulfilling a duty and many an army before now has been lost from this love of plunder

Very true

And is there not illiberality and avarice in robbing a corpse and also a degree of meanness and womanishness in making an enemy of the dead body when the real enemy has flown away and left only his fighting gear behind him — is not this rather like a dog who cannot get at his assailant quarrelling with the stones which strike him instead?

Very like a dog he said

Then we must abstain from spoiling the dead or hindering their burial?

Yes he replied we most certainly must

Neither shall we offer up arms at the temples of the gods
 470 least of all the arms of Hellenes if we care to maintain good feeling with other Hellenes and indeed, we have reason to fear that the offering of spoils taken from kinsmen may be a pollution unless commanded by the god himself?

Very true

Again, as to the devastation of Hellenic territory or the burning of houses what is to be the practice?

May I have the pleasure he said of hearing your opinion?

Both should be forbidden, in my judgement I would take
 B the annual produce and no more Shall I tell you why?

Pray do

Why you see there is a difference in the names discord and war and I imagine that there is also a difference in their natures the one is expressive of what is internal and domestic the other of what is external and foreign and the first of the two is termed discord and only the second war

That is a very proper distinction, he replied

C And may I not observe with equal propriety that the Hellenic race is all united together by ties of blood and friendship and alien and strange to the barbarians?

Very good he said.

And the afore when Hellenes fight with barbarians and barbarians with Hellenes they will be described by us as being at war when they fight and by nature enemies and this kind of antagonism should be called war but when Hellenes fight with one another we shall say that Hellas is then in a state of disorder and discord, they being by nature friends and such enmity is to be called discord. D

I agree.

Consider then, I said, when that which we have acknowledged to be discord occurs and a city is divided if both parties destroy the lands and burn the houses of one another how wicked does the strife appear? No true lover of his country would bring himself to tear in pieces his own nurse and mother. There might be reason in the conqueror depriving the conquered of their harvest but still they would have the idea of peace in their hearts and would not mean to go on fighting for ever.

Yes, he said, that is a better temper than the other.

And will not the city which you are founding, be an Hellenic city?

It ought to be, he replied.

Then will not the citizens be good and civilized?

Yes, very civilized.

And will they not be lovers of Hellas and think of Hellas as their own land and share in the common temples?

Most certainly.

And any difference which arises among them will be regarded by them as discord only—a quarrel among friends, 471 which is not to be called a war?

Certainly not.

Then they will quarrel as those who intend some day to be reconciled?

Certainly

They will use friendly correction but will not enslave or destroy their opponents, they will be correctors not enemies?

Just so

And as they are Hellenes themselves they will not devastate Hellas nor will they burn houses nor ever suppose that the whole population of a city—men, women, and children—are equally their enemies for they know that the guilt of war is always confined to a few persons and that the many are their friends. And for all these reasons they will be unwilling to waste their lands and raze their houses their enmity to them will only last until the many innocent sufferers have compelled the guilty few to give satisfaction?

I agree he said, that our citizens should thus deal with their Hellenic enemies and with barbarians as the Hellenes now deal with one another

Then let us enact this law also for our guardians —that they are neither to devastate the lands of Hellenes nor to burn their houses

Agreed and we may agree also in thinking that these, like all our previous enactments are very good

But still I must say Socrates that if you are allowed to go on in this way you will entirely forget the other question which at the commencement of this discussion you thrust aside —Is such an order of things possible and how if at all? For I am quite ready to acknowledge that the plan which you propose if only feasible would do all sorts of good to the State I will add what you have omitted, that your

citizens will be the braves of warriors and will never leave D
their ranks for they will all know one another and each will
call the other father brother son and if you suppose the
women to join their armies whether in the same rank or in
the rear either as a terror to the enemy or as auxiliaries in
case of need I know that they will then be absolutely in-
vincible and there are many domestic advantages which
might also be mentioned and which I also fully acknowledge
but as I admit all these advantages and as many more as E
you please if only this State of yours were to come into
existence, we need say no more about them assuming then
the existence of the State, let us now turn to the question of
possibility and ways and means—the rest may be left

If I loiter¹ for a moment you instantly make a raid upon 472
me I said, and have no mercy I have hardly escaped the
first and second waves and you seem not to be aware that
you are now bringing upon me the third which is the
greatest and heaviest When you have seen and heard the
third wave I think you will be more considerate and will
acknowledge that some fear and hesitation was natural
respecting a proposal so extraordinary as that which I have
now to state and investigate

The more appeals of this sort which you make he said the
more determined are we that you shall tell us how such B
a State is possible speak out and at once

Let me begin by reminding you that we found our way
hither in the search after justice and injustice

True he replied but what of that?

I was only going to ask whether if we have discovered
them we are to require that the just man should in nothing

fall of absolute justice or may we be satisfied with an approximation and the attainment in him of a higher degree of justice than is to be found in other men?

The approximation will be enough

We were inquiring into the nature of absolute justice and into the character of the perfectly just and into injustice and the perfectly unjust that we might have an ideal. We were to look at these in order that we might judge of our own happiness and unhappiness according to the standard which they exhibited and the degree in which we resembled them, but not with any view of showing that they could exist in fact

True he said

Would a painter be any the worse because after having delineated with consummate art an ideal of a perfectly beautiful man he was unable to show that any such man could ever have existed?

He would be none the worse

Well and were we not creating an ideal of a perfect State? To be sure

And is our theory a worse theory because we are unable to prove the possibility of a city being ordered in the manner described?

Surely not he replied

That is the truth, I said. But if at your request I am to try and show how and under what conditions the possibility is highest I must ask you having this in view to repeat your former admissions

What admissions?

I want to know whether ideals are ever fully realized in language? Does not the word express more than the fact and must not the actual, whatever it may think, always

n the nature of things fall short o the truth? Wha do you say

I agree

Then you must not insist on my proving that the actual State will in every respect coincide with the ideal if we are only able to discover how a city may be governed nearly as we proposed you will admit that we have discovered the possibility which you demand and will be contented. I am B sure that I should be contented—will not you?

Yes I will

Let me next endeavour to show what is tl at fault in States which is the cause of their present maladministration and what is the least change which will enable a State to pass into the truer form and let the change if possible be of one thing only or if not of two at any rate the changes be as few and slight as possible

Certainly he replied.

I think, I said that there might be a reform o the State if only one change were made which is not a slight or easy though still a possible one.

What is it? he said.

Now then I said, I go to meet that which I liken to the greatest of the waves yet shall the word be spoken, even though the wave break and drown me in laughter and dishonour and do you mark my words

Proceed

I said *Until philosophers are kings or the k rgs and princes of this world have the spirit and power of philosophy and D political greatness and wisdom meet in one and those commoner natures who pursue either to the exclusion of the other are compelled o stand aside cities will never have rest from their evils — no nor the human race as I believe and then only will this*

E our State have a possibility of life and behold the light of day
Such was the thought my dear Glaucón, which I would fain
have uttered if it had not seemed too extravagant for to be
convinced that in no other State can there be happiness
private or public is indeed a hard thing

Socrates, what do you mean? I would have you consider
that the word which you have uttered is one at which
numerous persons and very respectable persons too in
a figure pulling off their coats all in a moment, and seizing
any weapon that comes to hand, will run at you might and
main before you know where you are intending to do
heaven knows what and if you don't prepare an answer
and put yourself in motion, you will be pelted by their fine
wits and no mistake

You got me into the scrape I said

And I was quite right however I will do all I can to get
you out of it but I can only give you goodwill and good
advice and perhaps I may be able to fit answers to your
questions better than another—that is all And now having
such an auxiliary you must do your best to show the un-
believers that you are right

I ought to try I said since you offer me such invaluable
assistance And I think that, if there is to be a chance of
our escaping we must explain to them whom we mean when
we say that philosophers are to rule in the State then we
shall be able to defend ourselves There will be discovered
to be some natures who ought to study philosophy and to be
leaders in the State and others who are not born to be philo-
sophers and are meant to be followers rather than leaders

Then now for a definition he said.

Follow me, I said, and I hope that I may in some way or
other be able to give you a satisfactory explanation.

P o e d

I dare say that you remember and therefore I need not remind you that a lover if he is worthy of the name ought to show his love not to some one part of that which he loves but to the whole

I really do not understand and therefore beg of you to assist my memory

Another person I said might fairly reply as you do but a man of pleasure like yourself ought to know that all who are in the flower of youth do somehow or other raise a pang or emotion in a lover's breast and are thought by him to be worthy of his affectionate regards Is not this a way which you have with the first one has a snub nose and you praise his charming face the hook nose of another has you say a royal look while he who is neither snub nor hooked has the grace of regularity the dark visage is manly the fair are children of the gods and as to the sweet honey pale as they are called what is the very name but the invention of a lover who talks in diminutives and is not averse to paleness if appearing on the cheek of youth? In a word there is no excuse which you will not make and nothing which you will not say in order not to lose a single flower that blooms in the springtime of youth

If you make me an authority in matters of love for the sake of the argument I assent

And what do you say of lovers of wine? Do you not see them doing the same? They are glad of any pretext of drinking any wine

Very good.

And the same is true of ambitious men if they cannot command an army they are willing to command a file and if they cannot be honoured by really great and important

persons they are glad to be honoured by lesser and meaner people—but honour of some kind they must have

Exactly

Once more let me ask Does he who desires any class of goods desire the whole class or a part only?

The whole

And may we not say of the philosopher that he is a lover not of a part of wisdom only but of the whole?

Yes of the whole?

And he who dislikes learning especially in youth, when he has no power of judging what is good and what is not such an one we maintain not to be a philosopher or a lover of knowledge just as he who refuses his food is not hungry and may be said to have a bad appetite and not a good one?

Very true, he said

Whereas he who has a taste for every sort of knowledge and who is curious to learn and is never satisfied, may be justly termed a philosopher? Am I not right?

D Glaucon said If curiosity makes a philosopher you will find many a strange being will have a title to the name All the lovers of sights have a delight in learning and must therefore be included. Musical amateurs too are a folk strangely out of place among philosophers for they are the last persons in the world who would come to anything like a philosophical discussion if they could help while they run about at the Dionysiac festivals as if they had let out their ears to hear every chorus whether the performance is in town or country—that makes no difference—they are there Now are we to maintain that all these and any who have similar tastes as well as the professors of quite minor arts are philosophers?

Certainly not I replied they are only an imitation.

He said Who then are the true philosophers?

Those I said who are lovers of the vision of truth

That is also good, he said but I should like to know what you mean?

To another I replied I might have a difficulty in explaining but I am sure that you will admit a proposition which I am about to make

What is the proposition?

That since beauty is the opposite of ugliness they are two?

Certainly

And inasmuch as they are two each of them is one: 476

True again.

And of just and unjust good and evil and of every other class the same remark holds taken singly each of them is one but from the various combinations of them with actions and things and with one another they are seen in all sorts of lights and appear many?

Very true

And this is the distinction which I draw between the sight loving and loving practical class and those of whom I am speaking and who are alone worthy of the name of philosophers

How do you distinguish them? he said

The lovers of sounds and sights I replied are as I conceive fond of fine tones and colours and forms and all the artificial products that are made out of them but their mind is incapable of seeing or loving absolute beauty

True he replied

Few are they who are able to attain to the sight of this

Very true

And he who having a sense of beautiful things has no sense of absolute beauty or who if another lead him to a knowledge of that beauty is unable to follow—of such a

one I ask Is he awake or in a dream only? Reflect is not the dreamer sleeping or waking or who likens dissimilar things who puts the copy in the place of the real object?

I should certainly say that such an one was dreaming

But take the case of the other who recognises the existence of absolute beauty and is able to distinguish the idea from the objects which participate in the idea neither putting the objects in the place of the idea nor the idea in the place of the objects—is he a dreamer or is he awake?

He is wide awake

And may we not say that the mind of the one who knows has knowledge and that the mind of the other who opines only has opinion?

Certainly

But suppose that the latter should quarrel with us and dispute our statement can we administer any soothing cordial or advice to him without revealing to him that there is sad disorder in his wits?

We must certainly offer him some good advice he replied

Come then, and let us think of something to say to him Shall we begin by assuring him that he is welcome to any knowledge which he may have and that we are rejoiced at his having it? But we should like to ask him a question Does he who has knowledge know something or nothing? (You must answer for him)

I answer that he knows something

Something that is or is not?

Something that is for how can that which is not ever be known?

7 And are we assured, after looking at the matter from many points of view that absolute being is or may be absolutely known, but that the utterly non-existent is utterly unknown?

Nothing can be more certain.

Good But if there be anything which is of such a nature as to be and not to be that will have a place intermediate between pure being and the absolute negation of being?

Yes between them

And as knowledge corresponded to being and ignorance of necessity to not being for that intermediate between being and not being there has to be discovered a corresponding intermediate between ignorance and knowledge if there be such?

Certainly

Do we admit the existence of opinion?

Undoubtedly

As being the same with knowledge or another faculty?

Another faculty

Then opinion and knowledge have to do with different kinds of matter corresponding to this difference of faculties?

Yes

And knowledge is relative to being and knows being But before I proceed further I will make a division

What division?

I will begin by placing faculties in a class by themselves C they are powers in us, and in all other things, by which we do as we do Sight and hearing for example I should call faculties Have I clearly explained the class which I mean?

Yes I quite understand.

Then let me tell you my view about them I do not see them, and therefore the distinctions of figure, colour and the like which enable me to discern the differences of some things do not apply to them. In speaking of a faculty I think

I only of its sphere and its result and that which has the same sphere and the same result I call the same faculty but that which has another sphere and another result I call different. Would that be your way of speaking?

Yes

And will you be so very good as to answer one more question? Would you say that knowledge is a faculty or in what class would you place it?

Certainly knowledge is a faculty and the mightiest of all faculties

E And is opinion also a faculty?

Certainly he said for opinion is that with which we are able to form an opinion

And yet you were acknowledging a little while ago that knowledge is not the same as opinion?

Why yes he said how can any reasonable being ever identify that which is infallible with that which errs

478 An excellent answer proving I said, that we are quite conscious of a distinction between them

Yes

Then knowledge and opinion having distinct powers have also distinct spheres or subject matters?

That is certain

Being is the sphere or subject matter of knowledge and knowledge is to know the nature of being?

Yes

And opinion is to have an opinion?

Yes

And do we know what we opine? or is the subject matter of opinion the same as the subject matter of knowledge?

Nay he replied that has been already disproven if difference in faculty implies difference in the sphere or

subject matter and if as we were saying opinion and knowledge are distinct faculties then the sphere of knowledge and of opinion cannot be the same

Then if being is the subject matter of knowledge something else must be the subject matter of opinion?

Yes something else

Well then is not being the subject matter of opinion? or rather how can there be an opinion at all about not being? Reflect when a man has an opinion has he not an opinion about something? Can he have an opinion on which is an opinion about nothing?

Impossible

How can he have an opinion about something

Yes

And not being is not one thing but properly speaking, nothing C

True

Of not being ignorance was assumed to be the necessary correlative of being knowledge?

True he said.

Then opinion is not concerned either with being or with not being?

Not with either

And can therefore neither be ignorance nor knowledge?

That seems to be true

But is opinion to be sought without and beyond either of them in a greater clearness than knowledge or in a greater darkness than ignorance?

In neither

Then I suppose that opinion appears to you to be darker than knowledge, but lighter than ignorance?

Both and in no small degree

D And also to be within and between them?

Yes

Then you would infer that opinion is intermediate?

No question

But were we not saying before, that if anything appeared to be of a sort which is and is not at the same time that sort of thing would appear also to lie in the interval between pure being and absolute not being and that the corresponding faculty is neither knowledge nor ignorance, but will be found in the interval between them?

True

And in that interval there has now been discovered something which we call opinion?

There has

E Then what remains to be discovered is the object which partakes equally of the nature of being and not being and cannot rightly be termed either pure and simple this unknown term, when discovered we may truly call the subject of opinion and assign each to their proper faculty—the extremes to the faculties of the extremes and the mean to the faculty of the mean

True

479 This being premised, I would ask the gentleman who is of opinion that there is no absolute or unchangeable idea of beauty—in whose opinion the beautiful is the manifold—he I say you, lover of beautiful sights who cannot bear to be told that the beautiful is one and the just is one or that anything is one—to him I would appeal saying Will you be so very kind, sir as to tell us whether of all these beautiful things there is one which will not be found ugly or of the just which will not be found unjust or of the holy which will not also be unholy?

No he replied the beautiful will in some point of view be found ugly and the same is true of the rest

And may not the many which are doubles be also halves?—doubles that is of one thing and halves of another?

Quite true

And things great and small heavy and light, as they are termed, will not be denoted by these any more than by the opposite names?

True both these and the opposite names will always attach to all of them

And can any one of those many things which are called by particular names be said to be this rather than not to be this?

He replied They are like the punning riddles which are asked at feasts or the children's puzzle about the eunuch aiming at the bat with what he hit him as they say in the puzzle and upon what the bat was sitting The individual objects of which I am speaking are also a riddle and have a double sense nor can you fix them in your mind either as being or not being or both or neither

Then what will you do with them? I said Can they have a better place than between being and not being? For they are clearly not in greater darkness or negation than not being, or more full of light and existence than being D

That is quite true, he said

Thus then we seem to have discovered that the many ideas which the multitude entertain about the beautiful and about all other things are tossing about in some region which is half way between pure being and pure not being?

We have

Yes and we had before agreed that anything of this kind which we might find was to be described as matter of opinion, and not as matter of knowledge being the intermediate

flux which is caught and detained by the intermediate faculty

Quite true

E Then those who see the many beautiful and who yet neither see absolute beauty nor can follow any guide who points the way thither who see th many just and not absolute justice and the like —such persons may be said to have opinion but not knowledge?

That is certain.

But those who see the absolute and eternal and immutable may be said to know and not to have opinion only?

Neither can that be denied

The one love and embrace the subjects of knowledge the other those of opinion? The latter are the same as I dare
480 say you will remember, who listened to sweet sounds and gazed upon fair colours but would not tolerate the existence of absolute beauty

Yes I remember

Shall we then be guilty of any impropriety in calling them lovers of opinion rather than lovers of wisdom and will they be very angry with us for thus describing them?

I shall tell them not to be angry no man should be angry at what is true

But those who love the truth in each th ng are o be called lovers of wisdom and not lovers of opinion

Assuredly

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